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Information modeling is focused on representing, using, and exchanging information in
large-scale applications that include law-enforcement, healthcare, e-commerce, and
others. Information modeling, as achieved by varied data formats, creates new security
challenges. First, there is a need to integrate the security requirements of existing
information applications that use and exchange information in via tree-structured
documents. Second, there exists a need to consolidate this security in support of a newly
developed information system. Third, we ask if is it possible to develop an approach for
security for information applications that is able to reconcile the security policies across
potential constituent component systems in an information exchange scenario. In this
dissertation we present a security framework aimed towards an approach to modeling the
security of information at global and local levels. This framework leverages the three
major access control models: RBAC, LBAC, and DAC to achieve security assurance
throughout varied scenarios. First, we introduce a security model that creates the base for
the rest of the framework. This security model considers the access control requirements
as realized in tree-structured documents with schemas. Second, we extend UML model
and metamodel layers with new diagrams that provide a graphical notation for the
security model. Third, we present a mapping process between the UML diagrams and the
XACML that yields security policies ready to be deployed. Last, towards the overall
purpose of the dissertation, we advance the information security problem to a software
engineering perspective, elevating information security to a first-class citizen of the
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software design and development process, resulting in secure information engineering.
By tackling the problem from a perspective of tree-structured documents, any data format
that is represented by such a structure (e.g. XML, specialized JSON structures, RDF,
OWL, etc.) can be secured. This effectively allows us to provide separation of concerns
with respect to information security by defining security requirements in one software
process phase and generating enforcement policies in another phase. These enforcement
policies are not embedded in the system, on the contraire, they are agents evaluated and
enforced in the overall security architecture of the application.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information modeling is focused on representing, using, and exchanging information
in large-scale applications that include: law-enforcement repositories that use the model
minimum uniform crash criteria data model standard (Ogle, Alluri, & Sarasua, 2011);
healthcare collaborative and non-collaborative scenarios that use the Health Level 7‘s
clinical document architecture (Alschuler, Mair, Boyer, & Dolin, 2002; Dolin et al., 2006)
or the continuity of care record (Ferranti, Musser, Kawamoto, & Hammond, 2006; Kibbe,
2005; Kibbe, Phillips, & Green, 2004) to store all types of data associated with patients;
and, cXML (Merkow, 1999) for e-commerce communication between procurement
applications. These information systems may support a wide range of data formats such
as: the eXtensible Markup Language (Bray, Paoli, Sperberg-McQueen, Maler, & Yergeau,
1998) that models documents as schemas and instances; the resource definition
framework (Klyne, Carroll, & McBride, 2004) that brings semantics to the web; the web
ontology language (McGuinness & Van Harmelen, 2004) that is used for applications that
need to process semantic information instead of just its presentation; and, the JavaScript
Object Notation (Crockford, 2006; Lanthaler & Gütl, 2012), which uses a programming
like notation to model data interchange; etc. These information applications data often
have a tree structure of index and entity nodes that allows for information to be modeled
via schemas (that define structure) which can be used as blueprints for the creation of
new documents (instances) and their validation (enforcement). In such settings, where
sensitive data is utilized by users for time-critical applications, security that is achieved
via access control is a paramount concern. These applications all present unique
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challenges to the objective of providing a high-degree of protection to information. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.1, where a role-based access control (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila,
Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2001; Liebrand, Ellis, Phillips, & Ting, 2002) approach is
represented as a user attempting to access the instances of an application. This is
accomplished by utilizing the role of the user to determine the required instances of the
application that are authorized by role to the user (top half of Figure 1.1) which is
balanced with the enforcement of the access of the relevant instances via security
schemas for roles, users, and constraints, that are able to filter the application instances
before they are delivered to the user (bottom half of Figure 1.1). In the scenario as given
in Figure 1.1, the ability to provide granular access control in support of information
modeling for structured documents is based on security policies defined in an local
manner (e.g., institutions) and guidance defined and enforced at a more global scope
(e.g., legal entities and active pieces of legislation), has proven to be difficult to achieve.
From a system perspective, today‘s information applications are designed and
developed with the purpose of leveraging multiple technologies. Offering multiple
application programming interfaces (APIs), cloud computing capabilities, web services
such as the representational state transfer (Masse, 2011) and simple object access
protocol (Parastatidis, Webber, Woodman, Kuo, & Greenfield, 2005), data mining
capabilities, etc., have in turn increased the number of data formats (XML, RDF, JSON,
OWL, etc.) used to both represent (model) and exchange information. In turn, the usage
and information exchange of data has increased across information applications such as
library repositories, collaborative environments, healthcare, etc., accompanied by the
development of standardized document structures that promote and simplify
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interconnection between systems and applications. As a process, information exchange
involves more than one system with one or more applications, with the purpose to either
provide a consolidated view of data stored in different repositories, or the transmission of
data from one repository to another so that consistency of information is preserved.
Application
Schemas

Application
Schemas

User’s Role Determines
the Scope of Access
to Each Document

Application
Instances

Security Schemas
n Role Schema
n User Schema
n Constraint Schema

Application

Security Officer
Generates Security
Application Schemas

Filtered
Instances
Appl_Role.xml
Appl _User.xml
Appl_Constraint.xml

Figure 1.1: Document-based Secure Information Access.
Information modeling as achieved by varied data formats creates new security
challenges. First, there is a need to integrate the security requirements of existing
information applications that use and exchange information in via tree-structured
documents. Second, there exists a need to consolidate this security in support of a newly
developed information system. Third, we ask if is it possible to develop an approach for
security for information applications that is able to reconcile the security policies across
the constituent component systems in order to control the instances that are utilized and
shared. These three challenges in turn drive us to the main research questions that involve
the ability to bring together multiple systems in support of a larger overriding information
application. How do we provide a solution at an information modeling level that operates
across various contexts? Is there be an approach that is capable of integrating the local
security of the individual interacting information systems into some higher-level global
security mechanism? Is it possible to integrate different access control models (e.g.,
3

lattice-based access control (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993), role-based access control (RBAC)
(Ferraiolo et al., 2001), and discretionary access control (DAC) (Dittrich, Hartig, &
Pfefferle, 1989; Downs, Rub, Kung, & Jordan, 1985; Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)) into a
single framework that is capable to providing a diverse and flexible approach to
information security? Finally, how can we enforce security across multiple interoperating
systems? The constituent systems, services, and technologies might have a varied field of
security requirements realized through different security approaches. The main challenge
for a newly developed information application that employs tree-structured document
formats is to utilize to all of the resources that are available in the constituent information
systems allowing their secure access to be achieved.
The work presented in this dissertation provides a framework that allows for treestructure documents for a new information application to be modeled, utilized, and
exchanged in conjunction with the constituent information systems (and their documents
and services). The proposed work supports the definition of security at a model level
(schemas) that is then enforced on the executing information application to customize the
information (instances) that is to be utilized and exchanged. Specifically, the proposed
work seeks to control the information security of an application by providing the ability
to define access control permissions across LBAC, RBAC, and DAC for the information
schemas in an application and their respective instances. For LBAC, the ability to define
sensitivity levels (clearance for users and classifications for data) for tree structured
documents (at the schema level) that provide a robust access control mechanism to
control what can be seen from each authorized instance. For RBAC, the ability to define
on with specific permissions on the tree structured documents (at the schema level) that
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are then filtered to show custom instances that is delivered to a user is a needed
requirement. Lastly, for DAC, the capability of defining authorizations that can be
delegated from one user to another allows the access control (LBAC and/or RBAC) at the
schema level to be delegated. Why are the three major access control models important?
The answer is that they are targeting across the spectrum of the possible domains, from ecommerce to healthcare, banking, infrastructure and national defense
The result of all of these supports fine-grained access control of instances for: nondestructive (document-level) operations that utilize instances as a source of information
(e.g., read and aggregate); destructive (document-level) operations that alter instance(s)
to reflect a change (e.g., insert, update, delete); and, other types of operations (policylevel) that act on the instance as a whole and not in the intrinsic data found within (e.g.
authorizations). As a result, our work provides a security framework and an associated
security model that supports all of the aforementioned access control capabilities for
large-scale information applications in domains such as healthcare, e-commerce, national
defense, etc. The intent of this dissertation is to define a security for framework for treestructured information modeling formats that use schemas to concretely specify structure
that are enforceable via generated security policies at the instance level to deliver only the
information required and nothing more to the end user of an information application
across LBAC, RBAC, and DAC access control models. The end result will include a
secure information engineering process and the generation of security policies to enforce
the define security against an application‘s schemas (design time) and instances (run
time).
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1.1 Motivation for the Healthcare Domain
The healthcare domain, where patient information is modeled and utilized by a wide
range of stakeholders is a prime example of a large-scale information application that
heavily relies on tree-structured information modeling for the operation and exchange of
medical data. In the healthcare domain, XML has emerged as the de-facto standard of
information exchange. XML provides an extensible tree-structure for information design
via documents that is machine readable and easy to process, combined with the ability to
design and develop schemas for document instance validation. The existence of XML
standards (e.g. HL7 CDA, CCR, etc.) in healthcare for representations and their use by
numerous health information technology (HIT) systems dictate the need for a new layer
of functionality: the ability to secure and enforce access control of an information
application that is designed and constructed to use data from constituent local systems in
a more global manner. In the United States, federal laws like the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (Annas, 2003; Baumer, Earp, & Payton, 2006) of 1996
provide guidance on not only who can access information, but on how it is to be
transmitted, disclosed and distributed; and countries throughout the world have similar
laws. Another example legislation of the United States healthcare system, the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH act enforcement
interim final rule.2014) Act of 2009, which aims to promote the adoption and meaningful
use of health information technology while addressing the privacy and security concerns
of electronic transmission of private patient information and health information exchange
(HIE); and again, there are international efforts and ongoing efforts on electronic usage of
patient data/HIE. Providing a solution for security in scenarios like these needs to
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consider all the elements in play (legal constructs, system‘s requirements, capabilities,
technologies, etc.) and must be able to integrate the essential components in a sensible
way. In support of this, as shown in the right hand side of Figure 1.2, the proposed
security framework is comprised of multiple access control mechanisms, the algorithms
and infrastructure for permission definition that are used for policy generation. The
bottom of the figure shows the generated policies that are filtered for delivery to the end
user.
To illustrate, consider a healthcare information application – a system of systems built as a combination of constituent HIT systems (right hand side of Figure 1.2), where
each one can have their own local security policies. The example is focused on a
healthcare information application composed of: two electronic health records (EHRs),
OpenEMR (Sainz de Abajo & Ballestero, 2012) and Practice Fusion (Practice
fusion.2014)), utilized by a hospital, clinic or medical provider; a personal health record
(PHR) Microsoft HealthVault (Microsoft HealthVault.2014) for patients to manage their
own health information; and, a patient portal (PP) that provides a means for
appointments, referrals, and interactions with a medical provider. The bottom right shows
two information applications: PHA and SMARTSYNC. Personal Health Assistant (PHA)
which consists of two related mobile health applications for health information
management, one that supports a patient/healthcare provider scenario where the patient
can authorize a subset of the PHI (CCR instance) stored in MSHV to different providers
at different time, and a second that allows providers to select and view the authorized PHI
on a patient-by-patient basis. SMARTSync for medication reconciliation (Ziminski, De la
Rosa Algarín, A., Saripalle, Demurjian, & Jackson, 2012), takes patient medications from
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MSHV and the Harvard SMART Platform Electronic Medical Record (EMR) and from
this information is able to generate a summary list of medications/supplements added by
patients (in MSHV) with those prescribed by a patient’s medical provider to generate a
color-coded list of potential overmedication, adverse interactions, and adverse reactions
for the patient and provider. Both PHA and SMARTSYNC need to utilize local security
policies of the constituent HIT systems (OpenEMR, MSHV, etc.) guided by the security
requirements and capabilities (access control models, and/or permissions) of those
constituent systems in order to construct a global security policy that integrates and their
security capability/model/policy (left side of Figure 1.2).
For the purposes of this dissertation, the healthcare application as shown in the left
hand side of Figure 1.2 will support multiple access control models (LBAC, RBAC, and
DAC), which in healthcare would support the definition of security policies on an treestructured documents (patient data) at the schema level can then be used to specify (allow
or deny) different permissions on certain portions of the schema‘s instances. This will
allow the same instance to appear differently to specific users (patients and medical
providers) acting in a chosen role at different times, with the ability to severely limit
access to data (using LBAC classifications to protect mental health data that is more
restrictive under HIPAA) while simultaneously allowing authority to be delegated (so that
a provider in an emergent situation can get the authority to access a system s/he has not
previously been asked to use). To accomplish this, we leverage a secure information
engineering process that promotes the consideration of security at the early stage of the
software development and continued throughout the process. In healthcare, the use of an
XML schema for an information application requires a security framework for that tree-
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structured schema that allows the design, implementation, and deployment of an
enforceable security policy to allow access to instances to be precisely controlled by role,
security level, or delegation authority. The definition of security at the schema level
separates the security from the instances, which avoids the overhead required when
updating security policies that would otherwise be embedded in the instances themselves.
Figure 1.2 demonstrated that data will be obtained from different systems that have their
own local security policy, and in some cases, there may be the need to translate the data
from a local source into an tree-structured format such as XML in order to define the
local security policy and allow the information to be shared, as shown by the DOC-C
yellow diamond in Figure 1.2. As a result, for the research in this dissertation, we
generalize from a security framework with a tree-structure information model with varied
access control (LBAC, RBAC, and DAC) that is able to generate security policies for
enforcement to a detailed example of the specialization of our approach to where XML is
the information format.
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Figure 1.2: Interplay of Information in the Healthcare Domain between Computational
Systems.
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Security for healthcare goes well beyond the needs of compliance of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which provides a set of security
guidelines in the usage, transmission, and sharing of protected health information (PHI);
protecting personally identifiable information (PII), including names, addresses,
accounts, credit card numbers, etc.; encryption of PHI and PII data and its secure
transition (e.g. SSL); extensive usage of standards such as the Health Level Seven‘s
(HL7) clinical document architecture (CDA) (Bilykh, Jahnke, McCallum, & Price, 2006)
and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) for storage of administrative, patient
demographics, and clinical data; and the leveraging of XML for a wide range of
healthcare standards (CDA, CCR, LOINC, SNOMED, UMLS). Instead, to attain security
for healthcare, we will need all of these underlying technologies and standards that must
be coupled with a strong understanding of the way that healthcare data is utilized by a
wide range of stakeholders, including patients, providers, researchers, etc. In HIT
systems, CDA and CCR come together in various systems such as EHRs for
organizations to manage patient data, PHRs like Microsoft HealthVault for patients to
track their health history; and, PPs where a patient can make appointments, order refills,
request referrals, etc., as shown in Figure 1.2.
As CDA and CCR documents are circulated among various systems and made
available to particular users with specific needs, we must expand security from each
individual local system to a focus that is more expansive in controlling a CCR document
and its content, particularly for HIE, and in the rapidly emerging mobile healthcare
domain, where patients manage personal health information for chronic diseases and need
to securely access information and authorize its exchange with medical providers via
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mobile applications, EHRs, secure emails, or other means. This will require documentlevel access control of XML schemas to allow XML instances to appear differently to
authorized users at specific times based on criteria that include, but are not limited to, a
user‘s role, time and value constraints on data usage, collaboration for sharing data,
delegation of authority, etc.
The emerging trends in healthcare are all strongly tied to information usage, sharing,
and exchange, across a wide range of medical initiatives related to patient care. First, a
Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH) (Reid et al., 2009; Zajac, Norris, & Keenum,
2014) that is targeted toward coordinating chronic conditions and optimizing care plays
by interacting with multiple stakeholders (e.g., specialists, therapists, visiting nurses); in
this situation, there may be a need for the lead provider to access information in other
EHRs, PHRs, PPs, etc., in a timely manner. Second, accountable care organizations
(ACOs) (Accountable care organizations.2011) that bring together larger groups of
providers, clinics, and hospitals in an effort to give coordinated care to Medicare patients,
which is particularly for chronic conditions, attempts to eliminate duplicate test and
procedures. Third, secondary use (SU) (Safran et al., 2007) of clinical data that allows
both providers and researchers to analyze specific diseases and their treatments across a
large patient base via a clinical research data warehouses (CRDW), seeking events such
adverse drug reactions, infection monitoring, disease monitoring in a larger population.
Fourth, personalized medicine (PM) (Hamburg & Collins, 2010) which is targeting to
treat individual based on their unique medical profiles which might include specific types
of diseases and focus on the use of a patient‘s genomic information. In support of all of
these initiatives, secure information engineering is vital to insure that the correct data is
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available at the specific time by the appropriate stakeholder. In support of all of these
initiatives, secure information engineering for information applications as shown in
Figure 1.2 is vital to insure that the correct data is available at the specific time by the
appropriate stakeholder. Note that what is shared in an HIE implementation is determined
by the institute (practice, clinic, hospital, etc.) that owns the data; it doesn‘t mean all data
is shared and the data to be shared is often offloaded into another server particularly
intended for that purpose PCMH, ACO, SU, and PM support this infrastructure from
three viewpoints: the reconciliation of security (both local and global) within the
environment to insure that the required clinical data reaches the medical providers
involved in PCMH and PM; the availability of de-identified patient data for providers and
clinical researchers, in support of ACO and SU, that can be used for data analysis,
mining, and clinical decision support in order to learn about what works and what doesn‘t
in terms of treatments of various illnesses and diseases; the facilitation of the first two
perspectives via the use of the eXtensible Markup Language and all of the associated
standard, and terminologies. To demonstrate document-level security aspects of the work
in this proposal, we use a healthcare and CCR case study of the Personal Health Assistant
(PHA) application, which consists of two related mobile health applications for health
information management, one that supports a patient/healthcare provider scenario where
the patient can authorize a subset of the PHI (CCR instance) stored in MSHV to different
providers at different time, and a second that allows providers to select and view the
authorized PHI on a patient-by-patient basis.
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1.2 Problem Statement
The security framework in this dissertation is aimed towards a comprehensive
approach to modeling the security of an information application in support of efforts such
as PCMU, etc., at global and local levels operating within an environment that is driven
to use, share, and exchange, and having to deal with the distributed nature of repositories,
the fragmentation of data across these constituent HIT systems, and differences on
sharing and security policies across them. Towards this purpose, we advance the
information security problem to a software engineering perspective, elevating
information security to a first-class citizen of the software design and development
process. This secure information engineering is accomplished by leveraging and
extending the Unified Modeling Language (Fowler, 2004) and the Meta-Object Facility
(Poernomo, 2006) M2 layer with new constructs. With these new constructs, the security
framework for secure information engineering and enforcement can provide guidance and
structure for secure information usage and exchange. By tackling the problem from a
perspective of tree-structured documents, any data format that is represented by such a
structure (e.g. XML, specialized JSON structures, RDF, OWL, etc.) can be secured. This
effectively allows us to provide separation of concerns with respect to information
security by defining security requirements in one software process phase and generating
enforcement policies in another phase. These enforcement policies are not embedded in
the system, on the contraire, they are agents evaluated and enforced in the overall security
architecture of the application.
In this dissertation, the initial high-level view of our information security framework
(De la Rosa Algarín, A., Demurjian, Berhe, & Pavlich-Mariscal, 2012; De la Rosa
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Algarín, A., Ziminski, Demurjian, Kuykendall, & Rivera Sánchez, 2013; De la Rosa
Algarín, A., Ziminski, Demurjian, Rivera Sanchez, & Kuykendall, 2013; De la Rosa
Algarín, A., Demurjian, Ziminski, Rivera Sanchez, & Kuykendall, 2013) for information
usage, sharing, and exchange can be defined as given in Figure 1.3. Security (via access
control models) is defined at the schema level and realized at the instance level through
the creation and generation of eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (Godik,
Anderson, Parducci, Humenn, & Vajjhala, 2002) policies (as shown by the Information
Security Extensions to UML box). Figure 1.3 illustrate the overall proposed information
security framework, which starts with the ability for a designer to pick and choose to
create local XACML security policies of constituent information systems (e.g.
SchemaCIS1, SchemaCIS1, SchemaCIS3, SchemaCIS4) and policies for meta-systems (e.g.
SchemaLSIA1 and SchemaLSIA2) for applications (in HIT, these would be EHRs, PHRs,
PPs, etc.). The resulting information security framework achieves granular security by
taking the generated XACML policies and enforcing them on the targeted schemas and
instances via a combination of schema modeling, policy definition and policy generation,
as shown in the second horizontal box in Figure 1.3. These policies support the three
major access control models (LBAC, RBAC and DAC), as shown in the third horizontal
box in Figure 1.3, and provide a custom or filtered view based on role, user clearance
against data classification, and delegated authority.
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Figure 1.3: Information Security framework in a Healthcare Scenario.
Our approach provides separation of security concerns to tackle the challenge of
changing security policies that can apply to multiple instances. This framework is built by
leveraging prior work on secure software engineering using UML (Pavlich-Mariscal,
Demurjian, & Michel, 2008), which proposed the creation of new UML-like diagrams for
the NIST RBAC, MAC and DAC models that were consistent with an object-oriented
design paradigm. In our work, we adopt these ideas but apply them in order to create new
UML diagrams that can capture tree-structured schemas, roles, sensitivity levels,
delegation rules and authorization rules that allow privileges on an application‘s schemas
(see the fourth horizontal box in Figure 1.3) to be allowed and/or denied to different users
different times. All of these applications require that the document that is delivered to a
user be restricted by role (a filtering of the content of the instance), by security level
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(sensitivity of data vs. clearance of user), and by delegation of authority, in order to
insure that only the authorized information is provided to the user; these are referred to as
security enforced instances that have gone through potentially multiple levels of security
until the instances has reached a state where it can be safely presented to a user. The end
result, shown in the bottom horizontal box in Figure 1.3, are generated security policy
models for the new systems.
By achieving this security framework for tree-structured schemas and instances,
leveraging three major components (UML, XACML and access control models: LBAC,
RBAC and DAC), we present a model-driven approach to document-level security and
policy generation. Our intent is to bring together the processes of software engineering
and knowledge engineering overlaid with a security emphasis, resulting in a broader
definition of secure information engineering, a term that we mean to denote a
comprehensive process that leverages both software and knowledge engineering in order
to emphasize on their information to be secured. In turn, designers can follow a secure
information engineering process model to achieve both the modeling and security
definition of an application. In the perspective of information exchange, the documentlevel security framework for tree-structured documents produces local security policies
that act on the system being engineered and developed. Utilizing the extensions to UML
with respect to LBAC, RBAC and DAC, we can also integrate these local policies into an
all-encompassing meta-policy that can be utilized by a newly developed meta-system
(system of systems).
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1.3 Research Objectives and Expected Contributions
From the research perspective, the problem of secure information and sharing is
achieved by realizing the following expected contributions.
A. Security Model and Access Control Integration: The contribution of this aspect
of our work is to provide a security model that leverages the RBAC, LBAC and
DAC models with support for their capabilities and features, facilitating the
extension of modeling components (such as UML diagrams) to realize granular
information security across different access control concepts. Towards this
objective, we have defined a proper security model that generalizes away from
XML and moves towards the security of tree-structured documents. In this
contribution, we assert that RBAC and LBAC features are orthogonal (nonconflicting).
B. UML Extensions for Tree-structured Document Security: The contribution of
this aspect of our work is to represent a tree-structured schema as an UML-like
diagram which is augmented with security features that capture the core aspects of
the three main access control models: LBAC, RBAC, and DAC. To date, we have
developed two new UML diagrams: the Document Schema Class Diagram
(DSCD), which is a generalization of the XML Schema Class Diagram (XSCD),
to represent a tree-structured schema as an UML-like diagram; and, the Document
Role-Slice Diagram (DRSD), a generalization of the XML Role Slice Diagram
(XRSD), to represent RBAC security. Representing the tree-structured schemas
with these diagrams permits us to tackle document security from an information
engineering perspective. This provides several benefits, including a more
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consistent process towards secure information engineering, and facilitating the
secure policy generation process by utilizing modeling artifacts that contain all
the pertinent information for the security policy.
C. Security Policy Generation: The intent of this objective is to leverage XML and
UML for an automatic policy Creation. This is achieved via a mapping from the
new UML security diagrams for LBAC, RBAC and DAC, and the Oasis XACML
(Godik et al., 2002) Policy structure, which can be used as part of an enforcement
mechanism to assure security. Towards this contribution, we have also introduced
a mapping algorithm that considers LBAC, RBAC and DAC security components
and integrates them into a single enforcement policy for a required application.
D. Secure Information Engineering: This contribution provides a secure
information engineering process to systems information by focusing on the
perspective of the information to be secured. As shown in Figure 1.3, this secure
information engineering process involves the security model by modeling the
tree-structured schemas to be secured with the respective access control models
(Contribution A), the use of UML diagram and metamodel extensions that realize
the security model (Contribution B), and the generation of locally acting security
policies (Contribution C) into enforcement policies for a newly developed or
existing system. The end result of this contribution is a formal engineering
process that a software designer or developer can follow in order to ensure
security and information assurance in their respective application.
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1.4 Research Progress to Date
In support of the proposed information security framework, a number of articles have
been published or in the process of publication (accepted or in the printing stage). In the
first paper, a case for security in digital healthcare is made by considering the current
state of affairs in the United States.


Demurjian, S., De la Rosa Algarín, A., Bi, J., Berhe, S., Agresta, T., Wang, W.,
Blechner, M. (2013). A Viewpoint of Security for Digital Health Care: What's
There? What Works? What's Needed? (Accepted) To appear in International
Journal of Privacy and Health Information Management.

In the second paper, an approach for functional, collaborative and information
security leveraging UML is presented.


Pavlich-Mariscal, J. A., Berhe, S., De la Rosa Algarín, A. and Demurjian, S. A.
(2013). An Integrated Secure Software Engineering Approach for Functional,
Collaborative, and Information Concerns. (Accepted) To appear in State-of-theArt Concepts and Future Directions in Software Engineering, IGI Global.

In the third and fourth papers, a methodology to generate XACML enforcement
policies from a UML diagram that models role-based access control is discussed.


De la Rosa Algarín, A., Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K.
and Kuykendall, R. (2013). Generating XACML Enforcement Policies for RoleBased Access Control of XML Documents. (WEBIST 2013 Selected Papers)
(Accepted) To appear in Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing
(LNBIP), Springer-Verlag.
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De la Rosa Algarín, A., Ziminski, T. B., Demurjian, S. A., Kuykendall, R. and
Rivera Sánchez, Y. (2013). Defining and Enforcing XACML Role-Based Security
Policies within an XML Security Framework. Proceedings of 9th International
Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies (WEBIST 2013) (pp.
16-25), doi:10.5220/0004366200160025

In the fifth paper, UML extensions for integrated RBAC are presented. The work in
this paper allows security engineers to integrate heterogeneous system‘s RBAC security
into an all-encompassing policy that can be utilized by a newly developed meta-system.


De la Rosa Algarín, A. and Demurjian, S. A. (2013). An Approach to Facilitate
Security Assurance for Information Sharing and Exchange in Big Data
Applications. Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Technologies
Security, pp. 65-83. Elsevier (Kaufman). Editors: Babak Akhgar and Hamid R.
Arabnia.

In the last two papers an overview of the general approach of this dissertation is
given, specifically focusing on extending UML with RBAC security constructs.


De la Rosa Algarín, A., Demurjian, S. A., Ziminski, T. B., Rivera Sánchez, Y. K.
and Kuykendall, R. (2013). Securing XML with Role-Based Access Control: Case
Study in Health Care. Architectures and Protocols for Secure Information
Technology (APSIT), pp. 334-365, IGI Global. Editors: Antonio Ruiz Martínez,
Fernando Pereñíguez García, and Rafael Marín López.



De la Rosa Algarín, A., Demurjian, S. A., Berhe, S. and Pavlich-Mariscal, J.
(2012). A Security Framework for XML Schemas and Documents for Healthcare.
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Proceedings of 2012 International Workshop on Biomedical and Health
Informatics (BHI 2012) (pp. 782-789), doi:10.1109/BIBMW.2012.6470239

1.5 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation has six chapters. Chapter 2 provides the motivation
and examples from the healthcare domain will be utilized throughout the discussion, as
well as background information on the major concepts of the work, including UML,
RBAC, LBAC, DAC and XACML. Chapter 3 presents the underlying security model for
RBAC, LBAC and DAC of tree-structured documents by discussing each access control
model support independently, and then demonstrating an example that utilizes all three.
Chapter 4 discusses the portion of the security framework that involves extensions to
UML with seven new information diagrams to model RBAC, LBAC and DAC
capabilities. More specifically, it presents the Document Schema Class Diagram, which
serves to model the tree-structured schema as a UML diagram; the Secure Information
Diagram, which presents a subset of the schema to be secured; the LBAC Secure
Information Diagram, which supports LBAC; the Document Role Slice Diagram, which
serves as a generalized version of the XML Role Slice Diagram; the User Diagram,
which considers LBAC features from the user perspective; the Authorization Diagram,
which supports schema and instance authorizations; and, the Delegation Diagram, which
supports DAC. Chapter 5 details the security policy generation process by leveraging the
UML extensions from Chapter 4 and XACML, demonstrating the different mapping
processes with respect to the supported access control models. Chapter 6 demonstrates
the secure information engineering process and the prototype of the security model and
framework by utilizing a mobile application targeted for healthcare and XML as the tree21

structured document format to be secured. Last, Chapter 7 offers concluding remarks and
ongoing/future research areas created by the work of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Background
This section reviews background concepts for this dissertation in a wide range of
areas to support the detailed material in the remaining chapters. First, Section 2.1 briefly
reviews the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998) and its usage in the
two dominant healthcare standards: Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture (HL7
CDA) (Alschuler et al., 2002) and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) (Kibbe et al.,
2004). Next, Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present the various access control models that are
utilized in support of the work in this dissertation, respectively: lattice-based access
control (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993) that assigns sensitivity levels to subjects (clearances) and
objects (classifications) to control access to information; role-based access control
(RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) that focuses on the responsibilities of the users for an
application per role; and discretionary access control (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)
to allow both authority and privileges to be passed from one user to another. Then,
Section 2.5 presents a set of assumptions for the healthcare domain, more specifically,
detailing the way that health information technology (HIT) systems leverage private and
protected information in interacting with patients for care and treatment. Next, Section
2.6 presents a scenario of information usage in the healthcare domain using the two
dominant standards (HL7 CDA and CCR) with an emphasis on the way to secure the
information across differing degrees of granularity and requirements. Using this as a
basis, Section 2.7 introduces the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Fowler, 2004) and
its metamodeling capabilities that are going to be utilized throughout this dissertation to
define the new UML diagrams to support the modeling of XML and LBAC/RBAC/DAC.
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Lastly, Section 2.8 introduces the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) (Godik et al., 2002), a language utilized to create formal and enforceable
security policies for XML documents.

2.1 The eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998) facilitates the modeling
and exchange of information between disciplines, offering a flexible means to collect and
transmit data between interacting information systems and platforms. XML provides a
common, structured language that is independent of the system that utilizes it, and
supports information to be hierarchically structured and tagged, with the tags offering the
capabilities to represent the semantics of the information. XML supports the definition of
an XML schema that defines data (elements) to be modeled accompanied by their
interdependencies; this is akin to a class diagram or entity in a database design. By
allowing the definition of XML schemas (see Figure 2.1) provides the mechanism to both
define a standard for the information that can be used both as a blueprint for the content
of an instance (which has to obey the schema) and as a means to validate instances that
are being exchanged in or to insure that they seeking to comply with the required format.
Towards this end, the main mechanism behind XML schemas is the XML Schema
Definition (XSD), which follows the XML Schema language.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of an XML schema that could be used in a healthcare
scenario. This example, which represents a generic patient, shows the tree-structure of
XML documents. In Figure 2.1, the node designated by <xsd:element name=‖patient‖>
acts as the root node of the tree. The direct child of that node is an element designated
with the <xsd:complexType> tag, which is in turn followed by a sequence of nodes that
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can contain different attributes. For the purposes of this dissertation, we consider non-leaf
nodes as those that provide context. In turn, leaf nodes provide value to their parental
context. As one would expect in a healthcare example, information stored on patients
include the name (first last), birthdate, vital statistics (height, weight, gender), along with
diagnostic data (blood pressure, pulse). Once an XML schema such as patient has been
defined, it is then possible to create instances of the schema, representing the actual
documents that are being stored and exchanged by an application. Figure 2.2 shows two
examples of an XML instance for the schema presented in Figure 2.1, providing both a
male and a female patient. The instance on the left hand side of Figure 2.2 is for a female
patient called Carol Smith (denoted by the <patient>) contains the name, height in
meters, weight in kilograms, etc. Similarly, the instance on the right hand side of Figure
2.2 is for Carol Smith‘s husband, Joseph Smith, likewise with data for name, height, etc.
Note that schemas and instances in XML follow a tree structure; and while the work in
this dissertation assumes such a tree structure will be applied to XML, it can also be
generalized to other document formats such as JSON (Crockford, 2006), OWL
(McGuinness & Van Harmelen, 2004), etc.
<xsd:element name="patient">
<xsd:complexType name="patientInfo">
<xsd:element name=”firstName”/>
<xsd:element name=”lastName”/>
<xsd:element name=”birthdate”/>
<xsd:element name=”height”/>
<xsd:element name=”weight”/>
<xsd:element name=”gender”/>
<xsd:element name=”bloodType”/>
<xsd:element name=”systolic”/>
<xsd:element name=”diastolic”/>
<xsd:element name=”pulse”/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

Figure 2.1: Generic Schema Segment for a ―patient‖.
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<patient>
<patientInfo>
<firstName>Carol</firstName>
<lastName>Smith</lastName>
<birthDate>
1983-04-13T00:00:00Z
</birthDate>
<height>1.70</height>
<weight>40</weight>
<gender>F</gender>
<bloodType>O</bloodType>
<systolic>110</systolic>
<diastolic>70</diastolic>
<pulse>85</pulse>
</patientInfo>
</patient>

<patient>
<patientInfo>
<firstName>Joseph</firstName>
<lastName>Smith</lastName>
<birthDate>
1990-05-26T00:00:00Z
</birthDate>
<height>2.1</height>
<weight>80</weight>
<gender>M</gender>
<bloodType>A</bloodType>
<systolic>95</systolic>
<diastolic>50</diastolic>
<pulse>75</pulse>
</patientInfo>
</patient>

Figure 2.2: Instantiated ―patient‖ Segment.

2.2 Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC)
The lattice-based access control model (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993) and the mandatory
access control model (Bell & La Padula, 1976) were simultaneously proposed in 1976.
Both LBAC and MAC share the approach that there are security sensitivity levels that are
assigned to subjects (clearance) and objects (classification) with the permissions for the
subject to read and/or write an object dependent on the relationship between clearance
and classifications. MAC typically is modeling using four sensitivity levels which are
hierarchically ordered from most to least secure: top secret (TS) < secret (S) < classified
(C) < unclassified (U)). LBAC generalizes this approach by ordering the sensitivity levels
in a lattice that determines the relative ranking of each sensitivity level vs the others.
Security policies in LBAC and MAC are using defined by a security administrator with
the intent to control information flow in computer systems where users prohibited from
changing their security attributes. In LBAC and MAC, access to objects (e.g., segments
of an XML document, tables in a database, etc.) by subjects (e.g., users, processes in a
system, etc.) is granted based on the security definitions on the targeted object (exhibited
via tags) and the credentials granted to the user. There have been several implementations
of both LBAC (IBM Informix (IBM-informix database software.2014) and DB2 LUW
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(Rjaibi, 2006)) and MAC (FreeBSD as part of the TrustedBSD, (Dinh-Trong & Bieman,
2005), Windows with Windows Vista (Conover, 2006), Trusted Solaris (Faden, 2006),
and the NSA SELinux research project (McCarty, 2004)).
In both LBAC and MAC, security features can be selected to govern the read and
write permissions of users with certain clearance levels and elements with certain
classification levels to dictate the way that information at one level is allowed to be read
or written at another level. In fact, as outlined in (DoD trusted computer system
evaluation criteria.2014):
―A subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's
security level and the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level
include all the non- hierarchical categories in the object's security level. A subject can
write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level is
less than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security level and all
the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are included in the nonhierarchical categories in the object's security level. ‖
Today, these rules have been realized as a set of security properties. Simple security
(SS), or read-down, no read-up, is the permission to read at equal or lower levels. That is,
a user is allowed to read elements with a sensitivity level lower than their clearance level,
but not those elements with a higher sensitivity level. Simple integrity (SI), or writedown, no write-up, is the permission to write to equal or lower levels. That is, a user can
write elements with a lower sensitivity level when compared to their clearance level, but
not to those elements with a higher sensitivity. Liberal star (LS), or write-up, no write-
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down, is the permission to write to equal or greater levels (the opposite of SI). Finally,
Strict Star Write (SSW) and Strict Star Read (SSR), or write (read) equal, is the
permission to write (read) only to equal levels. From a definition and management
perspective, a security administrator would set the clearance level of users following the
predefined sensitivity levels (e.g., TS, S, C, and U) to establish the levels for both
subjects and objects. These levels are then augmented on a user-by-user basis by
assigning the ability to read (via SS or SSR) and the ability to write (via SI, LS, or SSW).
Once this has all been established for an application it then supports the definition of
permissions and levels (e.g., the elements of a patient‘s health record) in order to
maintain confidentiality by preventing an unauthorized provider to access sensitive
information (e.g., not all providers are able to access mental health history) and to
prohibit a patient from changing their own record.

2.3 Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
In the role-based access control model (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001), the intent is to
allow the responsibilities of the role within the application to dictate the permissions for a
given user. Roles are defined in an application in order to name entities that are often
related to job categories and responsibilities that can be extrapolated from individual
users and established as a reusable role. For example, in a healthcare application, a role
for Nurse or Physician could be defined to capture all of the capabilities in terms of
access and modification of information that are available for a user assigned a given role.
Unlike LBAC, in RBAC, the users as subjects are assigned roles with the roles then
assigned permissions as shown in Figure 2.3. In that way, the role(s) that a user are
assigned to can vary based on what the user is doing in a given application at a specific
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time. For example, a nurse Sara might have a NurseManager role to be able to manage
the unit (all other nurses, staff, and patients) that they are supervising in a hospital and
have a NurseCare role to be able to manage the information associated with her assigned
patients. Sara can plan either NurseManager or the NurseCare role at any one point in
time.
The standardized version of RBAC, defined by the National Institute for Standards
(NIST) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) contains four reference models, as shown in Figure 2.3.
RBAC0 allows for policies to be denied at the role level instead of the individual level.
This is akin to the Nurse or Physician role above. To handle role hierarchies, RBAC1,
shown in the upper middle portion of Figure 2.3, allows for roles to be organized in a
hierarchical fashion and as a result, parent roles to pass down common privileges to
children roles so that permissions high in the hierarchy can be inherited by the roles
below, and specific permissions are associated with roles that act as leafs in the hierarchy.
In the example above, Nurse could be a parent role of both NurseManager and NurseCare
and contain the privileges that would be shared by both roles. This allows the definition
of roles to be more clearly organized into a hierarchy with privileges defined in one
location passing down the tree to other roles and sub-roles.
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Figure 2.3: NIST RBAC0, RBAC1, and RBAC2.
The next level of RBAC, RBAC2, shown in the upper left of Figure 2.3, provides for
the definition of constraints, such as separation of duty (SoD), mutual exclusion (ME),
and cardinality. Separation of duty mandates that in order to complete a particular task, a
number of individuals must participate, and, as a result, have a separation in their actual
duties to accomplish a given task. For example, a patient arriving at an emergency room
with heart symptoms is triaged and evaluated by a nurse, the ER physician, and a
cardiologist; all have users have their separate roles and their specific duties to
accomplish to treat the patient. Each will have the ability to write their own portion of the
patient record (e.g., Nurse for history, ER physician for ordering tests, and cardiologist
for evaluating an EKG) involving the need to all read the information in real-time, but
may be prohibited from seeing the information (the nurse can‘t see the EKG results) until
such time as allowed another use (cardiologist). SoD ensures that the authorization role
that grants permissions exists as a different entity to the other roles. This ensures that
roles are not allowed themselves to view sensitive data they would otherwise have no
authorization to. Mutual exclusion ensures that two or more specific roles may not be
assigned to any particular user, enforced by restrictions put in place by the cardinality
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constraint (the number of users/permissions getting assigned to a particular role). RBAC3
introduces the concept of sessions that represent the lifetime of a particular user, role,
permission and their association for a dynamic runtime application.

2.4 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
In the discretionary access control model (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994), access
to objects is permitted or denied based on the subject‘s identity or the group they are part
of with the ability to have privileges pass among users either under the control of a user
or as dictated by a security administrator. DAC utilizes the concept of delegation to be
able to pass privileges among users in certain situations and under specific constraints. A
user has both the authority to delegate his/her permissions to another user as well as to
authority to pass on the ability to delegate to another user who can then delegate to a third
sure. There are two types of delegation authority in DAC. The first, administrative
delegation, has a security office control who to delegate to whom and when to delegate.
This would be useful in a university application where the head of an academic
department may delegate his authority to another faculty member in his/her absence in
order to run the department. The second, user-directed delegation puts the capability to
both authorize and delegate to the user. In the above healthcare application, a physician
John would delegate his authority to another physician Tom who is covering John‘s
patients for the evening as the on-call physician. In both of these cases, the delegation
would essentially transfer the permissions (either LBAC or RBAC) and the involved
objects from one user to another. So John would specifically transfer his OnCallMD role
to Tom along with access to his patients.
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There are different ways to implement DAC under the assumptions of either LBAC
or RBAC. In one approach, the permissions and the objects they apply to can be
delegated. That is, every object would contain an owner that controls the permissions on
that object, and would as a result control which users can access the object, and which
permissions are allowed. This may not be manageable in many applications since it
assumes that the user plays a significant role in both the definition and management of
permissions, objects, and delegations. A second approach would permit users to delegate
(transfer) their permissions (access) that target certain objects with other users. In this
situation, it makes sense for a physician to pass on his/her OnCallMD role along with all
of his/her patients to another physician; this leverages RBAC concepts and allows a user
to pass on a role. In an LBAC setting, authorizations would be established to allow an
individual with a clearance to have access to objects and their elements as constrained by
classifications on the complete objects. This security capability can be utilized as an extra
layer of security (only those authorized objects are the ones a user can perform any
operations on), or as a fallback capability (delegating authorizations when a primary care
provider is not available and someone with equal credentials is).

2.5 Healthcare Domain Assumptions
The work of this dissertation involves several assumptions with regards to security
and the healthcare domain in HIT applications. The first assumption involves the idea
that there are a set of HIT applications that are relevant in the healthcare domain. These
include: electronic health records (EHRs), which are typically used in provider
institutions such as hospitals, clinics and private practices, and serve the purpose of
storing patient health information for continuous care; personal health records (PHRs),
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which are provided by several institutions (e.g. Microsoft HealthVault (Microsoft
HealthVault.2014), WebMD (WebMD.2014), etc.) for patients to use in order to maintain
their own record of health information that can potentially contain information not found
in EHRs; patient portals (PPs), which act as a door to an EHR from the perspective of the
patient and have functionalities such as medical appointments managing, prescription
repositories, etc.; and, a wide range of ancillary systems for pharmacy, diagnostic
laboratories, therapy centers, and so on. These applications are candidates for the usage
of our security framework presented in this dissertation to allow for the information that
must be exchanged to be appropriately modeled.
The second assumption considers the conditions under which information is modeled.
Specifically, we assume that HIT applications model information utilizing a tree structure
of index and entity nodes that allows for information to be modeled via schemas (that
define structure) which can be used as blueprints for the creation of new documents
(instances) and their validation (enforcement). In such settings, where sensitive data is
utilized by users for time-critical applications, security that is achieved via access control
is a paramount concern. Once such example of a tree-structured document is in XML, as
was discussed in Section 2.1, including XML‘s usage in standards such as HL7 CDA and
CCR.
Our third assumption is that a myriad of users with potentially different roles (RBAC)
and clearance levels (LBAC) are interested in accessing the information to be secured
from the set of HIT systems. There is a need to bring together all of the information
found in heterogeneous HIT applications (e.g. EHRs, PHRs, PP, etc., in the first
assumption) in a way that appropriate and required access control across the integrated
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set of HITs is achieved. This dissertation thrives under the assumption that different
information systems exist, some of them possibly built as large-scale information systems
(LSIS, or systems-of-systems) that are comprised of EHRs, PPs, etc. as given in the first
assumption, and that information must be secured for a new health information
application that will be used by multiple users under multiple roles and multiple
clearance levels. Using this as a basis, we list a number of high-level assumptions
regarding that information‘s structure, users, roles and general access control features:
1. Security administrators will determine the security requirements of a new
information system LSIS by considering a variety of access control models,
namely: LBAC, RBAC and DAC.
2. LBAC and RBAC are orthogonal. That is, features from either of the access
control models does not affect the other. This allows for the definition of security
for a new information system that supports LBAC and not RBAC, RBAC and not
LBAC, or LBAC and RBAC.
3. With the purpose of facilitating modeling, security administrators will be able to
graphically design and model the major concepts of an information system. This
includes the users, roles, lattice sensitivity levels, and authorizations.
4. All instantiated patient information to be secured is found in a tree-structured
format that contains a schema that easily validates its structure.
5. Access to the patient information is allowed through the secured information
system.
6. Generated external policies are used to enforce the defined security requirements
over the information system.
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7. Mobile applications geared towards health information management are used to
motivate and demonstrate the work presented herein.
These assumptions set the context for the dissertation in terms of both the security
framework to be presented as well as supporting the examples throughout.

2.6 Healthcare Scenario
This section presents a plausible scenario of health information modeling and the
needed security using current and standardized technologies in healthcare. The scenario
explained in this section will be utilized to illustrate both the modeling and the
implementation of security for information systems in support of the proposed security
framework. While the work presented in this dissertation is domain independent, most of
its capabilities are driven by healthcare requirements, and the majority of HIT
applications utilize XML in modeling or to be able export and import data sets (a patient
or a set of patients) for information exchange. The scenario described herein covers two
of the dominant standards in healthcare: Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture
(CDA) (Alschuler et al., 2002) and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) (Kibbe et al.,
2004). Both utilize XML and follow the tree-structured assumptions in this dissertation.
To begin, in Figure 2.4, a segment of the HL7 CDA schema is shown. CDA is capable
of modeling different aspects of a health provider transaction, ranging from a patient‘s
demographic data to medical diagnoses to medications to billing. In Figure 2.4 for the
CDA schema, each xsd:element refers to other XML complex types, allowing for the
inclusion into a patient‘s medical record: the encounter with the physician
(patient_encounter element), the organization of the physician (provider element), and the
patient him/herself (patient element). Likewise, in Figure 2.5, a CCR schema for a patient
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record represents the structure for a patient record to be instantiated for each actual
patient. In Figure 2.5, again, there are references to xsd:element that refer to other
complex types such as the body element that contains the payer information (insurance
type, company details, etc.), the problems element that serves as a list of individual
problems, and the family history element that houses specific instances of family history
problems specific for the patient.
<xsd:element name="clinical_document_header">
<xsd:complexType>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref="id"/>
<xsd:element ref="set_id" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="version_nbr" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="document_type_cd"/>
<xsd:element ref="service_tmr" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="origination_dttm"/>
<xsd:element ref="copy_dttm" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="confidentiality_cd"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="document_relationship"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="fulfills_order" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="patient_encounter" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="authenticator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="legal_authenticator" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="intended_recipient" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="originator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="originating_organization" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="transcriptionist" minOccurs="0"/>
<xsd:element ref="provider" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="service_actor" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="patient"/>
<xsd:element ref="originating_device" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="service_target" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xsd:element ref="local_header" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attributeGroup ref="common_atts"/>
<xsd:attribute name="HL7-NAME" type="xsd:string"
fixed="doc_serv_as_clin_doc_header"/>
<xsd:attribute name="T" type="xsd:string" fixed="service"/>
<xsd:attribute name="RIM-VERSION" type="xsd:string" fixed="0.98"/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

Figure 2.4: HL7 CDA ‗clinical_document_header‘ Schema Segment.
To illustrate both CDA and CCR, Figure 2.6 contains an instance of the CDA schema,
while Figure 2.7 contains an instance of the CCR schema. In Figure 2.6, a CDA instance
for the patient Carol Smith is shown as a female (GenderCode is F) and seeing Dr. Brock
Ketchum who is a general physician of the assignedEntity (the physician‘s office) and has
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written a note on Carol as part of her medical history. As shown in the note of the CDA in
Figure 2.6, Carol was hospitalized twice this year and last year, and has not been able to
reduce dependency on steroids for the last month of treatment recorded. She was assigned
to Dr. Elisa Fakington for the treatment received in each visit. Likewise, in Figure 2.7, a
CCR instance for CAROL SMITH contains identified health problems (Asthma) as well
as medications (Zithromax).
Given this brief introduction and examples for CDA and CCR, the intent of the
security framework in this dissertation is to secure a patient‘s data as it exists in the
CDA/CCR documents that are instantiated and validated to exchange that data with
different stakeholders (other medical providers) and the patient him/herself. To set the
stage for this, we consider the creation of a new information system that utilizes both
LBAC and RBAC in conjunction with DAC as presented in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.
The scenario starts with a Dr. Ketchum‘s private medical practice, called GetBetter
Clinic, where there is an interest to have a mobile patient application that allows a
provider to access select portions of a patient‘s medical information in his EMR, allowing
the prescription of medications and other activities such as secure email, making
appointments, etc. For our purpose, suppose that GetBetter Clinic, commissions the new
information system, a mobile patient application, to manage their patient‘s health data,
which may be modeled by either CCR or HL7 CDA schemas with data exchanged back
and forth between the patient and the system using XML instances. As her healthcare
providers will utilize the provider version of the mobile app, Carol will make extensive
use of the patient version in order to maintain continuous contact for her asthma
condition. This dissertation will utilize Carol Smith‘s health record in CDA and CCR
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<xs:element name="ContinuityOfCareRecord">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="CCRDocumentObjectID" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="Language" type="CodedDescriptionType"/>
<xs:element name="Version" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="DateTime" type="DateTimeType"/>
<xs:element name="Patient" maxOccurs="2">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="ActorID" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
…
<xs:element name="Body">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Payers" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Payer" type="InsuranceType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="AdvanceDirectives" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="AdvanceDirective" type="CCRCodedDataObjectType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Support" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="SupportProvider" type="ActorReferenceType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="FunctionalStatus" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Function" type="FunctionType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Problems" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Problem" type="ProblemType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="FamilyHistory" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="FamilyProblemHistory" type="FamilyHistoryType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
…

Figure 2.5: CCR – Continuity of Care Record Schema Segment.
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structure, as well as the information system (mobile app) commissioned by GetBetter
Clinic, to discuss the major contributions.
To control access to the information supplied to/from the provider mobile application,
there will be a need to utilize LBAC to define sensitivity levels (clearances for each user
and classifications for the data elements) in the CCR/CDA instances to control access to
Carol Smith‘s data. The security administrator of GetBetter Clinic uses the four levels
from Section 2.2: top-secret, secret, classified and unclassified. Some of the patient data
such as mental health records will require a top-secret classification to insure that the
information is protected for use by anyone except for the treating physician (available to
Dr. Ketchum but not available to Dr. Fakington); this information has to be shared under
specific rules. Other patient data such as medications or allergies may be secret; it could
be the ability for a physician such as Dr. Ketchum to write or alter a prescription, which
would be prohibited from a nurse such as Jenkins. Nurses like Jenkins may have access to
classified data that would include the ability to enter a medical history and record vital
signs. Office staff could have unclassified access to demographic data in order to contact
a patient for appointments or do insurance billing. These specific privileges are augment
with extra layer of security which will further defined the actual instances that will be
authorized, which in turn are filtered by the privileges.
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<ClinicalDocument>
…
<patient>
<name>
<given>Carol</given>
<family>Smith</family>
<suffix></suffix>
</name>
<administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/>
<birthTime value="19830413"/>
</patient>
…
<assignedPerson>
<name>
<given>Brock</given>
<family>Ketchum</family>
<suffix>MD</suffix>
</name>
</assignedPerson>
…
</author>
<custodian>
…
</custodian>
<documentationOf>
…
<performer typeCode="PRF">
…
<assignedEntity>
…
<code code="59058001" displayName="General Physician"/>
…
<assignedPerson>
<name>
<prefix>Dr.</prefix>
<given>Elisa</given>
<family>Fakington</family>
<suffix/>
</name>
</assignedPerson>
…
<component>
…
<title>History of Present Illness</title>
<text>
<content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content>
is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management.
Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content>
<content revised="insert">teens</content>.
She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year.
She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several
months.
</text>
</section>
</component>
</structuredBody>
</component>
</ClinicalDocument>

Figure 2.6: Instantiated part of CDA for Carol‘s Health Record.
Due to the initial design work that will go into the provider version of the app,
GetBetter Clinic has also commissioned a patient version that will serve as a mobile
patient portal. The information utilized in the patient version of the app like Carol Smith
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will follow CDA and CCR schemas, but be limited to medications, allergies, and
conditions; there will also be the ability to securely communicate with Dr. Ketchum,
request medication refills, make appointments, etc. The security requirements of the
patient version of the app will be similar to that of the provider version. One distinction
in security requirements is that medical notes created by physicians, psychiatrists, and
other health providers, will not be accessible to the patient; these may be classified so that
Nurses like Leroy and all of the GetBetter Clinic physicians can access, but office staff
and patients would be prohibited. A patient like Carol Smith that utilizes the app will be
authorized to her health record instances only, and their clearance and permissions will be
governed by those requirements set by the GetBetter Clinic security administrator. The
patient version of the app will not allow for patients to add their own information, as
GetBetter Clinic wants it to serve strictly as a window to the user‘s health information in
their EMR. In addition to the main functionality of browsing the permitted segments of
their health record, the patient app includes capabilities such as secure emailing for
continuous contact with their healthcare providers, the ability to check/request
appointments and a module to manage medication refills.
The practice has a set of personnel including: Brock who is a psychiatrist, Elisa who
is a family practice physician, Leroy and Jenkins who are nurses, and Gail who is an
office staff member. Brock with a clearance level of top-secret which allows him to read
and write mental health notes. GetBetter Clinic has several employees that are part of the
daily workflow. Brock is a provider (psychiatrist) with a clearance level of top-secret that
allows him to read and write mental health notes. Elisa has a clearance level of secret
able to read and write all of the patient information (except mental health notes). Leroy

41

and Jenkins are nurses with clearance levels of classified who are able to see most
portions of the patient record (except mental notes) and able to perform limited edits and
additions. These privileges are defined by the security administrator in consultation with
the personnel of GetBetter Clinic. Overall, most can Physicians can read the complete
patient record, but may be limited in writing certain parts. Nurses can also read the
complete patient record, and have limited write access. Parts of the patient‘s health record
will be tagged with sensitivity levels so that it is easy to understand which sections are
top-secret, secret, classified and unclassified. At the same time, users will be assigned
specialized permissions for reading and writing. Users will be able to read-down their
clearance levels, and will also be able to write-up their clearance levels.
The information system (mobile app) commissioned by GetBetter Clinic needs to
support the major access control models and needs to be developed with potentially
changing security policies (i.e., new laws can affect existing guidelines). The mobile app
will also needs to support two different viewpoints, one from the provider perspective in
which health information is secured with respect to roles and clearance levels; and, one
from the patient perspective in which health information is authorized on an instance
basis and certain parts of the health record are completely disallowed regardless of
ownership.
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<ContinuityOfCareRecord>
…
<Purpose>
<Description>
<Text>Summary of patient information</Text>
</Description>
</Purpose>
<Body>
<Problems>
<Problem>
…
<Description>
<Text>Asthma</Text>
</Description>
<Status>
<Text>Active</Text>
</Status>
…
</Problem>
</Problems>
<Alerts>
<Alert>
…
</Alert>
</Alerts>
<Medications>
<Medication>
…
<Product>
<ProductName>
<Text>Zithromax</Text>
<Code>
<Value></Value>
<CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem>
</Code>
</ProductName>
</Product>
</Medication>
</Medications>
…
<Actor>
<ActorObjectID>A1234</ActorObjectID>
<Person>
<Name>
<CurrentName>
<Given>CAROL</Given>
<Family>SMITH</Family>
<Suffix/>
</CurrentName>
</Name>
<DateOfBirth>
<ExactDateTime>1983-04-13T00:00:00Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateOfBirth>
<Gender>
<Text>Female</Text>
<Code>
<Value/>
</Code>
</Gender>
</Person>
…
</ContinuityOfCareRecord>

Figure 2.7: Part of Carol‘s Health Record Represented with the CCR Standard.
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2.7 Unified Modeling Language (UML)
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a general-purpose modeling language for
object-oriented systems (Fowler, 2004). Currently managed by the Object Management
Group (OMG), UML can be used throughout the software development cycle by
combining data, business and object modeling. UML diagrams can exhibit two views of a
system‘s model: the structural view, which represents the objects, attributes, operations
and relationships in the system; and, the behavioral view, which represents the
collaboration among objects and changes to the internal states of objects. Towards this
purpose, UML provides different kinds of diagrams. Structure diagrams, which include
the class diagram, component diagram, composite structure diagram, deployment
diagram, object diagram, package diagram, and profile diagram, focus on the
representation of components of the system. Behavior diagrams, which include the
activity diagram, UML state machine diagram, and the use case diagram, focus on the
series of events that must happen in the system. Finally, interaction diagrams, which
include the communication diagram, interaction overview diagram, sequence diagram,
and timing diagram, focus on the data- and control-flow between the components of the
system being modeled.
The UML language can be extended via the use of the meta-model architecture
developed by OMG. This meta-model architecture, called the Meta-Object Facility,
consists of four layers. As shown in Figure 2.8, the M3 layer consists of the meta-meta
model. M2-models are built using the M3 language. In turn, M2-models describe the
elements of the M1-layer, while the M1-models describe the elements of the M0-layer
(the runtime instance of the modeled system). Due to the inclusion of UML into ISO as a
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standard (UML ISO standard.2014) for software systems, several tools (and development
environments) exist to aid in UML modeling, including: ArgoUML (Ramirez et al.,
2003), StarUML (Lee, Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2005), Eclipse (Moore, Dean, Gerber,
Wagenknecht, & Vanderheyden, 2004), Visual Studio (Randolph, Gardner, Anderson, &
Minutillo, 2010), NetBeans (Boudreau, Glick, Greene, Spurlin, & Woehr, 2002), and
others. The UML meta-model will be utilized in this dissertation to support the definition
of new UML diagrams that are capable of modeling LBAC, RBAC, and DAC for tree
structured documents and their instances, like as supported in XML.
Meta-metamodel

M3

C2

C1

C3

instanceO
f
Metamodel

I1

C2.1

M2

C2.2

instanceO
f
User-defined Model

C4

C2.1.1

M1
instanceO
f
Object Diagrams

M0

I2.1.1

I4

Figure 2.8: UML‘s Meta-Object Facility Layers.

2.8 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
In the same way that XML aims to provide a common, structured language for
information exchange among heterogeneous systems, the OASIS eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) (Godik et al., 2002) defines a common language
and processing model from the perspective of access control policies. This would then
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permit a level of security interoperability among the heterogeneous systems. The
XACML schema provides various elements and a general structure for the design and
development of access control (security policies). These elements (as shown in Figure
2.9) include the PolicySet, the Policy and the Rule. An XACML PolicySet is utilized to
make the authorization decision via a set of rules in order to allow for access control
decisions. A PolicySet can contain multiple Policy structures, and each Policy contains
the access control Rules. As a result, the Policy structure acts as the smallest entity that
can be presented to the security system for evaluation. The collection of Policy structures
is contained in a PolicySet, combined via an algorithm specified by the PolicySet’s
PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute that targets the particular XML schema. The XACML
specification defines four standard combining algorithms: Deny-overrides, Permitoverrides, First-applicable, and Only-one-applicable.
The architecture of a typical security system that utilizes XACML for enforcement as
given in Figure 2.10 also has a number of components that we can explain and relate to
our ongoing example. First, the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) allows a request to be
made on a resource such as Dr. Ketchum playing a Physician role to access a continuity
of care record instance of Carol Smith. Next, the Policy Decision Point (PDP), evaluates
the request and provides a response according to the policies in place, and in our
example, a Physician role played by Dr. Ketchum can access (read and/or write) a portion
of a continuity of care record schema. Then, the Policy Administration Point (PAP) is
utilized to write and manage policies which in our example would be applied against the
CCR schema and its associated instances to deliver the appropriate subset of information
to a Nurse or Physician role and the individual who is playing that role. Last, the Policy

46

Information Point (PIP) can be utilized to arbitrate very fine grained security issues
which in our continuing example would be to control access to mental health data of
Carol Smith, allowing Ketchum, while denying Fakington In support of enforcement, an
XACML PolicySet allows the ability to make the authorization decision via a set of rules
in order to allow for access control decisions that may contain multiple Policies, and each
Policy contains the access control rules. Note that multiple XACML Polices may be
generated, resulting in a PolicySet for a specific set of XML schemas that comprise a
given application.

PolicySet
Policy Combination Algorithm

Policy
Rule Combination Algorithm

Rule
Resource

Subject

Action

Figure 2.9: Layered Representation of XACML‘s PolicySet, Policy and Rule Constructs.
Information System Roles

XACML Architecture
Policy Retrieval Point (PRP)

Physician

PEP

Nurse
PAP

XACML
Policy –
Schema 1

XACML Policy
Deifnition

XACML
Policy –
Schema 2

PIP

PDP

Figure 2.10: Security Architecture that Utilizes XACML Policies for Enforcement.
As an example to the way that a generated XACML policy would be for our scenario,
consider Figure 2.11, which illustrates the structure of a basic RBAC policy. In this
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policy, the target sets the subject to the user Elisa Fakington (<Subject> element and
<user> child element), any set of resources at a policy level (<Resources> element and
<AnyResources/> child element) and the possible actions (<Actions> element and
<AnyResources/> child element). The first rule pertains to the role of Physician (denoted
by the <roleName> tag inside the <role> sub-element of <Subjects> in the <Target>
subtree) with an identifier 5 (denoted by the <roleID> tag) when considering any
resources (<AnyResource/>) and any action (<AnyAction/>). The rule of this policy
(<Rule> element) dictates that Elisa Fakington, acting as a Physician, is permitted
(Effect=‖Permit‖) to insert (<operation> element under <Actions>) the element denoted
by the name ―Past Medical History‖ (<element> element under <Resources>). This
policy then allows any Elisa Fakington to insert new data in a patient‘s Past Medical
History.
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<Policy PolicyId="ada-example-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
<Description>
This is a pseudocode example of an XACML policy with LBAC, RBAC and DAC
capabilities for user Elisa and role Physician.
</Description>
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa Fakington</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<AnyResource/>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<AnyAction/>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<element>
<elementID>el-3</elementID>
<elementName>Past Medical History</elementName>
</element>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<operation>
<operationName>insert</operationName>
<opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode>
</operation>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only">
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
Secret
</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
Secret
</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="simple-DAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Schemas>
<schema><schemaID>4</schemaID><schemaName>Schema
4</schemaName></schema>
</Schemas>
<Instances>
<instance>
<instanceID>4,2</instaneID>
<instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName>
</Resources>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>

Figure 2.11: XACML Policy for User Elisa Fakington and Role Physician.
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Chapter 3
RBAC, LBAC and DAC Security Model for
Tree-Structured Documents
The objective of this chapter is to propose a security model for tree-structured
documents that includes the ability to define role-based (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et al., 2001),
lattice-based (LBAC) (Sandhu, 1993), and discretionary (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati,
1994) access control for information systems. This model will define the underlying
concepts and capabilities that will serve as a foundation for the definition of new UML
diagrams to model RBAC, LBAC, and DAC for tree-structured documents, with the
intent to achieve fine-grained information security via access control as part of the overall
software engineering process for information systems. The inclusion of security as part of
an information system‘s design facilitates the modeling of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC at a
schema-level that is then realizable against its instances. The key intent of our approach is
for a schema-level security solution that defines and enforces fine-grained control of an
information system‘s instances for: non-destructive (document-level) operations that
utilize instances as a source of information (e.g., read and aggregate); destructive
(document-level) operations that modify instance(s) to reflect a change (e.g., insert,
update, delete); and, other types of operations (policy-level) that act in the instance as a
whole and not in the intrinsic data found within.
In order to achieve this for an information system, there is the need to provide all
relevant stakeholders with some degree of assurance on the different capabilities of the
three access control models that are being supported. First, from a usability perspective,
the security model should be able to support any document format that follows a tree-
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structure for representation which would allow the design of an information system
without regard to the underlying data format. Candidate formats include, but are not
restricted to, the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998), JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) (Crockford, 2006), the Resource Description Framework (RDF)
(Klyne et al., 2004), the Web Ontology Language (OWL) (McGuinness & Van Harmelen,
2004), etc. The security model in this dissertation casts these formats in their most
generalized tree form, specifically, supporting a document model where each document
has a schema and each schema has a single root node and potentially many children
nodes. Second, the a majority of the RBAC capabilities in the NIST model (see Section
2.3) are supported through the definition of roles, the assignment of operations as
permissions, and the determination of constraints in support of role delegation with
mutual exclusion (ME). Third, a wide range of LBAC capabilities will be supported by
the security model, allowing a broad range of information systems and their security
needs to be supported. This includes, as indicated in Section 2.2, the ability to assign
classifications to all application schemas and their elements and define clearances for
users. This assignment extends the schema via a decoration operation that acts over a
determined criteria and results in an extension schema and its elements (e.g., the entire
document tree) with classifications as tags that are then enforced at the instance level for
actual users holding the appropriate clearance. When RBAC and LBAC are combined, a
given role can access each element in a specific way via a particular operation, achieved
by filtering schemas and instances utilizing the role as the criterion. Fourth, the ability to
support DAC that includes the delegation of role from user to user and the ability to pass
on the delegation. The model completes with a discussion from the user perspective that
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includes authorizations over schemas and instances. Finally, for the purposes of this
chapter, we note the distinction between document-level security and policy-level
security. Document-level security includes those concepts that act on the tree-structure
(e.g., classification levels for elements, access modes of operations that target the
elements, operations and permissions for a role that are tied to an element, etc.), while
policy-level security pertains to those capabilities that are defined at a higher level (e.g.,
authorizations over schemas and instances). The main assertion towards the research in
this chapter is that RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal. That is, their capabilities do not
conflict with one another. This is achieved by assigning clearance levels to users and not
roles. Ultimately, when unifying RBAC, LBAC and DAC, LBAC requirements take a
higher-level priority and dictate the final security effect; but from a construction
perspective, the security can be added in any order with the end result the same in terms
of the defined and enforced permissions.
The remainder of this chapter has seven sections to define and explain the security
model and compare our work to other efforts. Section 3.1 discusses the general
information system structure that will make use of this security model, presenting the
assumptions and the form of the major components in terms of schemas, an application,
and the users. Next, Section 3.2 presents the general security architecture (as a basis) that
the information system will utilize in order to leverage the security model presented in
this dissertation. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the RBAC, LBAC and DAC
capabilities respectively, taking special consideration to the structure of the User object
that is constructed as more security capabilities are considered. Section 3.6 presents user
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authorization capabilities that are utilized in an information system. Finally, Section 3.7,
which provides a general overview of previous work security and access control.

3.1 Model: Application, Schema, Instances, and Users
In this section, we define the aspects and components of an information system in
terms of the supported schema, the composition of an application, and the intended users.
We assume that an information system that will need access control security across any
combination of RBAC, LBAC, and/or DAC. Towards this purpose, we make an initial set
of assertions, given in Table 3.1. The intent of these assertions is to represent the types of
information system that whose security is to be modeled at a type level an enforced at an
instance level.
Information and data is represented in a tree structure with a root node, where non-leaf nodes
provide context (metadata, element name, typing information, cardinality constraints, etc.),
and leaf nodes offer a place to store data values.
A schema is defined to organize the structure and content of a tree and act as a blueprint for
instances. Schemas have the basic structures and context information (such as cardinality
constraints, etc.). Akin to classes in an object-oriented programming languages or relations in
a database, they contain the meta-data that describes the structure, elements, typing, etc. of a
schema.
A schema can be instantiated which means that the actual data is created and defined. The
structure and data in an instance is validated against it respective schema. This is equivalent to
classes in object-oriented programming languages (create an instance of the person class) and
to databases (create a tuple in a relation).
RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal. That is, each one can live independently from the other in
case an application only needs RBAC or LBAC security.

Table 3.1: Information System Assertions.
The third assertion is important since the security model should provide support to
information systems that may utilize either of those access control models. Note that we
do not consider such an assumption for DAC. The reason for this is due to the fact that
DAC capabilities live at a policy-level (authorizations) and not at the document level
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(such as read/write operations controlled by RBAC, LBAC, or both); DAC involves the
way that users utilize instances and pass on permissions among themselves.
Building on these assertions, the first set of definitions involves a characterization of
the information system application, its structure via a set of schemas and its instances
(data) that are authorized to a set of users. To assist the discussion, Figure 3.1 shows a
sample application, its instances, and its users, for the GetWellMobile application of
Section 2.6 utilizing the same users, Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture
(CDA) (Alschuler et al., 2002) and the Continuity of Care Record (CCR) (Kibbe et al.,
2004) as schemas, and Carol Smith’s health record as instances.
Defn. 1:

An element e  eID , eNAME  is defined as an ordered pair component in a

hierarchical data structure that contains information against which operations are
performed, where eID is a unique identifier for the element and eNAME is the tag
of the element.
Example: The elements in Figure 3.1 have unique identifiers eID such as eId1,
eId2,

Defn. 2:

etc., and names eNAME such as ClinicalDocument, patient, etc.
A schema S  S ID , S NAME , E  is defined as a hierarchical organization

of n elements represented as a set E  {e1 , e2 ,..., en } for a given purpose in the form
of a tree, where every ei  S and there is a single root node in the tree of the
schema S . In this case, S ID is a unique identifier for the schema S , and S NAME is
the tag of the schema.
Example: The schemas utilized in the healthcare scenario are from the CCR and
HL7 CDA as given previously in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Figure 3.1 shows the way
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that these schemas would be represented in the notation of the model, with
identifiers sId1 for the CCR, and sId2 for the CDA. In addition, Figure 3.1 also
contains the two element sets E1 and E2 for the instantiation of sets S1 and S2 ,
respectively.
Defn. 3:

An instance i  iID , iNAME  of a schema S is referred to as a document that

contains values for each of the n elements; instances must follow the structure of
a schema, where i ID is the unique identifier for the instance and i NAME is the tag
that describes the instance
Example: The instances utilized in the healthcare scenario are the CCR and HL7
CDA instances of Carol Smith‘s medical record as given in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
Using the model, in Figure 3.1, the two instance sets for sId1 and sId2 are given.
Defn. 4:

Each schema

Sj

has an instance set

Ij

which is defined as

I j  {i j1 , i j2 ,..., i jms } that contains ms instances where each instance follows the

format of the n elements that are defined by E and is validated against S j .
Example: Since the information system utilizes the CCR and HL7 CDA
representation of Carol Smith‘s medical record, the schema set for the
GetWellMobile

application consists of the two instance sets sId1 and sId2. In

this case, the instance set for CCR is Carol Smith‘s CCR instance, and for HL7
CDA it is the respective instance.
Defn. 5:

An application A is comprised of set of k schemas and g instance set

pairs A  { S1 , I1 ,  S1 , I 2 ,  S 2 , I1 ,...  Sk , I g } where each pair represents
one aspect of the information needs of an application.
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Example: Figure 3.1 shows the information system application as the
GetWellMobile,

consisting of the set of paired schemas and their respective

instances {<sId1, CarolSmithCCR>, <sId2, CarolSmithCDA>}.
Defn. 6:

A user u is defined as a pair  u ID , u NAME  that will have the ability to

access portions of an application and uniquely identifies each user by u ID .
Example: In Figure 3.1, the users of the GetWellMobile application are given for
the scenario in Section 2.5. Each user has his/her own identifier, as exemplified
by <uId1, Brock Ketchum> for Dr. Ketchum.
Defn. 7:

Let U  {u1 , u2 ,..., u j } be defined as the set of j users for a given

application A , where u j  U and u j  u ID j , u NAME j  .
Example: The list of users for an application is a set of pairs that contain each
user‘s identifier and name. In our scenario of Section 2.5, and as given in Figure
3.1, the set of users consists of Brock Ketchum, Elisa Fakington, Leroy, Jenkins
and Gail represented as {<uId1,

Brock

Ketchum>,

<uId5,

Elisa

Fakington>, <uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>}.

In summary, as given in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 for the CDA and CCR schemas,
respectively, please consider Figure 3.2 which contains an instance of the CDA schema
and Figure 3.3 which contains an instance of CCR. CDA has <xsd:element
name="clinical_document_header">

as

a

root,

while

CCR

schema

has

<ContinuityOfCareRecord>. In turn, each of these structures have several children node
(shown partially in Figures 3.2 and 3.3), which make the set of elements that are part of a
schema S and instance i.
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Elements e

<eId1, ClinicalDocument>, <eId2, patient>,
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>, …,
<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, patient>,
<eId10, name>

Element Sets E

E1 ={<eId1, ClinicalDocument>, <eId2, patient>,
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>}
E 2 ={<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9,
patient>, <eId10, name>}

Schemas S
Instances i
Instance Set I
Application A
Users u
User Set U

S1 ={<sId1, Continuity of Care
S 2 = {<sId2, Clinical Document

Record, E1>}

Architecture,E2>}
<iId1, CarolSmithCCR>, <iId2, CarolSmithCDA>
ccrRppt={<iId1, CarolSmithCCR>}
cdaJeaderRppt= {<iId2, CarolSmithCDA>}<iId1<iId2
GetWellMobile = {<sId1, iId1>,
<sId2, iId2>}
<uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington>,
<uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington>,
<uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>}

Figure 3.1: Sample Elements, Schemas, Instances, Application, and Users.
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<ClinicalDocument>
…
<patient>
<name>
<given>Carol</given>
<family>Smith</family>
<suffix></suffix>
</name>
<administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/>
<birthTime value="19830413"/>
</patient>
…
<assignedPerson>
<name>
<given>Brock</given>
<family>Ketchum</family>
<suffix>MD</suffix>
</name>
</assignedPerson>
…
</author>
<custodian>
…
</custodian>
<documentationOf>
…
<performer typeCode="PRF">
…
<assignedEntity>
…
<code code="59058001" displayName="General Physician"/>
…
<assignedPerson>
<name>
<prefix>Dr.</prefix>
<given>Elisa</given>
<family>Fakington</family>
<suffix/>
</name>
</assignedPerson>
…
<component>
…
<title>History of Present Illness</title>
<text>
<content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content>
is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management.
Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content>
<content revised="insert">teens</content>.
She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year.
She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several
months.
</text>
</section>
</component>
</structuredBody>
</component>
</ClinicalDocument>

Figure 3.2: Instantiated Portion of CDA for Carol‘s Medical Record.
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<ContinuityOfCareRecord>
…
<Purpose>
<Description>
<Text>Summary of patient information</Text>
</Description>
</Purpose>
<Body>
<Problems>
<Problem>
…
<Description>
<Text>Asthma</Text>
</Description>
<Status>
<Text>Active</Text>
</Status>
…
</Problem>
</Problems>
<Alerts>
<Alert>
…
</Alert>
</Alerts>
<Medications>
<Medication>
…
<Product>
<ProductName>
<Text>Zithromax</Text>
<Code>
<Value></Value>
<CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem>
</Code>
</ProductName>
</Product>
</Medication>
</Medications>
…
<Actor>
<ActorObjectID>A1234</ActorObjectID>
<Person>
<Name>
<CurrentName>
<Given>CAROL</Given>
<Family>SMITH</Family>
<Suffix/>
</CurrentName>
</Name>
<DateOfBirth>
<ExactDateTime>1983-04-13T00:00:00Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateOfBirth>
<Gender>
<Text>Female</Text>
<Code>
<Value/>
</Code>
</Gender>
</Person>
…
</ContinuityOfCareRecord>

Figure 3.3: Instantiated Portion of CCR for Carol‘s Medical Record.
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3.2 Model: Schema Operations for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC
In this section, the work of Section 3.1 is extended to introduce concepts related to
the ability to secure the schemas of a document-based application using RBAC, LBAC,
and/or DAC in order to enforce the defined security at the instance level thereby
customizing instances that are delivered to authorized users. Specifically, the schema
operation ―|‖ is defined and used to transform a schema from one state to the next state
under some set of assumptions and/or constraints as dictated by security that is defined
for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. The schema projection operation (SPO) is used to
transition an original schema (tree-structured) to a projected schema which identify those
portions of the original schema that require access control constrained by various factors;
the projected schema is a subset of the original one. The SPO is identifying those limited
portions (up the entire schema) to have security definition and enforcement. Projection
takes an original schema and removes those elements which do not need protection
resulting in a schema that contains elements that require security. SPO prunes the original
schema‘s tree-structure to produce a valid subtree as a projected schema which is
contained in and may be equal to the original schema. For RBAC, one type of projection
is based on role to order to identify that subset of a schema can be available to that role
creating a separate projected version for each role of every schema that the role requires.
For LBAC, SPO identifies the secure subset of the schema which needs control by
assigning classifications (CLSs) to elements (see Section 2.2 again) that is then followed
by decoration (see below).
To complement SPO, the schema decoration operation (SDO) is used to augment an
original schema with new data related to security that is associated with a schema‘s
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elements, resulting in a decorated schema that exceeds in structure the original schema.
For LBAC, decoration adds CLSs to the elements of schema, transitioning an element‘s
definition

from

a

two

tuple

el  eID , eNAME 

(see

Defn.

1)

to

the

triple:

el  e ID , e NAME , eSL  where eSL is the classification of the element (see Section 2.2

again). As a result, decoration enlarges the schema with the addition of a CLS field for
each element that needs a CLS, so the decorated schema actually gets larger and
contains the undecorated schema (whether it is an original or a projected one). While
SPO and SDO aimed to support RBAC and LBAC, the schema operator ―|‖ can be
modified to define new criterion over which the transformation will occur per the
discretion of the security administrator. This opens the possibilities to prune and/or
decorate a tree-structured document with respect to other attributes (e.g. user tenure, time
context, value constraints, etc.). Below we briefly summarize the assertions for this
portion of the model.
In

the

design

process

for

an

application,

A  { S1 , I1 ,  S1 , I 2 ,  S 2 , I1 ,...  S k , I g } serves as a starting point from which a

security administrator will being to define privileges. Specifically, using SPO an SDO
a designer can project/decorate to arrive a version of the application (which schemas
projected/decorated) resulting in a projected (decorated) application where AP ( r|c|e) (
AD (c ) ) that contains m  k schema/instance pairs from S , where m  A P ( r |c|e) ( m  AD (c )

), that have been projected/decorated in order to identify the portions of A that require a
level of security control as realized in AP ( r|c|e) ( AD (c ) ). The remainder of this section
reviews definitions involving schemas for SPO and SDO.
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A schema is a hierarchically structured collection of elements which can be altered via a
schema projection operation (SPO), denoted as |rP|c|e , that can filter the tree into a proper
subtree.

SiP ( r |c|e) is the result of a projection |rP|c|e of S i that effectively identifies the subset of S i that
has been filtered. Using this notation: S iPr means that a role has been utilized to create a
subtree of the original schema that represents all of the elements allowed for role r; S iPc means
that a CLS c (e.g., TS, C, etc.) has been utilized to create a subtree the original schema that
represents all of the elements allowed for that c; and, S iPe means that a subtree of the original
schema) that represents all of the elements of the schema that need to be protected.
Given a projection S iP ( r |c|e) of schema S i , the instance set is also projected, creating IiP ( r |c|e)
which are now filtered instances for the schema that must follow the structure of the filtered
schema. This yields an instance that has been project by role r, CLS c, elements e of the
schema.
A schema which is a hierarchically structured collection of elements can be extended via a
decoration operation, denoted as |c|Dt , over a criterion that alters the form of the elements by
adding new information in the form of LBAC sensitivity levels or time constraints.

S iD ( c|t ) is the result of a decoration |c|Dt of S i that effectively identifies the decorated version
of S i based on LBAC sensitivity levels. Using this notation: S iDc means that CLSs chosen
from the set of all possible sensitivity levels (e.g., S, TC, C, U) have been added to all of the
elements of the original schema; and, S iDt means that time constraints have be included that
represent the allowable timeframe for each element.
Given a decoration S iD (c ) of schema S i , the instance set is also decorated, creating I iD (c ) which
are now decorated instances for the schema that must follow the new structure of the
decorated schema. This yields an instance that has expanded by classification or time.

Table 3.2: Schema Security Assertions.
Defn. 8a. |rP is a schema projection operation (SPO) over an RBAC role r and
tree such that the end result of the action is the creation of a pruned tree by
RBAC role that is a subset of the tree being projected, meaning that the
projected subtree is a subset of the original schema to represent which portions
of the original schema can be access by role. In our notation, for a schema S i ,
~
~
SiPr  Si |rP means that S iPr is a projected version of S i with respect to a role r ,

the results of a filtering action.
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Defn. 8b. |cP is a schema projection operation (SPO) over an LBAC sensitivity c
and tree such that the end result of the action is the creation of a pruned tree by
LBAC that is a subset of the original schema to represent the portion of original
~

tree that has a sensitivity level c. In our notation, for a schema S i , SiPc  Si |cP
~

means that S iPc is a projected version of S i with respect to an c , the results of a
filtering action.
Defn. 8c. |eP is a schema projection operation (SPO) over elements e and tree
such that the end result of the action is the creation of a pruned tree that is a
subset of the tree being projected, meaning that the projected subtree is a subset
of the original schema to represent the portion of original tree that has had
elements deleted resulting in a subtree of the original tree that has the elements
~

~

to be secured.. In our notation, for a schema S i , SiPe  Si |eP means that S iPe is a
projected version of S i with respect to elements e , the results of a filtering
action.
Defn. 9:

|cD is a schema decoration operation (SDO) over LBAC and tree such

that the end result of the decoration is the creation of an expanded tree with
sensitivity level or classifications on the elements of the tree. In our notation,
~

~

for a schema S i , Sid  Si |cD means that S iDc is an expanded version of S i with
respect to LBAC, the results of a decoration action.
~
Defn. 10: A P( r|c|e)|D(c )  A is a subset of the information in an application‘s schemas

that need to be protected through a process of SPO and/or SDO. Specifically,
~
~
~
~
~
A P ( r|c|e)| D(c )  { S1P ( r|c|e)| D(c ) , I1P ( r|c|e)| D(c ) ,...,  S mP ( r|c|e)|D(c ) , I nP( r|c|e)|D(c ) } is the result of
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an SPO and/or SDO on the original k schema/instance set pairs, that results in
the creation of a set of m schemas where the information that needs to be
secured and is available for access control has been identified.
To illustrate the concepts related to projection and decoration, Figures 3.4 and 3.5
have an organization of the resulting tree-structured schema from Figures 2.4 and 2.5,
respectively, that after projection and decoration operations over RBAC and LBAC
criteria. In Figure 3.4, the <xs:element name=”patient_encounter”> element (and
~

others) in the original CDA schema has been removed yielding CDA ; in Figure 3.5,
the <xs:element name = ”FamilyHistory”> element (and others) in the original
~

CCR schema has been removed (explain further once final) yielding CCR .
<xs:element name=”ClinicalDocument”>
<xs:element name=”patient”>
<xs:complexType name=”name”>
<xs:element name=”given”/>
<xs:element name=”family”/>
<xs:element name=”suffix”/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name=”administrativeGenderCode"/>
<xs:element name=”birthTime”/>
</xs:element>
<xs:complexType name=”component”>
<xs:element name=”title”/>
<xs:element name=”text”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
~

Figure 3.4: SPO and SDO to Generate CDA Schema.
To accompany these two figures, we provide their corresponding instances.
Specifically, Figure 3.6 shows the result of a projection operation over a human -guided
criteria, such as one from the security administrator of the practice from the scenario in
Section 2.6, for Carol Smith‘s CDA, with <ClinicalDocument> as the root of the tree
and two direct children: <patient> and <component> (each with their own set of
context children nodes). Likewise, Figure 3.7 shows the result of a similar operation of
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human-guided criteria from the security administrator of practice A) for the CCR, with
a root node of <ContinuityOfCareRecord> and one direct child node: <Body> (with
<Problems>

and <Medications> children.

<xs:element name="ContinuityOfCareRecord">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="Body">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Problems" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Problem" type="ProblemType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Medication" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Medication" type="MedicationType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:element>
~

Figure 3.5: SPO and SDO of the CCR Schema.
<ClinicalDocument>
<patient>
<name>
<given>Carol</given>
<family>Smith</family>
<suffix></suffix>
</name>
<administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/>
<birthTime value="19830413"/>
</patient>
<component>
<title>History of Present Illness</title>
<text>
<content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content>
is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management.
Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content>
<content revised="insert">teens</content>.
She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year.
She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several
months.
</text>
</component>
</ClinicalDocument>

Figure 3.6: Applying Figure 3.4 to Generate Carol‘s CDA Instance.
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<ContinuityOfCareRecord>
<Body>
<Problems>
<Problem>
<Description>
<Text>Asthma</Text>
</Description>
<Status>
<Text>Active</Text>
</Status>
</Problem>
</Problems>
<Medications>
<Medication>
<Product>
<ProductName>
<Text>Zithromax</Text>
<Code>
<Value></Value>
<CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem>
</Code>
</ProductName>
</Product>
</Medication>
</Medications>
</Body>
</ContinuityOfCareRecord>

Figure 3.7: Applying Figure 3.5 to Generate Carol‘s CCR Instance.

3.3 Model: RBAC Security
In the section, we continue with the definition of RBAC in our security model for tree
structured documents. This set of definitions involves designing a RBAC security policy
that supports the ability to specify custom versions of the schemas that are projected on a
role-by-role basis. The allows the permissions that are defined on the various elements of
a schema to be of as authorized to a user by role, we call these role-based permissions
(RBP); these definitions represent a formalization of a portion of the NIST RBAC model,
which involves roles, objects, operations, permissions, and mutual exclusion. The set of
assertions for RBAC is given below.
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A schema that contains a set of elements has defined, for each of the elements, a set of
operations that are allowable, namely: read, aggregate, insert, update, and delete. These
operations dictate the way that each element can be utilized.
A role is a means to characterize privileges that are based on usage behaviors of the
application coupled with needed functionality to arrive at a construct (role) that is able to
quantify a common set of responsibilities that are shared by multiple users. Roles will be
authorized to utilize different portions of the schema and instances for an information
application. Each application has a set of roles.
A permission is defined on each element in a schema by associating an element (by id) with an
operation. The collection of all permissions for all roles across all schemas of an application is
the role-based permission set, where each set member binds a permission to a role.
The schema projection operation (SPO) (see Defn. 8a) can be applied by role in order to
identify the elements of each schema and the associated permissions per role.

Table 3.3: RBAC Assertions.
Defn. 11: A role r is defined as a two-pair r  rID , rNAME  representation of the
responsibilities for a user u  U to access some portion (entire or further
restricted) of a schema.
Example: Consider Figure 3.8 with the sample roles for the scenario of Section
2.6.

The

roles,

with

identifiers,

{<rId1,Psychologist>,

for

GetWellMobile

<rId2,Physician>,

would

be

<rId3,Nurse>,

<rId4,Staff>}.

Defn. 12: Let R  {r1 , r2 ,..., rj } be defined as the set of j roles for a given application

A , where rj  R and rj  rID , rNAME  .
j

Defn. 6 (RBAC Version):

j

A user that has been authorized to RBAC (but not

LBAC) redefines the user u as a tuple  u ID , u NAME , urID  , where u rID is the
role as defined in Defn. 26. Note that a user can be authorized to more than
one role, but is limited to playing one role in any application session.
Example: Consider the users of GetWellMobile from Figure 3.8. When their
roles are assigned, the user is augmented with a role identifier. In the case of the
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users of GetWellMobile, their users are:
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, rId1>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington, rId2>,
<uId10, Leroy, rId3>, <uId11, Jenkins, rId3>,
<uId20, Gail, rId4>}.

Defn. 13: There exists a schema projection operation |rP by role that acts on a
~

schema S i , and yields a filtered version S iPr for any given role r  R . This results
in what is referred to as a role-secured schema.
~

~

~

~

Defn. 14: The set of role-secured schemas ASPr  (S1Pr , S2Pr ,..., SiPr ) is the set of role
~

projections of S ir for role r , for any given schema i , where i  1,2,..., m .
Defn. 15: Let O  {read , aggregate, insert , update, delete} be the set of operations
that can be performed against an element in each schema from either an
original or a projected and/or decorated tree. The operation is defined at the
schema level to be applied at the instance level. For permissions, each op  O
will be assigned to individual roles.

Defn. 16: A permission p is represented by the four tuple p  pID , sID , eID , op  ,
where pID is the unique identifier of the permission (akin to u ID and rID ),
~

s ID is

~

the identifier of a schema SiP ( r|c|e)|D(c )  ASP ( r|c|e)|D (c ) and eID is the identifier of an
~

element el  SiP ( r|c|e)|D ( c ) for some i  1,2,..., m , meaning that operation op can be
performed on the element (node) identified by eID constrained to the schema
~
SiP ( r|c|e)|D ( c ) of the application.

Defn. 17: Let P  { p1 , p2 ,..., p z } be defined as the set of all granular permissions
in a given application A, where a permission p  P . That is, P is the set of all
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permissions defined by the security administrator in a given application A.
Example: A set of permissions for the scenario of Section 2.6. is shown in Figure
3.8. The set {<pId1, sId1, eId1, read>, <pId2, sId1, eId1, insert>,
…,

<pId6,

sId2,

eId9,

update>,

<pId7,

sId2,

eId10,

update>}

denotes a read permission over the CCR schema‘s eId1 element, an insert
permission over the CCR schema‘s eId1 element, an update permission over the
CDA schema‘s eId9 element, and an update permission over the CDA schema‘s
eId10 element.

Defn. 18: The

set

of

all

permissions,

the

role-permission

assignments

RPA  { rID1 , p ID1 ,...,  rIDk , p IDn } , where rID is the identifier of a role r as
defined in Defn. 12, and pID is the identifier of a permission p as defined in
Defn. 16, contains all the role-permissions pairs meaning that role with
identifier rID can perform the permission with identifier pID .
Example: Consider Figure 3.8, which follows the healthcare scenario utilized so
far. Sample role-permission assignments would be in the form of {<rId1,
pId1>, <rId1, pId6>, <rId1, pId7>, …, <rId2, pId1>, <rId2, pId2>,
<rId2, pId7>, …, <rId3, pId1>, <rId3, pId2>}.

These pairs represent the

following: the role Psychologist can perform the permissions with the identifiers
pId1, pId6

and pId7. The role Physician can perform the permissions with the

identifiers pId1, pId2 and pId7. Last, the role Nurse can perform the permissions
with the identifiers pId1 and pId2.
It is important to note that RPA can have multiple entries for a given role, where each
entry represents one of the permissions that have been assigned to a role with a unique
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rID . Recall that a permission is defined as a tuple p  pID , sID , eID , op  , where pID acts
as the identifier for the whole permission p. Role secured schemas are in turn the result
~

of a projection of a role‘s permissions and the elements they target. This SiP ( r|c|e)|D ( c ) can be
empty, meaning that a role r  R has no nodes to act upon.
Roles:
Elements:

Operations:
Permissions:

Role-Permissions
Assignments:
Users:

{<rId1,Psychologist>, <rId2,Physician>, <rId3,Nurse>,
<rId4,Staff>}
{<eId1, ClinicalDocument>, <eId2, patient>,
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>, …,
<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, patient>, <eId10,
name>}
{read, aggregate, insert, update, delete}
{<pId1, sId1, eId1, read >,
<pId2, sId1, eId1, insert >, …,
<pId6, sId2, eId9, update >,
<pId7, sId2, eId10, update >}
{<rId1, pId1>, <rId1, pId6>, <rId1, pId7>, …, <rId2, pId1>,
<rId2, pId2>, <rId2, pId7>, …, <rId3, pId1>, <rId3, pId2>}
{< uId1, Brock Ketchum>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington>,
<uId10, Leroy>, <uId11, Jenkins>, <uId20, Gail>}

Figure 3.8: Sample Roles, Operations, Permissions, Role-permission Assignments and
Users.
The next set of definitions involve the definition of separation of duty and mutual
exclusion as defined between roles and their associated permissions. Separation of duty
between two users playing different roles means that in the process of working on a
specific task, their actual duties (privileges) must be separated. For instance, in a hospital
setting, when administering significant intravenous medications (say, for cancer
treatment), there are two separate individuals in the process, one in a verifier role that
checks that the dosage and patient name is correct and another in a patient care role that
administers the IV medication; these two roles have a separation (has to be two separate
persons) in order to offer protection to the patient receiving the medication with the
permission to verify the mediation separate from the permission to administer the
medication. Mutual exclusion ensures that two or more specific roles may not be assigned
to any particular user. Continuing with the example, the verifier and patient care roles can
never be assigned to the same user.
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Defn. 19:  SoD denotes separation of duty between roles which means that, given rx

 SoD ry , with rx  R and ry  R , a user with role rx cannot be assigned and perform
any permissions of role ry , where the two tuple  rx , ry  SoD represents the
SoD between the two roles. The set SoD contains all the pairs of roles that have a
separation of duty relation.
Defn. 20: For a given role rx , the set SoD rx  { rx , ri | rx , ri  SoDi} where i
iterates over all of the roles in R.
Example: As discussed above, consider that rx is the verifier role and that ry is the
patient care role. The duties of these two roles are different, and the security
administrator at the hospital has decided that for security purposes, an explicit
separation of duty must be defined. In this case, SoD r

Verifier

 { rVerifier , rPatientCare } .

Defn. 21:  ME denotes separation of duty between roles that is strictly defined as two
roles not allowed to have any permissions in common which means that, given rx

 ME ry , with rx  R and ry  R , the set of RPA does not have pairs with rx and ry
where the pID are the same. This defines a set ME that contains all the pair of
roles that have a mutual exclusion relation. More specifically,  rx , ry  ME .
Defn. 22: For a given role rx , the set ME rx  { rx , ri | rx , ri  ME Ai} where i
iterates over all of the roles in R.
Example: Consider the roles of Nurse and Staff from Figure 3.8. The security
administrator has realized that a staff person (e.g. secretary) cannot be assigned the
role

of

nurse

because

of

the

professional

requirements.

In

this

case,
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ME rNurse  { rNurse, rSecretary }

The previous definitions create a user object that redefines Defn. 6 as follows:
Defn. 6 (RBAC with SoD and ME):
with

SoD

and

ME

A user that has been authorized to RBAC

constraints

redefines

the

user

u

as

a

tuple

 u ID , u NAME , rID , SoD rID , ME rID  , where SoD rID is the resulting set of roles that

have a separation of duty for role rID and ME rID is the resulting set of roles that
have a mutual exclusion with rID .
Example: In the SoD example above, assume the user u JaneSmith with role rVerifier
would have the user tuple:
 uId 7 , u JaneSmith, rVerifier ,{ rVerifier , rPatientCare },   .

Likewise, for the ME example above, the user with role would have the user
tuple:
 uId 9 , u JaneJones, rNurse, ,{ rNurse, rSecretary } 

Note that in order to correctly generate the security enforcement (see Chapter 5), it is
necessary to be able to compute a transitive closure for rx of both SoD rx and ME rx . For

SoD rx , the transitive closure would be generated by starting with the tuple  rx , ry  and
using ry to search for all of the separation of duties in SoD that are of the form  rx , rz 
for all z and continuing to recursively seek all of the other possible SoDs until the process
terminates. The generation of the transitive closure for SoD rx will yield a set that may
have conflicts, and if it doesn’t, would then be utilized in the generation of the security
enforcement. A similar process would apply for ME rx .
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3.4 Model: LBAC Security
Given the general security definitions in Section 3.1, the relevant operations related to
schemas in Section 3.2, and the RBAC capabilities in Section 3.3, this section focuses on
LBAC. From the perspective of the research in this proposal, the security model and
framework is realized as a combination of the three major access control models: RBAC,
LBAC and DAC. In this section, we present the way that our security model supports
LBAC features. The overriding premise of our security approach for LBAC, as reviewed
in Section 2.2 is to provide the overall infrastructure and concepts that are needed to
allow us to assign sensitivity levels, namely classifications to elements of schema and
clearances to users. This will allow a user to only access those portions of instances for
the schemas that they have been authorized to. As in the previous two sections, we start
off with a set of assertions, given in Table 3.4.
There exists a lattice of sensitivity labels that covers mandatory access control features in a
generalized manner. These sensitivity levels correspond to classifications that are assigned to
schema elements (see Defn. 1) and clearances that are assigned to users (see Defn. 6).
The lattice L of sensitivity levels is constructed from sensitivity levels that are bound by
upper (most secure) and lower (least secure) values (see Defns. 19 to 23).
In support of our security model, we specialize from a lattice L of sensitivity levels to an
ordered set SL  {x1 , x2 ,..., xq } of sensitivity levels, where SL , x1  x 2  ...  x q . This means
that x q represents the most secure sensitivity level and x1 represents the least secure sensitivity
level (see Defn. 24).
An element of a schema can be assigned a sensitivity level (classification) with a user being
assigned a clearance. Since schema elements can be either be context nodes (refer to other
elements) or data nodes, and each can be assigned a classification. In a subtree of a schema,
the classification of a node cannot be more secure than the classifications of its children, and
the entire tree‘s schema when annotated with classifications must satisfy the lattice
relationship of sensitivity levels (e.g., in MAC, TS > S > C > U) with the least secure level
tending toward the top of the tree and the most secure level tending towards the bottom of the
tree.

Table 3.4: LBAC Assertions.
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Given the assertions in Table 3.4, the following set of definitions for LBAC are
provided. We assume there are q sensitivity levels; all represented in a chain (see
Defn. 24). This set, denoted as SL, creates a linearly ordered set of levels that
transitions the order operation  as defined in Defn. 19 to a set of positive integers
ordered by <, which is now the symbol to do ordering between a clearance and a
classification. Note that while we consider q sensitivity levels, the case where q = 4
represents the typical MAC sensitivity levels in implementation: unclassified (U=1),
classified (C=2), secret (S=3) and top-secret (TS=4).
Defn. 23: A partial order relation  is a binary relation that is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive.
Defn. 24: A lattice is a structure with a set LS , a partial order  , and two binary
operations: infimum and supremum.
Defn. 25: Let a, b  LS . infimum(a,b) is called the greatest lower bound of a and b ,
or meet, and, supremum(a,b) is called the least upper bound, or join of a and b,
such that:
a. For any a, b  LS , infimum(a, b)  infimum(a, b)  b, and for any g  LS , if
g  a and g  b then g  infimum(a, b).
b. For any a, b  LS , a  supremum(a, b) and b  supremum(a, b), and for
any g  LS , if a  g and b  g, then supremum(a, b)  g.
Defn. 26: If for any given a, b  LS , with  as the partial order relation, we have that
a  b or b  a , then we call LS a chain or totally ordered set.

Defn. 27: We call a lattice L  ( LS , ) bounded if there exist elements top (┬) and
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bottom (┴) such that for any a ∈LS, ┴  a  ┬.
Defn. 28: Define SL  {sl1 , sl2 ,..., slq } to be the partially ordered set of q consecutive
sensitivity levels for the application where sl1 represents the least secure and slq
represents the most secure; an individual level is referred to as sl  SL .
Example: Consider the list of sensitivity levels in Figure 3.9. These sensitivity
levels, {unclassified (U), classified (C), secret (S), top-secret
(TS)}

are a partially ordered set in which top-secret represents the most secure

and unclassified represents the least secure level.
Defn. 29: Given a, b  SL , the expression a  b denotes that b has a higher sensitivity
(classification or clearance) than a, which means that b is more secure. Similarly,
the expression a  b denotes that a and b have the same sensitivity.
Example: Consider the list of sensitivity levels from Figure 3.9. In this example,
the relation between levels would be U < C < S < TS.
Defn. 30: We define a lattice L  (SL, ) as the lattice of sensitivity levels in an
application A, ordered by the relation < which has replaced  as defined in Defn.
19.
~

Defn. 31: Let S iDc be the subtree that results from the decoration S i |cD as defined in
~

Defn. 9. The nodes of S iDc are LBAC decorated and in the form of

el =< eID,eNAME ,eSL > , where el  Si or el  SiP( r|c|e) and eSL Î SL for any i. As a
result, the schema has been extended due to the addition of an element for eSL .
Example: Recall the elements for the CCR and CDA schemas following the
healthcare scenario and as shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. When a decoration
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operation is performed over the schemas, instances with their elements would
look

as

follows

(as

shown

in

Figures

3.10

and

3.11):

{<eId1,

ClinicalDocument, C>, <eId2, patient, C>, <eId3, name, C>, <eId4,
given, C>, <eId5, family, C>, …, <eId8, clinical_document_header,
U>, <eId9, patient, S>, <eId10, name, S>}.

~
Defn. 32: If some node in a secure schema, e  SiP ( r|c|e) with classification eSL , has

children nodes e1 and e2 , then the classification e1,SL and e2,SL must be equal to or
higher than the classification eSL . That is, eSL  e1,SL or eSL  e1,SL and eSL  e2,SL or
eSL  e2,SL .

This definition means that the least secure levels migrate towards the top of the
tree of the schema while the more secure level migrate towards the bottom leaf
nodes.
Example: Following the previous example, the patient element in the CDA
schema (and resulting instances as in Figure 3.10) would need to have a
classification higher or equal than that of unclassified.
The result of a decoration operation with an LBAC criterion is exemplified in Figure
3.10 for Carol‘s CDA instance, and in Figure 3.11 for her CCR instance (decorations
shown in bold red text). In these examples, we consider a set of sensitivity labels as SL=
{TS, S, C, U},

the typical sensitivity levels for MAC (Bell & La Padula, 1976), a use-

case of LBAC. Note that for the CDA, the <patient> element could be given a
classification of secret (S), but the <family> element could have a classification of topsecret (TS). This is in order with Defn. 28, where a child node can be classified at the
same or higher level of sensitivity than its parent. In Figure 3.11, the CCR has a base

76

classification of classified (C), as shown with the sl=”C” tag in the root node.
Sensitivity
Levels:
Elements:

{top-secret, secret, classified, unclassified}
{<eId1, ClinicalDocument>,
<eId2, patient>,
<eId3, name>, <eId4, given>, <eId5, family>, …,
<eId8, clinical_document_header>, <eId9, patient>, <eId10,
name>}

Figure 3.9: Sample Sensitivity Levels and Elements to be Secured with LBAC.
<ClinicalDocument sl=”u”>
<patient sl=”s”>
<name sl=”s”>
<given sl=”s”>Carol</given>
<family sl=”ts”>Smith</family>
<suffix sl=”s” />
</name>
<administrativeGenderCode
code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1" sl=”s” />
<birthTime value="19830413" sl=”ts” />
</patient>
<component sl=”ts”>
<title sl=”ts”>History of Present Illness</title>
<text sl=”ts”>
<content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content>
is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management.
Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content>
<content revised="insert">teens</content>.
She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year.
She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several
months.
</text>
</component>
</component>
</ClinicalDocument>

Figure 3.10: Result of an LBAC Decoration of Carol‘s CDA Instance.
<ContinuityOfCareRecord sl=”c”>
<Body sl=”c”>
<Problems sl=”c”>
<Problem sl=”c”>
<Description sl=”c”>
<Text>Asthma</Text>
</Description>
<Status sl=”s”>
<Text>Active</Text>
</Status>
</Problem>
</Problems>
<Medications sl=”c”>
<Medication sl=”c”>
<Product sl=”c”>
<ProductName sl=”c”>
<Text>Zithromax</Text>
<Code>
<Value></Value>
<CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem>
</Code>
</ProductName>
</Product>
</Medication>
</Medications>
</Body>
</ContinuityOfCareRecord>

Figure 3.11: Result of an LBAC Decoration of Carol‘s CCR Instance.
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The next portion of the LBAC model is the need to define the conditions under which
sensitivity levels are compared. Specifically, when a user with a clearance wants to
access an element with a classification, LBAC and MAC both provide different ways to
compare the allowable read and/or write from CLR to CLR. Specifically, as given in
Section 2.2, there are a number of different read and write permissions that are defined
and enforced for a user against an application that are called domination properties that
define the way to evaluate a user‘s CLR. Simple security (SS), or read-down, no read-up,
is the permission to read at equal or lower levels so that means CLR > CLS for read. That
is, a user with CLR is allowed to read elements with a CLS lower than their clearance
level, but not those elements with a higher CLS. Simple integrity (SI), or write-down, no
write-up, is the permission to write to equal or lower levels, meaning CLR > CLS for
write. That is, a user can write elements with a lower CLS when compared to their
clearance level, but not to those elements with a CLS. Liberal star (LS), or write-up, no
write-down, is the permission to write to equal or greater levels (the opposite of SI)
meaning CLR < CLS for write. Finally, Strict Star Write (SSW) and Strict Star Read
(SSR), or write (read) equal, is the permission to write (read) only to equal levels of CLR
as compared to CLS, meaning CLR = CLS for either read or write. Overall, the
domination properties SS, SI, LS, SSR and SSW allow a security administrator to
carefully control the usage of information, and most importantly, by setting the
appropriate the read and write permissions of users it can be insured that a user will never
violate the requirements when reading and writing to CLSs.
These features are comparisons performed over the nature of the operations that act in
the schemas and instances. Building on this assertion, we define access modes and their
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relationship to the operations as follows:
Defn. 33: AM  {AM  READ , AM  WRITE} is the set of access modes that are
used to categorize the multiple read oriented operations into the AM-READ category
and multiple write operations in the AM-WRITE category that act against the
secured tree nodes.
Defn. 34: Each op  O has an access mode assigned based on the operation. For
non-destructive operations such as {read , aggregate} have am  AM  READ ,
while

destructive

operations

such

as

{insert , update, delete }

have

am  AM  WRITE .

The operations from Section 3.3 have five values: read, aggregate, insert, update, and
delete. When enforcing the read and write levels to check the domination properties SS,
SI, LS, SSR and SSW, the comparison of a user‘s CLR against an element‘s CLS must
first translate the operation into either AM-READ or AM-WRITE. When that has occurred,
then the comparison of the CLR against the CLR can be performed based on the
domination properties assigned to a user; that is, each user is assigned one read
domination property and one write property. This translation is performed using the
relation described in Defn. 30, which determines that non-destructive operations have an
access mode of AM-READ, while destructive operations have an access mode of AMWRITE.

This section is completed by utilizing all of the previous definitions, Defn. 6 can
be redefined for a user to capture the definition of CLR of a user along with the R -W
properties (SS, SI, LS, etc.) to access elements. The prior two-tuple becomes a five
tuple as below:
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A user that has been authorized to LBAC (but not

Defn. 6 (LBAC Version):

RBAC) redefines the user u as a tuple  u ID , u NAME , uCLR , u LBAC R , u LBAC W  ,
where u LBAC R / W are either SS, SI, LS, SSR, or SSW.
Example: Building on the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, the users of
GetWellMobile would

look as follows:

{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, TS, SS, SI>, <uId5, Elisa Fakington, S, SS,
SSW>,
<uId10, Leroy, C, SS, LS>, <uId11, Jenkins, S, SS, SI>,
<uId20, Gail, U, SS, SI>}.

This user definition is utilized in the situation where the security for the information
application is limited to LBAC to define permissions on schemas that can be enforced on
instances. For example, consider an insert operation which has an access mode of AMWRITE. If the user Brock Ketchum, as described in Defn. 6 (LBAC Version) has a

u LBAC W of SI (simple integrity), this means that can only insert new data in those
elements of the schema that have a lower classification than his clearance.

3.5 Model: DAC Delegations
The next set of definitions involves DAC and delegation of authority that allows a
role and its permissions to be passed among users. These definitions tackle the delegation
of roles for an administrator-directed delegation where the security administrator, rather
than the user, decides the delegation of roles and their validity based on constraints set by
the model. Note that the concepts used in this work is based on the DAC/delegation
concepts in prior research (Liebrand et al., 2003).
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There exists a set of original users that have assigned roles and the ability to delegate those
roles.
There is a set of delegable users that have the ability to receive roles from original users.
Pass-on delegation is an ability given to original users that allows an individual the authority
to delegate the role even further. This means that an original user can delegate a role to a
delegable user with pass-on delegation, resulting in the permission of that delegable user to
pass the role on one step further to another user.
Delegation of roles is only allowed to delegable users. This means that original users can
delegate the role to a user in the delegable users set, and in the case that pass-on delegation is
authorized, the receiving delegable user can delegate the role to another user in the delegable
users set.

Table 3.5: DAC Delegations Assertions.
Given the assertions in Table 3.5, we now proceed to discuss DAC and delegation
aspects of the security model, where the security administrator models the allowed
delegations that can be defined (Defn. 32) and the allowed delegations that can be
received (Defn. 33) by each user.
Defn. 35: Let DelRoles  R , where DelRoles  {r1 , r2 ,..., ry } and ry  R , be defined
as the subset of all roles that are eligible for delegation.
Defn. 36: The set of Original Users, OU  U  DelRoles , OU  U  DelRoles ,
where DU  { u1 , r1 ,...,  u x , ry } , is the set of original users with their assigned
roles. That is, the members of OU have the form  u x , ry  OU , which means
that the user with identifier uID is allowed to delegate the role with identifier ry .
Example: Consider Figure 3.8 where the original users of the application have
been defined. The OU set would look as follows:
{<uId1, rId1>, <uId5, rId2>, <uId10, rId3>,
<uId11, rId3>, <uId20, rId4>}.

Defn. 37: The

set

of

Delegable

Users,

DU  U  DelRoles ,

where

DU  { u1 , r1 ,...,  u x , ry } , is the set of delegable users with the roles they are
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allowed to receive as part of a delegation. The members of DU have the form of
 u x , ry  DU , which means that the user u x can receive the role with identifier

ry when delegated by another user.

Example: For example, let us extend the scenario of Section 2.6. User Samantha,
a fourth year medical student with the role PhysicianIntern with an identifier
uId30;

and, user Emily, a first year medical student also with the role

PhysicianIntern

with identifier uId40. The acting Physician, Dr. Elisa

Fakington, has decided that Samantha should be delegated the role of Physician
whenever she is not available. Elisa wishes to do this with pass-on delegation (see
Defn. 34) so that Samantha can delegate the role to Emily should she not be
available. Therefore, the DU set would look as follows:
{<uId30, rId2>, <uId40, rId2>}.

Defn. 38: Pass-On Delegation, or PoD, is a Boolean {0,1} that indicates whether a
user and role pair  u x , rx  DU can delegate the role rx , originally received by a
user and role pair  u y , rx OU , one further step to another user u z that is set as
 u z , rx  DU . In this case, a PoD value of 0 means that the delegation has no

pass-on authority. A value of 1 means that the delegation has a pass-on authority.
Example: Following the example from Defn. 33, the user Elisa might grant
Samantha pass-on delegation so that in the case that Samantha is not available,
Emily would take over the role of Physician. In this case, PoD would have a
value of 1 (true).
Defn. 39: Delegable, or Del, is a Boolean {0,1} that indicate whether a user and role
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pair  u y , ry OU or a user and role pair  u x , rx  DU can execute the
permission of delegation to another user and role pair  u z , rz  DU , where
rz  ry or rz  rx .

Defn. 6 (RBAC with Delegation):

A user that has been authorized to RBAC

(but not LBAC) redefines the user u as a tuple  uID , u NAME , rID , Del, PoD  ,
where Del true means that the role can be delegated and when PoD true means
that the authority to delegate that role can be passed on when the role is
delegated. If Del is false, PoD must be false; if Del is true, PoD can be either
true or false.
Example: Following the scenario in Section 2.6, users of Figure 3.11 are the
members of the OU set. Their role delegation capabilities would look as follows:
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, rId1, false, false>,
<uId5, Elisa Fakington, rId2, true, false>,
<uId10, Leroy, rId3, true, false>,
<uId11, Jenkins, rId3, true, false>,
<uId20, Gail, rId4, true, true>}.

What this means is that the security administrator has several users defined (e.g.
Brock Ketchu, Elisa Fakington, etc.) with their roles (e.g. rId1, rId2, etc.). The security
administrator then takes the user-role assignment and defines the delegation capabilities
by leveraging the set of original users (see Defn. 32) and the delegable users (see Defn.
33). At the model level we then capture delegation as the user-role permission of
delegation to a secondary user (e.g. Samantha or Emily from Defn. 33) with the pass-on
delegation permission (see Defn. 34). All the information needed for the delegation is
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available in the model in the form of the user object (see Defn. 6 (RBAC with
Delegation)) and the user sets
The example of Defn. 6 (RBAC with Delegation)) shows that Brock Ketchum
cannot delegate his role of Psychiatrist. Elisa Fakington can delegate her role of
Physician,

but without Pass-on Delegation (i.e. Samantha or Emily, which would be in

the set of Delegable Users, DU, from the example of Defn. 33 would not have PoD). The
nurses Leroy and Jenkins follow the same role delegation rules as Elisa Fakington. Last,
Gail can delegate her role with PoD (the user who is assigned the role can delegate it one
step further). The users that act as recipients of these delegations, if triggered, must be
members of the Delegable Users (DU) set. Those users of the application that are not part
of the DU set cannot receive any role delegation.

3.6 Model: User Authorizations
In this section, we complete the model with a discussion of user authorizations and
the authentication process. Recall that we define authority as a capability obtained by a
user/role pair that allows him/her to perform operations over a schema‘s instances. In
other words, if user U with role R has authorization for instance I kSi , then s/he can perform
the permissions tied to R over the instantiated elements in I kSi . The following set of
definitions describes the characterization of authorization with respect to instances and
schemas.
Defn. 40: The

set

of

authorized

schemas,

AS  { uID1 , rID1 , sID1 ,...,  uIDx , rIDy , sIDz } , is defined as the schemas from the
application A that have been assigned to a user/role combination. That is, the tuple
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 u ID , rID , sID  AS represents an authorized schema to a user/role combination,
where u ID is the unique identifier for a user u U , rID is the unique identifier for
a role r  R , and s ID is the unique identifier for a schema S  A , where S is a
role-secured schema or an LBAC decorated schema.
In Defn. 35, the end result is that,the set AS is a derived set from the users U set (see
Defn. 6 RBAC Version) and the role-permission assignments RPA sets, in which the

u ID and rID are obtained from the U set, and the s ID is obtained from the RPA using
the rID as a seed.
Example: Recall the users from GetWellMobile in Figure 3.9. A sample schema
authorization object for the user Brock Ketchum would look as follows: <uId1,
rId1, sId1>.

This means that Brock is authorized to the CCR schema under the

role of Psychiatrist.
Defn. 41: The set of authorized instances (AI) is defined as the instances from the
application A that have been assigned to a user/role combination. That is, the tuple

 u ID , rID , iID  AI represents an authorized instance to a user/role combination,
where u ID is the unique identifier for a user u U , rID is the unique identifier for
a role r  R , and i ID is the unique identifier for an instance i  A .
Example: Following the example above, the user Brock Ketchum‘s instance
authorization object would be: <uId1, rId1, iId1>. This means that Brock is
authorized to the CCR instance of Carol Smith‘s record under the role of
Psychiatrist.
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The previous two definitions represent the authorization granted over schemas and
instances. Since in our model the security is defined at the schema level and enforced at
the instance level, schemas authorized to a user/role combination include those that have
permissions defined over their elements (Defn. 35 and Defn. 6 RBAC Version).
Complete instances are authorized to the user/role combination, and the security is
enforced with the permissions defined at their respective schemas. For example, if the
instances of one schema S1 is a patient record for inpatient visit (hospital) and another
schema S2 is a patient record for outpatient visit (MD office), we assign Carol Smith‘s
instances of S1 to user Elisa. Carol Smith‘s instances, following S2, can be assigned to
user Brock. The security over these instances is the result of a projection or decoration of
the schemas with respect to the user/role (Elisa as a physician would use the security
defined for her role in S1 and Brock as a psychiatrist would use the security defined for
his role in S2, for example).
To complete the work, we bring together the three access control models (RBAC,
LBAC, and DAC) in order to define the ability of users who play optional roles to access
elements of tree-structure documents which may have optional security levels. In our
proposed security model, DAC is considered a policy-level security component, which
means that authorizations over schemas and instances are automatic due to the defined
permissions (with regards to the schemas) and driven by a security-administrator (with
regards to the authorized instances). In terms of RBAC and LBAC, no preset order is
necessary in terms of which one is defined first for information applications where
components from both models are required; order is irrelevant with the final result
staying the same. The combined definition is:
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Defn. 6 (LBAC + RBAC):
LBAC

redefines

A user that has been authorized to both RBAC and
the

user

u

as

a

 u ID , u NAME , uCLR , u LBAC  R , u LBAC W , rID , SoD rID , ME rID , Del, PoD  , where

tuple

u ID is

the unique identifier for the user, u NAME is the tag for the user u, uCLR is the
clearance level assigned to the user (per LBAC components), u LBAC R / W are either
SS, SI, LS, SSR, or SSW, rID is the unique identifier for the assigned role r  R ,

SoD rID is the resulting set of roles that have a separation of duty for role rID ,
ME rID is the resulting set of roles that have a mutual exclusion with rID , Del
means that the role with the identifier u rID can be delegated (Boolean value), and
PoD means that pass-on delegation is allowed or not (Boolean value).
Example: Building on all the definitions and examples utilized in this chapter, the
finalized user object for the GetWellMobile application would look as follows:
{<uId1, Brock Ketchum, TS, SS, SI, rId1, Ø, Ø, false, false>,
<uId5, Elisa Fakington, S, SS, SSW, rId2, Ø, Ø, true, false>,
<uId10, Leroy, C, SS, LS, rId3, Ø, Ø, true, false>,
<uId11, Jenkins, S, SS, SI, rId3, Ø, Ø, true, false>,
<uId20, Gail, U, SS, SI, rId4, Ø, Ø, true, true>}.

Figure 3.12 demonstrates the way that a tree-structured schema would look after
RBAC project and projections are performed. In the figure notice that from the original
schema to the LBAC decorated schema, there has been a prune and decoration. This is
the execution of Defn. 8c and Defn. 9. When decorating the original S schema, there
was first a projection operation over those nodes that needed a classification. The

~

resulting S was then further pruned via a projection operation over a role R, yielding the
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~
~

schema S . The end result of this process is a role-secured schema with classification
labels on the nodes that would provide RBAC and LBAC security.
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Figure 3.12: LBAC Decoration and RBAC Projection of a Tree-structured Schema.

3.7 Access Control Related Work
Access control enforcement in tree-structured documents, most commonly with
XML, has two typical approaches. First, the enforcement can be done as query rewrites,
where these are generated depending on the access control policy. Second, the
enforcement can be embedded into the schema and documents to provide different views
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based on the policies in place. This embedded enforcement can include either security
policy definitions or cryptographic properties.
The work of (Damiani, De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Paraboschi, & Samarati, 2000)
presents an access control system that embeds the definition and enforcement of the
security policies in the structure of the XML documents in order to provide customizable
security. The security details can also be embedded in the XML DTD (L. Sun & Li,
2006), providing a level of generalization for documents that share the same DTD. This is
similar to our work in that security policies act in both a descriptive level of the XML
instances and target the XML instances, but differ in two ways. First, the work targets
XML DTD‘s, which have been replaced by schemas in the newest specifications of the
format. Second, the security policies are embedded into both the DTD and the instance.
When policies are changed, the cost of updating the XML instances is huge.
Another effort by (Damiani, Fansi, Gabillon, & Marrara, 2008) details a model that
tries to combine the two discussed methodologies to provide security to XML datasets.
The XML schema is extended with three security attributes: access, condition and dirty.
Any changes done to the security policy must be updated in the XML schema, and
therefore on any XML instance constructed from the schema. This is similar to our work
in that it ultimately targets security in XML document instances via XACML policies, but
our work differs by also taking into consideration XML document writing. For example,
XPath (Clark & DeRose, 1999) design allows it only to perform reading queries to XML
instances.
The encryption of different sections of an XML document with different encryption
keys is presented in (Bertino & Ferrari, 2002). These keys are then distributed to the
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specific users based on the access control policies in place. Special focus is given
content-based access control, and users are granted or denied access based on their
credentials (not roles, as in our approach). This makes it difficult to handle policies such
as role-delegation, time and value constraints, unless they are handled at the application
level. Efforts by (Bertino, Castano, Ferrari, & Mesiti, 2002) present Author-X, a Javabased system for DAC in XML documents, and provides customizable protection to the
documents with positive and negative authorizations. Author-X employs a policy base
DTD document that prunes an XML instance based on the security policies (similar to
our approach), but focuses on discretionary access control (different to our approach of
RBAC and its extensions and its lack of XML schemas).
Another example of embedding access control policies into the XML DTD and
instances is proposed by (Cao, Sun, & Wang, 2005; L. Sun & Li, 2006) via a usage
control model allows for a more custom control than the more commonly used access
control models. By embedding security into documents, changes to security have broad
impact on instances. When security policies change, the cost of re-securing all created
instances is directly proportional to the amount of instances. Work by (Rahaman,
Roudier, & Schaad, 2008) presents a distributed access control model for collaborative
environments where XML documents are used. The proposed framework utilizes a
cryptographic methodology, employing a key management scheme to enforce security
policies (much different to our secure software engineering approach). The framework
also supports delegation of access control decisions via the use of a lazy rekeying
protocol. Ultimately, this approach only handles the reading of XML instances, and does
not handle the destructive permissions such as insert, delete and update.
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The work of (Leonardi, Bhowmick, & Iwaihara, 2010) considers the scenario of a
federated access control model, in which the data provider and policy enforcement are
handled by different organizations. This approach relates to ours with regards to the
separation of the security policies from the data to be handled, but differs in the specifics
of where the policies‘ details are stored. (Kuper, Massacci, & Rassadko, 2005) has
presented a model consisting of access control policies over DTD‘s (again, outmoded in
XML) with XPath expressions in order to achieve XML security. The purpose of their
model is similar to ours, as it aims to provide different authorized views of an XML
document based on the user‘s credentials. However, the significant difference is that this
approach combines query rewriting and authentication methods, whereas our approach
can be applied to any non-normative XACML architecture (having a policy enforcement
point) for both reading and updating, as well as XPath or XQuery queries.
Last, the work of (Müldner, Leighton, & Miziołek, 2009) presents an approach of
supporting RBAC to handle the special case of role proliferation, which is an
administrative issue that happens in RBAC when roles are changed, added, and evolve
over time, making security of an organization difficult to manage. This approach supports
the encryption of segments of the XML document. Our approach doesn‘t address role
proliferation; however, by separating our security into an XACML policy, we do insulate
role proliferation from impacting an application‘s XML schemas and instances.
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Chapter 4
UML Security Extensions for
Tree-Structured Documents
In this chapter, the second major component of our security framework for treestructured documents involves the realization of the security model in Chapter 3 as a
series of new unified modeling language (UML) diagrams (Fowler, 2004) that capture the
characteristics of the security model and allow us to augment the software engineering
process of UML with an information engineering process for tree-structure documents.
Recall from Section 2.7 that UML provides a large variety of diagrams for the
visualization of different software requirements: class, component, deployment, activity,
use-case, state-machine, communication, sequence, etc. UML provide the benefit of
reducing misinterpretation and promoting simple communication of domain requirements
with its visual notation (Lange & Chaudron, 2005). However, while UML can be utilized
to define security requirements, what is lacking in UML is actual diagrams that are
dedicated to, in our interest, access control models (RBAC, LBAC, and DAC) that allow
the definition of security requirements using new security UML diagrams that seamlessly
integrate with the UML model and unified design process. This is particularly true for
domains such as healthcare where the information to be utilized is private and often
governed by legal constructs that assure its proper use and dissemination, as we have
described in Section 2.6 and illustrated with a detailed example for our security model of
Chapter 3.
The work presented in this chapter leverages off of early work that has extended
UML with new diagrams for RBAC, mandatory access control (MAC) (Bell & La
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Padula, 1976), and DAC capabilities (Pavlich-Mariscal, 2008; Pavlich-Mariscal,
Demurjian, & Michel, 2010) from an object-oriented perspective. This prior work defines
role slices that contain the methods of an object-oriented application that are both
assigned and prohibited on a role-by-role basis, along with the ability to tag roles with
classifications in support of MAC and support delegation of author. The work also
generates aspect-oriented AspectJ enforcement code for a UML design augmented with
security. The work in this chapter also meshes with work on extending NIST with
collaboration of duty and adaptive workflow capabilities (Berhe, Demurjian, & Agresta,
2009; Berhe et al., 2010; Berhe, Demurjian, Gokhale, Pavlich-Mariscal, & Saripalle,
2011) that also added new UML diagrams to represent users, roles, collaborations, and
the required interaction of users towards a common goal. To support enforcement in an
object-oriented RBAC context, the Java Meta Language is leveraged to define policies
that can be directly embedded in code. The work in this chapter augments the overall
UML design process by providing new UML diagrams for the information engineering of
tree structure documents (see the security model of Chapter 3) that is integrated with an
overall application process that includes object-oriented and collaborative capabilities.
These three approaches have been integrated into a secure software engineering approach
for functional, collaborative, and information concerns for complex applications like the
one given in Section 2.6 (Pavlich-Mariscal, Berhe, De la Rosa Algarín, A., & Demurjian,
2014).
The formal definition of the UML metamodel by OMG with the Meta-Object Facility
(MOF) allows the extension of the modeling language with several degrees of formality,
as reviewed in Section 2.7. MOF facilitates Model Driven Architecture (MDA) (Kleppe,
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Warmer, Bast, & Explained, 2003; Soley, 2000), another standard that aims to platform
independent models (PIM) (Burmester, Giese, & Schäfer, 2005) to platform specific
models (PSM) (Kelly & Tolvanen, 2008). UML can be extended via the use of the MOF,
which consists of four layers: the M3 layer consists of the meta-meta model, M2-models
are built using the M3 language. In turn, M2-models describe the elements of the M1layer, while the M1-models describe the elements of the M0-layer (the runtime instance
of the modeled system). The other major benefit of UML that the security framework
presented in this dissertation makes use of is the automatic generation of code from the
diagrams (Montrieux et al., 2010), which has also been done in our prior work on RBAC,
MAC, and DAC (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and NIST extensions for collaboration of
duty and adaptive workflow (Berhe et al., 2010). The security framework presented
herein further extends and supplements that capability by mapping the new UML
extensions for the security model in Chapter 3 with XACML policy elements. This results
in the automatic generation of proper enforcement ready for deployment in information
systems. Towards this purpose, we advance the information security problem from a
software engineering perspective, elevating information security to a first-class citizen of
the software design and development process.
In support of this work, this chapter presents a set of UML diagrams to realize the
security model in Chapter 3 into a format that can be utilized to design an application that
has functional (object-oriented), collaborative, and information security concerns. To
accomplish this, we introduce new UML diagrams that correspond to the key security
model characteristics as given in Chapter 3. First, there exists a necessity to represent a
tree-structured schema (see Definitions 1 and 2 from Section 3.1) for which we propose
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the creation of a new UML diagram to represent such a schema as a tree structured
collection of elements, namely, the Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD). Second,
to identify those portions of the tree-structure document schema as captured in DSCD
(see Definitions 8a, 8b, 8c, 9, and 10 in Section 3.2) , we propose the creation of a new
UML diagram that identifies the subset of DSCD that needs to be protected, namely, the
new Secure Information Diagram (SID). Third, to represent RBAC security capabilities
(see Definitions 11 and 12 from Section 3.3), we propose a new UML diagram to
represent the roles and provide the ability to define. For elements of a schema,
permissions for RBAC (read, write, etc.) and classifications for LBAC, we propose the
new UML Document Role-Slice Diagram (DRSD). Note that DSCD, SID, and DSRC are
generalizations of our prior work that specified these diagrams for XML (De la Rosa
Algarín, A. et al., 2012; De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013); these new document based
diagrams can apply to different document standards (e.g., XML, JSON, OWL, etc.).
Fourth, to support LBAC features (see Definitions 26, 27, and 28 in Section 3.4), we
propose the new UML LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) that builds off of the
SID and serves as a means to define which elements in the tree-structured document need
classifications. Fourth, to tie together RBAC, LBAC and DAC is the User Diagram
(UD), created to consider the orthogonal nature between RBAC and LBAC, as well as the
role-delegation and authorization assignments from DAC. Fifth, to support the ability to
have privileges delegated from one user to another (see Definitions 31 to 35 in Section
3.5), the new UML Delegation Diagram (DD) provides the ability to define which users
and role pairs can delegate or be delegated. Lastly, to support the definition of users and
their authorization (see Definition 6 in Section 3.1 and its augmented versions in Sections

95

3.3 and 3.4), we propose the new UML Authorization Diagram (AD) that provides the
ability to determine which schemas and instances are tied to a user/role pair (see
Definitions 35 and 36 in Section 3.6)
The remainder of this chapter is organized into four subsections. Section 4.1
introduces and motivates the usage of UML for secure information engineering for treestructured documents and places our work into a context with previous work (Berhe et
al., 2011; Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) that includes functional, collaborative, and
information security concerns. Using this as basis, Section 4.2 presents the new UML
diagrams for our security model, namely, DSCD, DRSD, SID, LFD, DD, UD, and AD,
and provides a detailed example of their usage using the healthcare scenario from Section
2.6 and by reformulating the example in Chapter 3 from a model to a UML context.
Section 4.3 complements the formalization of the new UML diagrams by starting their
definition via a utilization of the UML metamodel to define these new security diagrams.
Section 4.4 brings all of these diagrams together and presents a secure information
engineering process, and shows the way that this process it be placed into an appropriate
context with the work presented in Section 4.1 for designing an healthcare application for
functional, collaborative, and information concerns. This chapter concludes with detailed
discussion on the related work in Section 4.5 as related to security modeling via UML.

4.1 Motivation and Usage of UML for Secure Information Engineering
The software development process has evolved over 30+ years from the waterfall
model (Royce, 1970) to the iterative model (Larman & Basili, 2003) to the spiral model
(Boehm, 1988) to the unified process model (Jacobson, 1999) to agile development
lifecycle (Cohen, Lindvall, & Costa, 2003). Despite this long history, these processes
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have yet to address challenges of large-scale applications that have varied concerns
(users‘ interfaces, server functionality, database support, tracking and logging, security,
etc.) that are often tangled, e.g., an object-oriented application, code to read/write the
database can be spread across multiple classes even if the database is abstracted via
Hibernate (Bauer & King, 2005). All of these different concerns end up intertwined and
spread out across the application‘s varied components. As a result, the traceability of
security through different aspects, which in our case involves functional, collaborative,
and information, capabilities, cannot be easily isolated. This chapter presents UML
extensions and a secure information engineering process that elevates information
security to a primary step of the software development process as depicted in Figure 4.1
where the prior work on functional (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and collaborative
(Berhe et al., 2010) security with extensions with UML yields a secure engineering
approach that encompasses the different aspects of a system‘s security. In our focus on
information security, representing the tree-structured schemas with new UML diagrams
allows us to tackle document security from an information engineering perspective. This
provides several benefits, including a more consistent process towards secure information
engineering, and facilitating the secure policy generation process by utilizing modeling
artifacts that contain all the pertinent information for the security policy.
To provide a motivation for the usage of UML for security design, consider Figure 4.1
more closely, where a secure software engineering approach for functional, collaborative,
and information concerns (focused on tree-structured documents) is intended to visually
model RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. From a functional perspective, the work of (PavlichMariscal et al., 2010), extended UML with new diagrams for RBAC, MAC, and DAC to
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identify a subset of the object-oriented classes and their methods that need to be securely
controlled in terms of permissions (methods) assigned to users by roles, and to allow
these roles to be assigned permissions via a new role-oriented diagram. From a
collaborative perspective, the work of (Berhe et al., 2010) extended NIST RBAC and
UML with new diagrams to support the specification of collaboration among users that
need to coordinate their activities to achieve a particular tasks in a series of steps over
time. Our work in this chapter adds an information perspective, to allow tree-structured
documents to be securely handled in support of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC by allowing
different portions of the instances of a document to be delivered to different users based
on roles, permissions, and classifications. Individually, all three approaches can generate
appropriate enforcement mechanisms (AspectJ code for functional, Java Meta Language
code for collaboration, and XACML policies for information). The combination of all
three concerns promotes security as an integral part of a secure software engineering
approach, while tracking software quality assurance in terms of the consistency of the
security and non-security requirements.

New UML Diagrams
for Functional-Based
RBAC, MAC and DAC

Provide New Visual Security
Policies in UML to Model
Access Control Security
Concerns

New UML Diagrams for
Data-Sharing Based
Collaboration and
Adaptive Workflow

Functional,
Collaborative,
Information

Code/Policy
Generation

Security
Framework for
Information
XACML Policy Generation

Aspect Oriented Enforcement
Code and XACML Enforcement
Policies

Figure 4.1: An Abstraction Process for Concerns.
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4.2 UML Security Extensions for Tree-Structured Documents
The basis of the work presented herein leverages the work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al.,
2010) for functional security concerns (RBAC, MAC, and DAC) supported in an objectoriented context within UML with new diagrams in order to support the definition of
informational security concerns for tree-structure documents via new UML diagrams for
RBAC, LBAC, and DAC. Our work transitions the security model of Chapter 3 to
support security of tree-structured document schemas and instances in a granular
approach that focuses on the elements, rather than the work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al.,
2010) that has focused on providing secure access to methods. However, our work on a
security framework for tree structured documents has been influenced by some concepts
from (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010), namely: the secure subsystem diagram (SSD),
which denotes all of the classes and methods in the system that requires protection; the
role-slice diagram (RSD), which provides a means to define permissions by role to the
classes and methods that comprise the SSD; and, the user diagram (UD), which focuses
in denoting the roles assigned to each user in the system, with the role retaining the actual
permissions. The concept of identifying a secure portion via SSD corresponds to our
identification of the portion of a document schema that needs to be protected, the ability
to define a RSD for the methods allowed against SSD corresponds to our using the new
document role-slice diagram to define permissions against a portion of the document
schema, and, our user diagram corresponds to the actual document instances and portions
thereof that are available to each user with a role from a permission perspective (e.g.,
read, write, etc.).
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This section covers the new diagrams that extends UML with RBAC, LBAC, and
DAC, with a specific target of tree-structured documents with elements that have defined
schemas and instances (see Definitions 1 and 2 from Section 3.1). The UML extensions it
this section generalize our prior work (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013) that defined a
set of new UML diagrams that were specialized for XML. By generalizing, we are able to
provide a design approach in UML that can work for applications that will be built with
XML, JSON, OWL, etc., all which can be aligned into a document-tree structure format.
Towards that end, the remainder of this section reviews six new UML diagrams: DSCD,
DRSD, SID, LFD, DD, and AD. More specifically, Section 4.2.1 introduces the
Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD) that can handle any tree-structured schema to
model the document and realize the instance (see Definitions 8a, 8b, 8c, 9, and 10 in
Section 3.2). Note that in showing examples for DSCD and other new UML diagrams, we
utilize both the HL7 CDA and CCR schemas, which are specializations of a tree-structure
document whose structure can be represented with the UML DSCD modeling construct
called the UML Profile. The new UML Secure Information Diagram (SID) is presented in
section 4.2.2, and is a UML extension that allows security administrators determine
which subtree of the original document schema tree requires a level of security some sort
of security (e.g. role filtering, LBAC sensitivity, etc.). Given DSCD and SID, the next
new diagram in Section 4.2.3 is the Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD) to define the
role and the associated permissions to access elements (see Definitions 11 and 12 from
Section 3.3). Next, in Section 4.2.4, LBAC is supported via the definition of a new UML
LBAC Secure Information (LSID) to capture the capabilities of security model (see
Definitions 26, 27, and 28 in Section 3.4) that are used to define access modes and
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classifications for schema elements; this decorates the originally created SID. Then,
Section 4.2.5 contains the User Diagram (UD) for the definition of users (see Definition
6 in Section 3.1 and its augmented versions in Sections 3.3 and 3.4). To handle delegation
of roles between users, in Section 4.2.6, the new UML Delegation Diagram (DD) is
proposed (see Definitions 31 to 35 in Section 3.5) to capture which users and roles are
allowed to delegate authority in an application. Finally, Section 4.2.7 contains the
Authorization Diagram (AD) that ties schemas and instances with the user/role
combination to arrive at a culminating new diagram (see Definitions 35 and 36 in Section
3.6 and Definition 6 in Section 3.6).

4.2.1 The Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD)
The new UML Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), shown in Figure 4.2 for
HL7 CDA‘s clinical_document_header and section subtrees and in Figure 4.3 for the
CCR segment of the healthcare example of Chapter 2, is an artifact that holds all of the
characteristics of the schema, including structure, data type, and value constraints. The
DSCD graphically represents the schemas utilized by an information system as described
by Definitions 1 and 2 from Section 3.1. Recall that the assumption of the work presented
in this dissertation is that schemas are characterized by a tree-structure, possibly
complimented with data type constraints. To achieve this, we utilize a UML profile for
tree-structured documents. There has been research in UML profiles for tree-structured
documents, mainly utilizing XML (Bernauer, Kappel, & Kramler, 2003; Bernauer,
Kappel, & Kramler, 2004), which range from information modeling (Carlson, 2008;
Combi & Oliboni, 2006; Conrad, Scheffner, & Christoph Freytag, 2000; Routledge, Bird,
& Goodchild, 2002) to systems modeling represented in XML (Bray et al., 1998). This
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work also considers round-trip engineering, a concept that denotes the ability of
producing a UML diagram from XML and vice-versa, without the loss of information.
For the scope of the work in this dissertation, we generate a DSCD a UML diagram from
a source tree-document schema, which for the purposes or demonstrating the concepts, is
actually an XML schema. To facilitate this process, we utilize the UML Profile concept
that allows new diagrams to be defined using the various UML concepts (stereotypes,
tags, constraints applied to classes, attributes, operations, etc.) that allow a tree structured
document to be transitioned into DSCD, and for the particular purposes of this section, to
demonstrate the way that an XML schema (a tree structured format) can be transitioned
to the new UML DSCD diagram; this is shown in Table 4.1.
While it is possible to utilize the UML profile to represent an entire schema as a UML
package, we instead have chosen to represent each schema as a tree of stereotyped
classes. This approach was chosen in order to capture the hierarchical structure of a
schema as a series of related classes. Table 4.1 has three columns: the first column
represents the features of tree structured document, the second column defines the
corresponding XML equivalents of these features, and the third column transitions the
second column into the equivalent UML profile concept. In the first row of Table 4.1, a
general element in the tree-structured document is equivalent to an XML element
(xsd:element) and is realized as a UML class; the second row maps the element name to
a UML class name. In the third row of Table 4.1, an element attribute in the treestructured document is equivalent to a generic attribute in XML which can be mapped to
a «stereotyped» attribute in UML. The fourth row corresponds to a patient – child
relationship at the schema level to identify a tree and its subtrees, which in XML is
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observed as nested elements, and is represented as a UML dependency relationship in the
DSCD. The fifth row of Table 4.1 describes complex elements (those that are built out of
many sub-elements), which in XML are denoted as xsd:complexType and in the DSCD
are denoted as a UML class with the «complexType» stereotype. The sixth row covers a
similar case, considering sequences or lists of elements, which in XML are denoted as
xsd:sequence

and in the DSCD are denoted as a UML class with the «sequence»

stereotype. Aggregation of attributes are handled with the seventh row of Table 4.1 and is
represented as xsd:attributeGroup in XML and as a UML class with the
«attributeGroup» stereotype in the DSCD. In the eighth row of Table 4.1, groups of

elements in a tree-structured document are equivalent to an XML xsd:group node and is
represented as a UML class with the «group» stereotype in DSCD. The ninth row of Table
4.1 handles acceptable or allowable values for elements, which in XML are usually
maxOccurs

and minOccurs attributes to an XML element constraints, realized as a

«constraint» stereotyped class member in DSCD. In the tenth row of Table 4.1, indirect

references allow elements of a tree-structure document to be associated with one another,
which in XML is a ref attribute on an element that are represented as a «ref» class
member from UML profile in the DSCD. Lastly, in the eleventh row of Table 4.1, for
tree-structured document, the parent-child relationship between non-named elements
corresponds

to

non-named

xsd:attributeGroup,

elements

in

XML

(e.g.,

xsd:complexType,

etc.) and is represented with a UML directed association

relationship between classes in the DSCD. Note that by using these mappings in Table
4.1 it is possible to develop an algorithm that operate over an XML schema to generate a
DSCD equivalent in UML. Note also that there would need to be other versions of Table
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4.1 for other data formats (e.g., JSON, RDF, etc.) where the second column of the table
would be replaced with the relevant model constructs from the other formats.
Tree-Structured Document
Component

XML Analog

DSCD Component

General Element

Element

UML Class

General Element Name

Element Name

UML Class Name

General Element Attribute

Generic Attribute

Stereotyped Attribute

Parent – child relationship of a
Tree - Subtree
schema (tree-subtree)

UML Dependency
Relationship

Complex Type of Elements
and/or Attributes

XML xs:complexType

Stereotyped «complexType»
UML Class

Sequential Element Order

XML xs:sequence

Stereotyped «sequence» UML
Class

Aggregation of Attributes

XML xs:attributeGroup

Stereotyped «attributeGroup»
UML Class

Grouping of Elements to form
XML xs:group
a complex type

Stereotyped «group» UML
Class

Acceptable Values for
Elements

XML constraints via
minOccurs, maxOccurs

Stereotyped «constraint» class
member

Indirect Reference of
Elements

XML ref

Stereotyped «ref» name class
member

Parent – child relationship of
non-named Elements

XML Element – non-named
child element

UML Directed Association
Relationship

Table 4.1: Specialized UML Profile for Tree-Structured Document to DSCD with XML
Cases.
To illustrate the process of creating a DSCD that transitions from an XML diagram,
consider the DSCD shown in Figure 4.3 has been created from the HL7 CDA schema
segment from Figure 2.4, which we repeat in Figure 4.2. To create Figure 4.3, we utilize
the equivalences from the tree-document structure and XML that then aligns the various
XML concepts (column two of Figure 4.1) in order to map them to the appropriate UML
profile concepts (column three of Figure 4.1). To begin, consider lines 1, 2, and 28 of the
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XML in Figure 4.2 which correspond to a set of UML constructs (A/B, C, and D in
Figure 4.3) that will be generated from the XML source. Specifically, these three lines of
XML cause the creation of three UML classes corresponding to the three labeled boxes
A/B, C and D in Figure 4.3 that are inside the dashed box at the top of the figure. First,
from

line

1

in

Figure

name="clinical_document_header">

4.2,

we

have

<xsd:element

where the element being defined in the XML

schema maps to a UML class with the same element name that acts as the root of the
DSCD (see UML class next to A in Figure 4.3). This mapping uses rows 1 and 2 of Table
4.1 to generate a class and its class name clinical_document_header. Second, notice
that in the XML, the xsd:complexType in lines 2 to 33 (open/close) in Figure 4.2 is
composed of a xsd:sequence (lines 3 to 27 in Figure 4.2), an xsd:attributeGroup
(line 28 in Figure 4.2), and three xsd:attribute (lines 29-32 in Figure 4.2. The
xsd:complexType of XML CDA in

lines 2 to 33 (open/close) causes the generation of a

UML «complexType» stereotyped generic class (see B in Figure 4.3), connected with a
direct association to the root UML class (rows 4, 5, 7 and 11 of Table 4.1, shown in A/B
of Figure 4.3). Once the «complexType» has been generated, it is then possible to create
its components. The xsd:sequence for lines 3 to 27 causes the generation of the UML
class next to C in Figure 4.3 that creates a sequence (list) that contains all of the refs
given on lines 4 to 26 generated as UML «elements» as captured within the dotted box at
the bottom of Figure 4.3 (see F). These UML «elements» are stereotyped with respect to
the attributes where the XML ref is represented as a «ref» stereotype and constraints are
represented as a «constraint» stereotype, as shown in row 10 of Table 4.1. Similarly, the
xsd:attributeGroup

in line 28 causes the generation of the UML construct next to D in
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Figure 4.3 that has the name of ―common_atts‖ from line 28 of Figure 4.2. Finally, the
last portion of the «complexType» is generated corresponding to the three attributes:
HL7-Name, T,

and RIM-Version (lines 29, 31, and 32, respectively) resulting in the

generation of E in the top right portion of Figure 4.3.
1. <xsd:element name="clinical_document_header">
2.
<xsd:complexType>
3.
<xsd:sequence>
4.
<xsd:element ref="id"/>
5.
<xsd:element ref="set_id" minOccurs="0"/>
6.
<xsd:element ref="version_nbr" minOccurs="0"/>
7.
<xsd:element ref="document_type_cd"/>
8.
<xsd:element ref="service_tmr" minOccurs="0"/>
9.
<xsd:element ref="origination_dttm"/>
10. <xsd:element ref="copy_dttm" minOccurs="0"/>
11. <xsd:element ref="confidentiality_cd" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
12. <xsd:element ref="document_relationship" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
13. <xsd:element ref="fulfills_order" minOccurs="0"/>
14. <xsd:element ref="patient_encounter" minOccurs="0"/>
15. <xsd:element ref="authenticator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
16. <xsd:element ref="legal_authenticator" minOccurs="0"/>
17. <xsd:element ref="intended_recipient" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
18. <xsd:element ref="originator" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
19. <xsd:element ref="originating_organization" minOccurs="0"/>
20. <xsd:element ref="transcriptionist" minOccurs="0"/>
21. <xsd:element ref="provider" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
22. <xsd:element ref="service_actor" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
23. <xsd:element ref="patient"/>
24. <xsd:element ref="originating_device" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
25. <xsd:element ref="service_target" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
26. <xsd:element ref="local_header" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
27. </xsd:sequence>
28. <xsd:attributeGroup ref="common_atts"/>
29. <xsd:attribute name="HL7-NAME" type="xsd:string"
30. fixed="doc_serv_as_clin_doc_header"/>
31. <xsd:attribute name="T" type="xsd:string" fixed="service"/>
32. <xsd:attribute name="RIM-VERSION" type="xsd:string" fixed="0.98"/>
33. </xsd:complexType>
34. </xsd:element>

Figure 4.2: HL7 CDA ‗clinical_document_header‘ Schema Segment.
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«sequence»

D

C

A

«element»
clinical_document_header

B

«complexType»

«attribute» HL7-NAME
«type» name=“xsd:string”
«constraint» fixed=“document_service_as_clinical_document_header”

«attributeGroup»
«ref» name=“common_atts”

E

F

«element»

«element»

«ref» name=“id”

«element»

«ref» name=“service_tmr”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«ref» name=“copy_dttm”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element»
«ref» name=“confidentiality_cd”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«ref» name=“origination_tmr”

«element»

«element»
«ref» name=“patient_encounter”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element»

«element»

«element»

«element»
«ref» name=“intended_recepient”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«element»

«element»

«ref» name=“originating_organization”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element»
«ref» name=“originating_device”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«ref» name=“service_actor”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«ref» name=“authenticator”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«ref» name=“fulfills_order”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«ref» name=“originator”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«element»
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«ref» name=“document_type_cd”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element»

«ref» name=“document_relationship”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«attribute» RIM-VERSION
«type» name=“xsd:string”
«constraint» fixed=“0.98”

«element»

«element»
«ref» name=“set_id”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«ref» name=“version_nbr”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element»

«attribute» T
«type» name=“xsd:string”
«constraint» fixed=“service”

«element»
«ref» name=“transcriptionist”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element»

«element»
«ref» name=“provider”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«element»
«ref» name=“local_header”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

«ref» name=“patient”

«element»
«ref» name=“service_target”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«constraint» maxOccurs=“-1”

Figure 4.3: A DSCD for the CDA Segment.
The conversion of the CCR schema from Figure 2.5 as repeated in Figure 4.4 follows
a similar process in conversion to the CDA example, with Figure 4.5 showing the first
portion of the CCR schema as a DSCD after applying the mapping process from Table
4.1. As with the prior example, the ContinuityOfCareRecord root (see row 3 of Table
4.1 and line 1 of Figure 4.4) contains a xsd:complexType that contains a sequence which
in turn contains a set of elements CCRDocumentID (line 4), Language (line 5), Version
(line 6), DataTime (line 7), Patient (lines 8 to 14), and Body (lines 16 to 64 and
following – no shown). In converting these to UML as shown in Figure 4.5, the
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ContinuityOfCareRecord

as given in the dashed top portion of the figures is

represented as a «complexType» that contains a «sequence» as given in A, which in turn
contains four simple attributes that are represented as «element» stereotyped UML
classes as given in B, a Patient that has in turn a «complexType», «sequence», and
«element» with an ActorID as given in C, and finally an «element» Body that is a
«complexType», and a «sequence» as given in D of multiple «element»s as given in E.
The Body subtree of the XML document is composed of subtrees for: Payers (line 19 of
Figure 4.4), AdvancedDirectives (line 26 of Figure 4.4), Support (line 34 of Figure
4.4), FunctionalStatus (line 42 of Figure 4.4), Problems (line 49 of Figure 4.4), and
FamilyHistory

(line 56 of Figure 4.4); these are shown in the bottom dotted area of

Figure 4.5). These XML subtrees are mapped to the corresponding UML diagrams in E of
Figure 4.5 in the bottom dashed box, where each of the «element» classes are translated
to UML diagrams that contain a «element» that is composed of a «complexType» with a
«sequence», that has an «element». As an example, the XML element that has a
AdvancedDirectives (line

26 of Figure 4.4) acts as the root of the subtree right after the

«sequence» stereotyped UML class (shown in the F in the middle of Figure 4.5 following
row 6 of Table 4.1). The constraint of AdvancedDirectives, which is an XML
minOccurs

constraint (line 26 of Figure 4.4), is represented as a stereotyped member

«constraint» minOccurs=”0” of the UML class. The direct children, the complexType
(line 27 of Figure 4.4) and sequence (line 28 of Figure 4.4) elements in the XML schema
are

represented

as

AdvancedDirective

directed

association UML classes. The leaf node, the

element (line 29 of Figure 4.4), is represented as an «element»
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1. <xs:element name="ContinuityOfCareRecord">
2.
<xs:complexType>
3.
<xs:sequence>
4.
<xs:element name="CCRDocumentObjectID" type="xs:string"/>
5.
<xs:element name="Language" type="CodedDescriptionType"/>
6.
<xs:element name="Version" type="xs:string"/>
7.
<xs:element name="DateTime" type="DateTimeType"/>
8.
<xs:element name="Patient" maxOccurs="2">
9.
<xs:complexType>
10. <xs:sequence>
11. <xs:element name="ActorID" type="xs:string"/>
12. </xs:sequence>
13. </xs:complexType>
14. </xs:element>
15. …
16. <xs:element name="Body">
17. <xs:complexType>
18. <xs:sequence>
19. <xs:element name="Payers" minOccurs="0">
20. <xs:complexType>
21. <xs:sequence>
22. <xs:element name="Payer" type="InsuranceType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
23. </xs:sequence>
24. </xs:complexType>
25. </xs:element>
26. <xs:element name="AdvanceDirectives" minOccurs="0">
27. <xs:complexType>
28. <xs:sequence>
29. <xs:element name="AdvanceDirective" type="CCRCodedDataObjectType"
30. maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
31. </xs:sequence>
32. </xs:complexType>
33. </xs:element>
34. <xs:element name="Support" minOccurs="0">
35. <xs:complexType>
36. <xs:sequence>
37. <xs:element name="SupportProvider" type="ActorReferenceType"
38. maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
39. </xs:sequence>
40. </xs:complexType>
41. </xs:element>
42. <xs:element name="FunctionalStatus" minOccurs="0">
43. <xs:complexType>
44. <xs:sequence>
45. <xs:element name="Function" type="FunctionType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
46. </xs:sequence>
47. </xs:complexType>
48. </xs:element>
49. <xs:element name="Problems" minOccurs="0">
50. <xs:complexType>
51. <xs:sequence>
52. <xs:element name="Problem" type="ProblemType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
53. </xs:sequence>
54. </xs:complexType>
55. </xs:element>
56. <xs:element name="FamilyHistory" minOccurs="0">
57. <xs:complexType>
58. <xs:sequence>
59. <xs:element name="FamilyProblemHistory" type="FamilyHistoryType"
60. maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
61. </xs:sequence>
62. </xs:complexType>
63. </xs:element>
64. …

Figure 4.4: CCR – Continuity of Care Record Schema Segment.
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stereotyped UML class with the minOccurs constraint (line 30 of Figure 4.4) as a
stereotyped «constraint» member (row 9 of Table 4.1).
«element»
ContinuityOfCareRecord

A

«complexType»
«sequence»

B

C

«element» CCRDocumentObjectID

D

«element» Patient

«element» Body

«constraint» maxOccurs=“2”

«element» Language

«complexType»
«complexType»

«element» Version

«sequence»
«sequence»

«element» ActorID

«element» DateTime

E
«element» AdvanceDirectives

«element» Payers

F

«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element» Support

«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«complexType»

«complexType»

«complexType»

«sequence»

«sequence»

«sequence»

«element» AdvanceDirective

«element» Payer
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”

«element» FunctionalStatus

«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”

«element» Problems
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element» SupportProvider
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”

«element» FamilyHistory
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«complexType»

«complexType»

«complexType»

«sequence»

«sequence»

«sequence»

«element» Problem

«element» Function
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”

«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”

«element» FamilyProblemHistory
«constraint» minOccurs=“unbounded”

Figure 4.5: A DSCD for the CCR Segment.

4.2.2 The Secure Information Diagram (SID)
The DSCD is utilized to provide input for the definition and construction of the
Secure Information Diagram (SID), which represents: the different portions of the DSCD
that need to be secured based on the overall security requirements for an application.
Essentially, the intent is to identify a subtree of the DSCD that must be secured for access
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by users. In the case of our sample DSCDs in Figures 4.3 and 4.5, a subtree and/or a set
of elements will be identified that must be securely controlled. The SID utilizes
extensions to the UML metamodel (M2-layer) in order to represent those portions of the
DSCD that need to be securely controlled. Graphically, at the model layer of the MOF
(M1), the SID is an UML package with the stereotype «SecureInformation» that contains
all of the respective classes of elements from the schema to be secured. The SID acts as
the visual representation of the projection operation (see Definition 8c in Section 3.2)
over the schema and elements (see Defs. 1 and 2 of Section 3.1). The effective subset of
elements from the schema that result from the projection over the original schema‘s
elements is visually represented with the SID. For example, consider the left side of
Figure

4.6,

which

shows

clinical_document_header

of

a

SID

with

CDA‘s

elements

(e.g.,

and section in Figure 4.3) as classes while the right side

of Figure 4.6 has an example of a SID with the CCR elements (e.g., Body, Patient,
Problems, FamilyHistory

in Figure 4.5) with some of the elements organized as a

subtree of the original schema (Body, Problems, FamilyHistory).
The security administrator that is in charge of designing the enforcement policies of
the clinic in the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6 has the responsibility to identify the
elements of a schema that need security control in terms of projecting their access (read,
aggregate, insert, update, and delete). This can include from Figure 4.2 and the CDA
elements such as patient, patient_encounter, and originating_organization, and
from Figure 4.4 and the CCR elements such as the Patient, Body, Problems and
FamilyHistory

with the last three a subtree The security administrator will interact with

all of the application‘s stakeholders in order to identify those portions of the application
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A‘s schemas (see Definition 5 in Section 3.1) that need to be securely controlled. Once
these have been identified, the security administrator can perform a projection operation
(Definition 8c from Section 3.2) over the elements that need some level of security, to
specifically select the set of elements from the DSCD that will comprise the SID
package. As a result, the SID elements are taken from across all of the schemas of the
application A. In fact, elements may be structured is packages that form a subtree as
shown in the right side of Figure 4.6 for CCR. These elements might need RBAC
permission defined over them in order to control destructive (insert, update, or delete) or
non-destructive (read or aggregate) operations (Definitions 15 to 17 from Section 3.3), or,
decorated with classification levels from LBAC (Definitions 9 and 24 to 28 from Section
3.4) to provide a more complete security policy, which will be further discussed in
Section 4.2.4 with the LBAC SID. Note that the process of creating SID is iterative in
nature, and the security administrator needs to arrive a preliminary version and constantly
revisit the content of an SID as work on defining roles, permissions, privileges, and users
are being defined and modified over time. There is also a need to revisit SID whenever
there are any substantial changes (additions, deletions, or modifications) to the schemas
for an application.
«SecureInformation»
ClinicalDocumentArchitectureSystem

«SecureInformation»
ContinuityOfCareRecordSystem

«element»
«ref» name=“originating_organization”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element»

«name» “Allergies”

«element»
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

«element»

«element»

«ref» name=“patient”

«name» “Assessment”

«element»
«name» “Past Medical History”

«element»
«name» “Vital Signs”

«element» Patient

«element» Body

«constraint» maxOccurs=“2”

«element» Problems
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
«element» FamilyHistory
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”

Figure 4.6: SID with CDA Elements (left) and CCR Elements (right).
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4.2.3 The Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD)
To support RBAC of operations that target schemas and their instances and to enable
granular LBAC labeling of elements, it is necessary to provide a construct that security
administrators can utilize to describe policies and segments of policies. Towards this
purpose, we present the Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD) that organizes the roles
(see Definitions 11 and 12 from Section 3.3) into a hierarchy Graphically, the DRSD is an
UML package with the stereotype «DRSD» with class diagrams as members that
represent each of the elements of the schema (e.g., xs:complexType, xs:element,
xs:sequence,

etc. for XML) that need to be secured. These elements appear in the

DSCD for the CDA schema as given in Figure 4.3. These diagram segments, which are
organized hierarchically depending on their position with respect to the schema tree,
contain stereotypes that represent the operations permitted by the role being described.
For example, the middle-left of Figure 4.7 shows the role slice for a Nurse with respect to
classes of the SID (see Figure 4.6) obtained by projecting the original XML schema of
the CDA (see Figure 4.2). The diagram in the DRSD package contains the stereotype
«read» to dictate that the Nurse role can read the elements legal_authenticator,
patient

and originating_organization from the clinical_document_header

subtree. The Nurse role can also read captions with the name values Allergies,
Assessment
Signs

and Past Medical History, while the same role can insert new Vital

and update Vital Signs, and aggregate Vital Signs.

Once the security administrator in charge of designing the security for the healthcare
scenario of Section of 2.6 has identified the elements that require security in creating the
SID (see Figure 4.6 in Section 2.2), the next step in the process is to define which roles in
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the application can perform which actions (read, aggregate, insert, update, and delete),
establishing the permissions (see Definitions 16, 17, 18 from Section 3.3). Towards this
objective, the security administrator designs the DRSDs on a role-by-role basis, defining
in a granular document level which operations can be performed on which elements and
by which role against the DSCD for CDA in Figure 4.3. These roles can also be
organized into a hierarchy with MedicalProvider as the parent role of Nurse, Physician,
and Psychiatrist and Staff as a separate role; this will allow permissions shared by all
roles to be defined at the parent MedicalProvider as is shown in Figure 4.7 so that they
are not unnecessarily replicated which improves the maintainability of the security policy.
For example, the permissions for the MedicalProvider role (top of Figure 4.7) includes
read access to the patient, Allergies, Assessment, Past Medical History, Vital
Signs, originating_organization,

and legal_authenticator elements of the CDA.

At the same time, the security administrator might define for the Nurse role, permissions
to read the current prescriptions and laboratorytests (Definition 16 of Section 3.3),
while both the Physician and Psychiatrist can write both of those items, with the
Psychiatrist having the additional capability to write psychhistory. Repeating this
process over all of the roles in the system will result in the creation of several DRSDs,
one per role, for the application that defines the RBAC requirements for the application
as a whole. Like the process of creating the SID as from Section 4.2.2, the process of
creating the DRSD is iterative. Therefore, refinement over the permissions assigned to a
role is possible by performing the design process as many times as desired. This allows
the possible changes over policy that affects one role without incurring in a high cost of
modification. This also allows for new roles to be defined as requirements change across
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the stakeholders of an application. For example, after meeting to discuss the security
permissions defined over the roles of the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, the decision
of adding the permission for Nurses to delete Vital Signs in case of input error is
agreed upon. This change could only require a refinement process over the Nurse DRSD
(Figure 4.7) that would include the «delete» stereotype over the access() method of the
Vital Signs

element class. Note that while we have not shown a DRDS for the CCR

schema, it is easy to imagine having a similar set of roles with the elements now referring
to the DSCD in Figure 4.5.
«DRSD»
MedicalProvider
«element»

«element»
ref:patient

caption : string = {“Allergies, Assessment,
Past Medical History”}

«read» + access()

«read» + access()

«element»

«element»

ref:legal_authenticator

ref:originating_organization

«read» + access()

«read» + access()

«element»
caption : string = {“Vital Signs”}
«read»«aggregate»«insert»«update» + access()

«DRSD»
Physician

«DRSD»
Nurse

«element»
ref:prescription
«read» + access()

«element»

«element»

«element»

ref:laboratytest

ref:prescription

ref:laboratytest

«read» + access()

«rwrite» + access()

«rwrite» + access()

«DRSD»
Staff

«DRSD»
Psychiatrist
«element»

«element»

«element»

ref:prescription

ref:laboratytest

«rwrite» + access()

«rwrite» + access()

«element»
ref:pyschhistory
«rwrite» + access()

ref:patient

«read» + access()

«element»

«element»

ref:legal_authenticator

ref:originating_organization

«read» + access()

«read» + access()

Figure 4.7: DRSD Role Hierarchy for CDA.
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4.2.4 The LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID)
The LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) is a UML package with the
stereotype «SecureInformation» that decorates the SID (see Section 4.2.2) and contains
all of the respective classes of elements from the schema to be secured per access modes
(ams) and classifications (cls). In the left of Figure 4.8 for the CDA segment‘s example, is
an LSID where each element would have several attributes that indicate the access mode
(denoted inside the element class with am) and the classification level (denoted with
security level or cls); in this case, for each element, there is a cls associated with respect
to the access mode. For example, the patient element has a cls of unclassified when
considering operations that have an access mode of read, while the same element has a
classification of classified when considering operations that have an access mode of
write. The right of Figure 4.8 shows the example of an LSID for the CCR schema
segment that is a subset of the DSCD in Figure 4.5. This LSID denotes a classified
classification to the Patient, Problems and FamilyHistory elements of the DSCD.
Note that in practice, the LSID works off an initial SID that has been established by the
security administrator during the initial design process. While the SID is a project of the
original schemas, the LSID decorates this projection thereby supporting decoration as
detailed in Definitions 27 and 28 in Section 3.4. Like SID, LSID may have packages
corresponding to subtrees of schemas.
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«SecureInformation»
ClinicalDocumentArchitectureSystem

«SecureInformation»
ContinuityOfCareRecordSystem

«element»
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“patient”
{ am=read, cls=u }
{ am=write, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Assessment”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“Vital Signs”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=c }

«element» Patient

«constraint» maxOccurs=“2”
«element» Body

{ am=read, cls=c }

«element»
«ref» name=“originating_organization”
{ am=read, cls=c }

«element»
«name» “Allergies”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Past Medical History”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=s }

{ am=read, cls=c }

«element» Problems
«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
{ am=read, cls=c }

«element» FamilyHistory

«constraint» minOccurs=“0”
{ am=read, cls=c }

Figure 4.8: LSID for CDA (left) and CCR (right).
The LSID permissions via decoration can be established before or after RBAC has
been, or in fact, can be in lieu of RBAC if the application only has LBAC. In either case,
whether RBAC has been defined or not, the security administrator is in charge of
designing the enforcement policies to utilize the capabilities of LBAC by assigning
clearance levels to users (Definition 6 from Section 3.4) and classification levels to
elements (Definition 27 from Section 3.4) of the CDA or CCR schemas. More
importantly, the security administrator must decorate the defined SID to create an LSID
with access modes and sensitivity levels. Following the example of Figure 4.8, this can
include for CDA elements in the DSCD of Figure 4.3 that includes patient, Vital
Signs,

and originating_organization or for CCR elements in the DSCD of Figure

4.5 that includes Patient and a subtree of Body, Problems and FamilyHistory; both
access modes and sensitivity levels have been defined in Figure 4.8. In the same manner
as with the SID, the security administrator will interact with the relevant stakeholders to
determine which access modes and classification levels are assigned to which elements
and which clearance levels will be assigned to which users (this will be later defined in
Section 4.2.7) in arriving at the LSID. The security administrator may also further refine
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the SID to an SID‘ if for some reason there is a wish to further restrict the information to
control for LBAC. Once the classification levels for elements have been defined, the
security administrator can then perform a decoration operation (Definition 9 from Section
3.2) over the elements defined in order to extend them with classification (sensitivity)
levels. As a result, the SID elements are classified with LBAC levels and thereby create
the LSID. In the same manner as with the SID and the DRSD, the process of creating the
LSID is iterative and open to refinements in case the security requirements constantly
change. Like the earlier diagrams (SID and DRSD), the security administrator will likely
pursue an iterative design process in order to arrive at a final LSID and this may involve
making changes to the original SID.

4.2.5 The User Diagram (UD)
Another major component of information security to support RBAC, LBAC, and
DAC is to quantify different users of the system, their requirements, and their constraints
in order define the users of the system whose information is to be secured. The interplay
of users, their roles and delegation permissions (for RBAC), their clearance levels (for
LBAC), and their authorization permissions (DAC) require the proper definition of a user
concept. The work in secure software engineering (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010)
proposed a UML extension for users via a User Diagram. In this dissertation, we build
upon this first iteration of the User Diagram to extend to include both LBAC and RBAC
user features directly to the metamodel. Graphically, the User Diagram (UD) is a UML
package with the stereotype «User». User-role assignments, which are part of RBAC (see
Definition 6 and its revisions throughout Chapter 3) are a directional arrow tagged with
the «RoleAssignment» stereotype. Clearance levels, in support of LBAC, are represented
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with a directional arrow tagged with the «CLRAssignment». Another capability of the
UD is the representation of separation of duty constraints (SoD) with an n-ary association
tagged with the «SOD» stereotype. These separations of duties connect all of the roles
that have a separation of duty relation. Lastly, the UD can also represent the mutual
exclusion relations between assigned roles via the use of the «ME» stereotype. Figure 4.9
follows the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6 for UD with the user named Elisa assigned
a role of Physician and the clearance level of secret (s). That role has a separation of duty
with the roles Nurse that is assigned to the users Leroy and Jenkins, in which Leroy has a
clearance level of classified and Jenkins has a clearance level of secret, and Psychiatrist,
which is assigned to the user Brock with clearance level of top-secret.

«RoleAssignment»

«User»
Elisa

«CLRAssignment»

«DRSD»
Physician

«LBAC»
S

«User»
Brock

«LBAC»
TS

«CLRAssignment»

«User»
Leroy

«CLRAssignment»

«RoleAssignment»

«LBAC»
C

«DRSD»
Psychiatrist
«SOD»

«RoleAssignment»

«ME»
«RoleAssignment»

«User»
Jenkins

«DRSD»
Nurse

«CLRAssignment»

«LBAC»
S

Figure 4.9: UD for the Healthcare Scenario.
The security administrator can bring together all the previous security capabilities that
cover RBAC, LBAC and DAC that include DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, and DD via the
creation of the UD as shown in Figure 4.9. The security administrator has the
responsibility of ensuring that clearance levels are assigned to users (Definition 6 of
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Section 3.4), their roles (Definition 6 of Section 3.3), and the separation of duty and
mutual exclusion between roles (Definition 6 of Section 3.3). As a result, the UD of an
application would graphically denote the interplay of users, their roles, and their
clearances (if needed) while also showing how separation of duty and mutual exclusion is
organized. This diagram is also iterative in its creation, and after deployment will be
managed by a security office who handles day-to-day updates and adjustments to this
diagram. This allows the security office to add, update or delete users and their
credentials as many times as needed. If there is a need to revisit the UD due to changes in
which roles are assigned to who, or which clearance level is now the one assigned to the
user, the security office can refine the end-requirements without obstacles particularly in
a rapidly changing environment like healthcare.

4.2.6 The Delegation Diagram (DD)
The Delegation Diagram (DD) captures the information of the security model‘s
delegation mechanisms as a new UML diagram extension and is meant to capture the
concepts of original user, role assigned, delegated users, and role delegation per
Definitions 31 to 35 in Section 3.5. This includes the delegable users that can receive a
role delegation from the original user/role pair. Figure 4.10 illustrates a delegation
diagram for our continuing example with the healthcare scenario from Section 2.6 where
the user Elisa who has the role Physician assigned (left side of the figure) is interested in
delegation that role to one or more other users. The role Delegation Diagram on the right
side of Figure 4.10 is a UML package tagged with the «DelegationDiagram» stereotype.
The User Diagram (left side of Figure 4.10 and within the Delegations class) contains
information on the user and role and are part of both the delegating user and the delegable
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user(s) who are capable of receiving the role as part of a delegation. The connection
between a user and the delegations is done with a directional connection tagged with the
«Delegation» stereotype. In Figure 4.10, the user Elisa with the role of Physician can
delegate the Physician role to Samantha or Emily.

«User»
Elisa

«Delegation»

«RoleAssignment»

«DelegationDiagram»
Delegations

«User»
Samantha

«User»
Emily

«DRSD»
Physician

Figure 4.10: DD for User Elisa in Physician Role in a Healthcare Scenario.
The security administrator that is in charge of the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6
also has the responsibility of defining permissions over user-role delegation to other users
which includes the delegation from an original to a delegated user. What is not directly
supported in the DD is the pass-on-delegation capability that allows Elisa to pass on the
authority to delegate Physcian to a user (say Samantha) who in turn would be able to
further delegate Physician to another user; this is supported in Definition 34 in Section
3.5. In Figure 4.10 Elisa defines the possibility to delegate her Physician role to potential
recipients Samantha and Emily. The security administrator would define the
DelegationDiagram package that would have the delegable users (Definition 33 of
Section 3.5) inside, while the original user (Definition 32 of Section 3.5) would have the
respective role assigned with a Delegation tagged relationship with the package. While
the security administrator will define the delegation, the user Elisa has the ability to
initiate the delegation. For example, Elisa might delegate to Emily on a Friday night since
Emily is the covering physician and will be answering calls from Elisa‘s patients. Like all
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the constructs discussed in the previous sections, the process of creating the DD is
iterative and can be refined as many times as needed by the security requirements of the
application. Note also that if Elisa has multiple roles assigned, then there will be separate
DDs for each user/role combination to establish the delegations that are allowed for all
roles Elisa can delegate.

4.2.7 Authorization Diagram (AD)
The Authorization Diagram (AD) is a new UML diagram that illustrates a particular
user/role combination and the way that it is connected to authorizations to particular
schemas and/or their instances for a given application. Authorizations are used to
augment security by providing another layer of verification. For example, if a user has
permissions defined over a specific schema, but is not authorized to it, then that user
cannot perform any of the permissions. Further, a user may have permission to access a
particular schema but have no assigned instances as yet; e.g., a Elisa with the Physician
role is a new doctor that doesn‘t have any patients. Figure 4.11 illustrates the structure of
an AD which is a UML package tagged with the «AuthorizationDiagram» stereotype for
user Elisa under the role of Physician (left hand side of the figure). Classes on the right
hand side of Figure 4.11 represent those specific schemas and instances that have been
authorized. In the case of the schemas, a simplified version of the DSCD is used. For
instances of the schema, placeholder classes that serve as identifiers are utilized tagged
with the «Instance» stereotype. In Figure 4.11, Elisa has access to the CCR schemas as a
DSCD for CCR as given in Figure 4.5, as well as two CCR instances «has» for Carol
Smith and John Jones. The connection between a user and the authorizations is done with
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a directional connection tagged with the «Authorization» stereotype. Note that while not
shown, in practice, there can be multiple DSCDs with associated instances in each AD.
«AuthorizationDiagram»
Authorizations

«User»
Elisa

«Authorization»

«DSCD»
CCR

«RoleAssignment»
«has»

«DRSD»
Physician

«Instance»
Carol Smith

«Instance»
John Jones

Figure 4.11: AD for User Elisa in a Healthcare Scenario.
Like the case with the DD, the security administrator also has the responsibility of
defining and maintaining authorizations over user/role combinations and the schemas
and/or instances which they have been authorized to use, e.g., the patients each physician
is treating. This includes the capabilities of, as shown in Figure 4.11, a user such as Elisa
being authorized to specific schemas (CCR) and/or instances (Carol Smith and John
Jones) while performing a specific role, such as that of Physician. The security
administrator would define the AuthorizationDiagram package that would have the
users/role and the authorized schemas (Definition 35 of Section 3.6) and instances
(Definition 36 of Section 3.6) inside the package. And like the DD, the AD creation
process is iterative and capable of handling refinements over new security requirements
and definitions. Moreover, as with UD, the day-to-day usage of the AD is taken over by a
security officer that would be in charge of adjusting user/role schema/instance
permissions on a continuous basis. This may actually be a person that is in charge of a
unit in a medical establishment (e.g., a nurse manager) that would be in charge of
authorizing which patients have been assigned to each user with the nurse role.
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4.3 The UML Metamodel for Security Extensions
The underlying model from Chapter 3 that is realized in UML extensions on Section
4.2 sets requirements that are engineered at the MOF M2 metamodel layer (see Figure 2.8
from Section 2.7). That is, all the new UML constructs presented in Section 4.2, which
are defined at the MOF M1 layer, require a corresponding metamodel extension at the
M2 layer. Towards this purpose, this section covers the UML metamodel extensions that
support those extensions presented in Section 4.2. To preface the discussion, we provide
in Figure 4.12 a high-level view of our MOF M2 metamodel for the new UML diagrams,
demonstrating the way that all of the new constructs interact to allow the modeling and
security definition for a set of schemas composed of tree-structure documents as we have
illustrated with XML. As shown in Figure 4.12, the meta-classes SecureInformation,
Element, AccessMode, Permission, SensitivityLevel, User, UserRole, RoleSlice,
OriginalUser, DelegableUser, Authorization, Instance, Schema, ME, and SOD extend the
MOF M2 layer to support RBAC, LBAC, and DAC capabilities as defined in Chapter 3
and as realized with the new UML diagrams in Section 4.2. Extending the MOF M2 layer
metamodel with these new constructs makes it possible to define the diagrams at a model
layer, and then instantiate their definitions to generate security policies that will be
further discussed in Chapter 5. The top-left of Figure 4.12 graphically represents the
section of the metamodel that pertains to the SID diagram from Section 4.2.2. The top of
Figure 4.12 contains the meta-classes the build the metamodel extensions for the SID
with LBAC as discussed in Section 4.2.4. In turn, the middle-right of Figure 4.12 shows
the meta-classes that make the Delegation Diagram from 4.2.6 possible. Moving to the
bottom of Figure 4.12, Mutual Exclusion and Separation of Duty meta-classes are shared
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by the Role Slice for the purposes of the User Diagram from Section 4.2.5. Lastly, the
Authorization Diagram from Section 4.2.7 has its meta-classes shown in the bottom-left
of Figure 4.12. The remainder of this section presents the MOF M2 metamodel for all of
the new UML diagrams in Section 4.2 in greater detail.

Figure 4.12: Tree-Structured Document Security UML Metamodel at MOF M2.
The DSCDs (schemas) for an application must be constrained to identify those
portions of the schema that require security control. This was accomplished in as
discussed in Section 4.2.2 with the Secure Information Diagram (SID) in Figure 4.6 that
identified those portions (elements and subtrees) of an application‘s schema on which
both RBAC permissions and LBAC classifications will be defined. For SID, the M2
metamodel is shown in Figure 4.13 where each class that is part of the SID is represented
as meta-class (SecureInformation) associated with many possible instances of any given
schema element as represented with the Element meta-class.
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SecureInformation

Element

*

*

Figure 4.13: Secure Information Diagram M2 metamodel.
Next, in Figure 4.14, the metamodel representation of the document role-slice
diagram (DRSD) is shown as discussed in Section 4.2.3 and shown in Figure 4.7, where
the RoleSlice meta-class represents the role slices that will be defined with permissions
against the SID with respect to the schema(s) of the application to be secured. The
Permission meta-class represents the permissions allowed over the instances validated
against the secured schema (read, aggregate, insert, update, delete) that define what a role
can and can‘t do for the elements in a schema. In order to create a relation between the
RoleSlice meta-class (which contains all of the DRSD instances) and the Permission
meta-class (which contains all of the schema targeting permissions), it is necessary to
create a relation between the users and their roles. In Figure 4.14, the UserRole metaclass is a parent-class of the RoleSlice meta-class and a sibling class of the Permission
meta-class. The connections between the UserRole and Permission meta-classes are given
by the permitted permission (PP) relation. The Element meta-class in turn represents all
of the instances of elements (from the schema) that are targeted by the different
permissions. This connection is tagged with the targeted element (TE) label in Figure
4.14.

UserRole

Permission

PP *
TE *
RoleSlice

Element

Figure 4.14: Document Role Slice Diagram M2 metamodel.
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Next, the meta-model for the LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID) as
discussed in Section 4.2.4 and shown in Figure 4.8 is shown in Figure 4.15. The four
meta-classes User, AccessMode, Element, and SensitivityLevel are interconnected to
represent the relations between the user (User), its clearance level (Sensitivity), and
access modes (read, aggregate, insert, update, delete; AccessMode) for each of the
elements (xs:element, xs:complexTyp, etc.; Element) from the SID that need to be
protected. To represent the relation between User and SensitivityLevel, an arrow with a
UC (user clearance) tag is used. This relation indicates that the user could either have a
clearance level or is without a clearance level, therefore the utilization of the 0..1
cardinality constraint. Element and Sensitivity are similarly related, represented with the
arrow tagged EC (element classification). The relationship between Element and
AccessMode is represented with the 1..+ cardinality constraint to cover the case of an
element with different possible access modes (e.g. patient element from Figure 4.8).

User

UC

AccessMode

0 .. 1

1 .. +
EC

SensitivityLevel

Element

Figure 4.15: LSID M2 metamodel.
Next, at the meta-model layer (M2) of the MOF, the User Diagram as discussed in
Section 4.2.5 and shown in Figure 4.9 is composed of six major meta-classes as given in
Figure 4.16: User, SensitivityLevel, UserRole, RoleSlice, SOD, and ME. The User metaclass represents all of the possible instances of users in a particular application. Both the
User meta-class and the RoleSlice meta-class, is a subtype of the UserRole meta-class.
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The UR tag represents user-role assignments (RBAC), the separation of duty (SOD)
meta-class represents the separation of duty relations, and, the mutual exclusion (ME)
meta-class represents the mutual exclusion relations between roles. The SensitivityLevel
meta-class, which represents the sensitivity as related to LBAC is a clearance level for a
user and is tied to the User meta-class. This distinction shows an important feature of the
security framework presented in this dissertation, namely, that RBAC and LBAC
capabilities are orthogonal.
User

UserRole
UR

0..1

ME

*

Sensitivity
Level

*

RoleSlice

0..1

SOD

Figure 4.16: User Diagram M2 metamodel.
The metamodel of the Delegation Diagram (DD) as presented in Section 4.2.6 and
shown in Figure 4.10 is given in Figure 4.17. The metamodel consists of three metaclasses: OriginalUser, DelegableUser, and RoleSlice. The OriginalUser meta-class, along
with the RoleSlice meta-class represents the original users of the application and their
assigned roles. The DelegableUser, connected to the RoleSlice meta-class, represents the
user/role pairs of authorized delegations. In turn, the Delegation tag in the connection
between OringalUsers and DelegableUsers represents the ability to perform the
delegation operation.
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OriginalUser
Delegation
*

RoleSlice

*

DelegableUser

Figure 4.17: Role Delegation Diagram M2 metamodel.
The final metamodel of the Authorization Diagram (AD) as presented in Section 4.2.7
and shown in Figure 4.11 is given in Figure 4.18 and consists of four meta-classes:
UserRole, Authorization, Instance, and Schema. The UserRole meta-class represents the
specific user/role pair in a similar fashion as the case of the UD in Figure 4.16 The
Authorization meta-class is connected to the Instance and Schema meta-classes to
represent whether an authorization to an instance or schema exists and is represented with
the 0..+ tag on the directional connection. This metamodel definition allows scenarios in
which a user might not be authorized to any schema/instance, or any combination of the
two (e.g. all schemas and all instances).
UserRole

*

Authorization
0..+

Instance

0..+

Schema

Figure 4.18: Authorization Diagram M2 metamodel.

4.4 Related Work in Security Modeling with UML
This section provides related work on secure software engineering and security for
multiple concerns for a system to be secured: functional, collaborative and information.
In the functional security area, there have been many research efforts that involve UML.
SecureUML (Basin, Doser, & Lodderstedt, 2006) is a modeling language to design
security in distributed systems. This language is based in UML, extending its semantics
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and notation to support RBAC, and certain authorization constraints. The focus of this
approach is to utilize UML to specify access control as part of the main design of the
application and then automatically generate access control infrastructures based on the
design models. The approach defines a meta-model for SecureUML and details a
methodology to integrate it into several design modeling languages. UMLSec, described
in (Jürjens & Juerjens, 2005) and improved by (Zisman, 2007) and ((Popp, Jurjens,
Wimmel, & Breu, 2003), is an extension to UML that defines several new stereotypes
towards formal security verification of elements such as: fair exchange to avoid cheating
for any party in a 2-party transaction; secrecy and confidentiality of information
(accessible only to the intended people); secure information flow to avoid partial leaking
of sensitive information; and, secure communication links like encryption. AuthUML
(Alghathbar, 2007) models RBAC policies using use cases and Horn clauses to represent
the access control information and to check its consistency. The approach of (PavlichMariscal et al., 2010) includes the definition of several new UML diagrams to represent
different access control concerns (RBAC, MAC, and DAC), and a set of features that
represent small subsets of an access control model. These features can then be composed
to create custom access control policies.
In the collaborative security area, research has occurred in many areas. In terms of
access control and collaboration, in (Tolone, Ahn, Pai, & Hong, 2005), a set of eight
criteria (complexity, understandability, ease of use, applicability, groups of users, policy
specification, policy enforcement, and granularity) critical for a collaborative
environment are presented. The eight characteristics and their support are evaluated
against seven access control models (Matrix, RBAC, TBAC, TMAC, C-TMAC, SAC,
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and Context-AW). This work demonstrates that collaboration capabilities are not primary
goals in access control models. As given, the seven access control models do not support
an integrated model for coordinated, obligated, secure, and team-based collaboration.
Another related area is a distributed secure interoperability framework for collaboration
environments (Sachpazidis, Rizou, & Menary, 2008). This framework presents a multisystem architecture in which different stakeholders with different privileges collaborate
with one another towards optimizing monitoring prescription intake. With regard to
collaboration, workflow, and security, the work of (Shehab, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005)
addressed security services that support inter-organizational collaborative enterprises,
which may span multiple organizations. This work presents a framework for mediatorfree collaboration. Similarly as in (Sachpazidis et al., 2008), this work focuses on intersystem collaboration, while our work focuses on early integration of collaboration
requirements into the software engineering process. The work of (Kang, Park, &
Froscher, 2001) concentrates on workflows that are addressed from an access control
perspective. This is an important aspect of our effort (Berhe et al., 2010), where
workflow is also represented as collaboration steps with access control addressed at each
step and for the overall workflow. The work in (Y. Sun & Pan, 2005) proposes a model
that integrates RBAC into workflows. In their approach, permissions, roles, cardinality,
ancestors (pre-obligations), and a status value are assigned to activities (collaboration
steps).
Finally, in the informational security area, a later effort (Mouelhi, Fleurey, Baudry, &
Le Traon, 2008) presents a model-driven security approach for designers to set security
requirements along with the system models to automatically generate an access control

131

infrastructure. The approach combines UML with a security modeling language defining
a set of modeling transformations; the former produces infrastructures for JavaBeans, and
the latter can generate secure infrastructures for web applications. (Basin et al., 2006)
utilizes the model-driven architecture paradigm to achieve security for e-government
scenarios with inter-collaboration/communication. This is achieved by describing
security requirements at a high-level (models), with relevant ―security artifacts‖ being
automatically generated for target architectures, removing the otherwise present learning
curve in specifying security requirements by domain experts with no technical knowhow. In the approach presented in (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013), UML is leveraged
to provide a secure information engineering approach for XML schemas and documents.
By extending UML with new XML diagrams, an enforcement security policy in XACML
can be generated and deployed for access control purposes (not unlike automatic code
generation from UML class diagrams). By doing this, the approach scales to scenarios
that involve a high volume of XML documents validated against a common schema.
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Chapter 5
Security Policy Generation Process
To this point, this dissertation has defined a security framework that includes a model
for access control for RBAC, LDAC, and MAC for the definition of permissions against
tree-structured documents (see Chapter 3 again) coupled with the definition of new UML
diagrams for the security modeling of schemas (see Chapter 4 again). This chapter
presents the third component of our framework that supports the automatic generation of
a security enforcement policy when given a security design for a set of schemas as
captured in our new UML diagrams (see Chapter 4). UML has a long history for the
automatic generation of code (Vogel-Heuser, Witsch, & Katzke, 2005) in varied
languages; our usage of our new UML diagrams to generate a security policy is
consistent with this usage. In this chapter, we present a process for the generation of
enforcement policies that transitions a UML design containing a Document Schema Class
Diagram (DSCD), a Secure Information Diagram (SID), a Document Role Slice Diagram
(DRSD), lattice-based access control SID (LSID), a User Diagram (UD), a Delegation
Diagram (DD), and an Authorization Diagram (AD); see respectively Sections 4.2.1 to
4.2.7.
To support the automatic generation of a security enforcement policy, we define a set
of mapping statements (MSs) that are utilized to define the conditions under which the
combination of the various diagrams (DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, UD, DD, and AD) can
be utilized to support the creation of respective policies for RBAC, LBAC, DAC, and
authorization. A mapping rule (MR) is defined to take the security model concepts and
capabilities to Chapter 3 that both underlie correspond to different portions of the new the
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UML diagrams of Chapter 4 and use this combination to yield a portion of the security
policy. To illustrate, in support for RBAC: a role mapping statement (R-MS) takes a
specific role such, as Physician from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, and maps it
to the policy‘s subject construct, such as the <Subject> element of XACML‘s
specification; an element mapping statement (E-MS) takes an attribute, such as a child
node of ‗clinical_document_header‘ or ‗section‘ segments of the HL7 CDA from the
healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, and maps it to the policy‘s resource construct, such as
the <Resource> element of XACML‘s specification; and, a permission mapping
statement (P-MS) establishes permissions for the element (read, aggregate, insert, update,
delete) as actions against elements of the document to be secured. These three mapping
statements support the transition of information from DSCD, SID, and DRSD into a
security policy segment that supports RBAC, specifically restricted to one user role
combination.
In support of LBAC, mapping statements are need with respect to: the user‘s
clearance level, the element‘s classification (sensitivity), and the access mode of the
operation being performed. Specifically: a subject (user) mapping statement (SU-MS)
that takes a specific user, such as Elisa from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, and
maps it to the policy‘s subject construct; an action (operation) mapping statement (AOMS) that takes a specific operation (e.g. read, aggregate, insert, update, delete from
Section 3.3) and its access mode and maps it to the action construct of the policy; and, a
resource (element) mapping statement (RE-MS) that takes an element that needs
classification levels to be added and maps it to the resource construct of the policy. In
support of DAC: a delegation user (original user) mapping statement (DUOU-MS) takes
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a user from the Original Users set as defined in the Delegation Diagram of Section 4.2.6
and Section 3.5 to a user construct in the policy, such as the <Subject> element
introduced for XACML; a delegation resources (roles) mapping statement (DRR-MS)
takes the role to be delegated, such as Physician from Section 4.2.6, and maps it to the
resource construct of the policy; and, a delegation targets (delegable users) mapping
statement (DTDU-MS) corresponds to the users in the delegable set as set in the DD from
Section 4.2.6 and Section 3.6 and maps it to the delegation target construct of the policy.
The authorizations over schemas and instances are in turned assigned to users. We utilize
a subject (user) mapping that takes the user from the User Diagram (UD) of Section 4.2.5
and the Authorization Diagram (UD) of Section 4.2.7; and a resources (schemas and
instances) mapping that takes the schemas and instance constructs (e.g. CDA and Carol
Smith‘s record from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6). This characteristic allows the
definition of authorizations in a policy similar to assigning a given user an LBAC
clearance. Overall, the work in this chapter presents a high-level view of the policy
generation process that is accompanied by a detailed examination of the policy generation
using the eXtensible access control modeling language (XACML) (Godik et al., 2002).
The remainder of this chapter is organized into six major sections. Section 5.1
provides an overview of the mapping process from an architecture perspective to take the
new UML diagrams through a process that results in the generation of a security policy.
Section 5.2 introduces the key XACML concepts needed for the discussion in this
chapter, including the normal components of a security architecture that enforces
XACLM policies, and policy/rule combination algorithms. Section 5.3 presents the
generation process for RBAC, LBAC, DAC delegations, and authorizations that provide
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the capability to convert from the new UML security diagrams (see Section 4.2 again) to
an XACML security policy via a series of mapping statements. Section 5.4 defines an
algorithm that automates the policy generation process by organizing the mapping
statements as presented in Section 5.3 into a structured process. Lastly, Section 5.5
reviews related work on policy generation and integration.

5.1 An Architecture for Security Policy Generation
In this section, we provide a high-level view of the security policy generation process
that combines the access control concepts and capabilities of our security model (see
Chapter 3 again) with the new UML diagrams into an architecture. As shown in Figure
5.1, the seven new UML diagrams in the first column (DSCD, SID, DRSD, LBAC, UD,
DD, and AD) are used in various combinations (see four different arrow types) in order to
start a process that can map them through access control models RBAC, LBAC, DAC
delegations, and authorizations (see column two) in order to identify the key policy
components (see column three) that are then utilized to automatically generate a security
policy (fourth column). First, DSCD, SID, DRSD and UD are combined to produce an
RBAC oriented policy for each user/role combination as shown with the solid arrows in
Figure 5.1; as a result, multiple security policies are generated on a user/role basis.
Second, DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD are combined to produce an LBAC oriented policy
for each user as shown with the dashed arrows in Figure 5.1; again, specific security
policies are generate for each user. Third, DRSD, UD, and DD are combined to produce a
security policy that defines the delegable users and the role that can be delegated as
shown with the long dash dot arrows in Figure 5.1; again, this results in a separate policy
each user/role combination. Finally, DSCD, DRSD, UD, and AD are combined to
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generate the policy that identifies the schemas and instances are authorized for a specific
user as shown with the long dash dot-dot arrow in Figure 5.1. For each of these
combinations, there is a transition to the policy components that form the basis of the
generated policies (third column of Figure 5.1). The last step in the process (fourth
column of Figure 5.1), illustrates the alternative policies that can be generated, including
XACML (the focus of this dissertation), SQL DDL code for a relational database system,
and aspect-oriented programing (AOP) for an object-oriented application (PavlichMariscal et al., 2010).
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Figure 5.1: An Architecture for Generating Policies from UML Diagrams.
To illustrate the usage of the architecture, we continue with the healthcare scenario of
Section 2.6. Suppose that user Elisa‘s role of Physician has a no read permission over a
psychiatric element of the CCR schema. In this case, the policy would involves Elisa,
Physician, and psychiatric element would filter the CCR schema to hide this information
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for the RBAC mapping as well as controlling and the ‗Carol Smith‘ instance for the
Authorizations mapping. The generality of the policies created via the architecture
presented in Figure 5.1 could be readily applied to an eXtensible Stylesheet Language
(XSLT) (Clark, 1999), to other query tools such as XPath (Clark & DeRose, 1999) and
XQuery (Boag et al., 2002) for XML documents, or to a relational database schema and
tuples. The generated policies must also be able to target the software methods at the
system‘s level in order to support destructive operations such as insert, update, and
delete. In all of these cases, the validation of the consistency of the altered instance is left
as a task of the system. In other words, this security model does not validate proper
alterations to an instance against its schema; it just assures that the security requirements
that control the destructive operations are properly enforced. For example, in the case of a
relational database, a system such as Oracle (Harrison, 2000) would be responsible for
enforcing operations against the database tuples. From the perspective of a security
administrator, the ability to automatically generate enforcement policies from the UML
diagrams as shown in Figure 5.1 would reduce the costs associated when security
requirements are frequently changed and modified over time. UML has a long history of
the automatic generation of object-oriented code (OOC) (Vogel-Heuser et al., 2005) from
UML class diagrams, and, this automated process reduces the complexity to the click of
one button with modeling tools that have that capability, e.g., CodeSmith Tools
(CodeSmith tools.2014), Acceleo (Mtsweni, 2012), etc. The benefit of automatic policy
generation, combined with the security framework‘s target of defining security definitions
at the schema level, would further reduce the effort and cost of updating security
requirements that can potentially affect thousands or millions of documents (instances).
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This benefit is particularly useful in the case of large institutions in the healthcare domain
such as hospitals and clinics.
The architecture given in Figure 5.1 can be reformulated as given in Figure 5.2 to
provide a view of this approach from the perspective of UML metamodel changes, UML
diagrams, and the support for policy generation at the schema and instance level that
results in the creation of a set of enforcement policies. Specifically, starting from the top
of Figure 5.2 downward, the generalized mapping approach utilizes the meta-classes of
the UML Meta-Object Facility (MOF) (Poernomo, 2006) M2 layer presented in Section
4.3 (e.g., User, UserRole, Permission, RoleSlice, etc.) to create two new sets of
authorizations (middle of Figure 5.2). These meta-classes are combined to form the seven
new UML diagrams, which in turn supports both policy level authorizations and
document level authorizations. Policy level authorizations include delegations and
authorizations, or those operations that have an effect on a user and not on a document.
Document level authorizations include permissions (operations over elements) on the
tree-structured document, or those operations that have an effect on the documents being
secured and not on the users. This includes support for delegation, where there is a set of
original users that can delegate their roles, and a set of delegable users that can receive
specific roles. This means that roles are resources that can be interchanged between users
of an application and have properties (e.g., the permissions are defined as part of a
policy) such as pass-on authority for second-level delegations. To support all of these
capabilities, it will be necessary to have a policy language that has a non-normative
construct that serves to identify the delegable users (delegation targets). This construct
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would act as a holder for all of the delegable users that can receive the role being treated
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Figure 5.2: Mapping Process to Generate Enforcement Policies.

5.2 XACML Concepts and Rule Combining Algorithms
In the same way that XML (Bray et al., 1998) provides a common, structured
language for information exchange among heterogeneous systems, the eXtensible access
control modeling language (XACML) (Godik et al., 2002) defines a common language
and processing model from the perspective of access control policies. This would then
permit a level of security interoperability among the heterogeneous systems. The
XACML schema provides various elements and a general structure for the design and
development of access control security policies. These elements (as shown in Figure 5.3)
include: the PolicySet, the Policy, and the Rule. In XACML, every policy has: a rule
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combining algorithm to interconnect the result of rules in order to reach a proper
authorization; a description to textually illustrate the purpose of the policy; and, an
identifier for indexing. The body of a policy consists of a target <Target> element and
one or more rules <Rule>. The <Target> element of the policy or the <Rule> element is
utilized by the policy evaluation point to determine whether the policy is relevant to the
request received by the application. If no policy or rule is relevant to the request, the
request is dropped, likely indicating an invalid access. The XACML specification defines
four standard combining algorithms: deny-overrides, in which a policy is denied if at
least one of the rules is denied; permit-overrides, in which a policy is permitted if at least
one of the rules is permitted; first-applicable, in which the result of the first rule‘s
evaluation is treated as the result of all evaluations; and, only-one-applicable, in which
the combined result is the corresponding result to the acting rule.
PolicySet
Policy Combination Algorithm

Policy
Rule Combination Algorithm

Rule
Subject

Resource

Action

Figure 5.3: Layered Representation of XACML‘s PolicySet, Policy and Rule Constructs.
The architecture of a typical security system that utilizes XACML for enforcement is
revisited with an example using our healthcare scenario from Section 2.6 in Figure 5.4.
The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) allows a request to be made on a resource such as
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Dr. Ketchum playing a Physician role to access a CCR instance of Carol Smith. The
Policy Decision Point (PDP) evaluates the request and provides a response according to
the policies in place. That would define, in the case of a Physician role played by Dr.
Ketchum, as to whether a portion of a CCR schema can be accessed (read/written). The
Policy Administration Point (PAP) is utilized to write and manage policies, which for the
CCR schema and its associated instances would be utilized to deliver the appropriate
subset of information to a Nurse or Physician role and the individual who is playing that
role. Last, the Policy Information Point (PIP) can be utilized to arbitrate very fine grained
security issues, which could be employed to control access to mental health data of Carol
Smith, allowing Ketchum, while denying Fakington.
Information System Roles

XACML Architecture
Policy Retrieval Point (PRP)

Physician

PEP

Nurse
PAP

XACML
Policy –
Schema 1

XACML Policy
Deifnition

XACML
Policy –
Schema 2

PIP

PDP

Figure 5.4: Typical Security Architecture for XACML Policies.
The layered representation (Figure 5.3) and architecture (Figure 5.4) provide the
means to support a process that can utilize the seven new UML diagrams as a starting
point for security policy generation. Specifically, to create a XACML policy, we can
utilize the policies‘ language structure and processing model where a policy consist of a
PolicySet, a Policy, and a Rule. Based on the capabilities of XACML, we are taking an
approach that each of the application' role(s) as represented, in say, a DRSD, must be
mapped into a XACML Policy structure with its own set of rules that represent the
appropriate enforcement for roles against a schema, the DSCD. Note that multiple
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XACML Policy structures may be generated, resulting in a PolicySet for a specific set of
XML schemas that have an associated set of user/roles that comprise a given application.
The collection of Policy structures, one for each DRSD, is contained in a PolicySet,
combined via an algorithm specified by the PolicySet’s PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute
that targets the particular tree-structured schema. In order to support instance-level
security for tree structured documents (schemas), the DRSD is mapped into an XACML
Policy with the combining algorithm deny-overrides chosen. With the deny-overrides
algorithm, if a single Rule or Policy element is evaluated to Deny, the evaluation result of
the rest of the Rule elements under the policy is also evaluated as Deny. We note that
while this assumption works when focusing on access control for instances in the
document-level, as in the work of this dissertation, other higher-level systems (e.g.,
software applications that utilize the instance, etc.) can very deploy security policies with
different combining algorithms. The pseudo-code implementation of all of the policy-rule
combining algorithms can be found in Appendix A. An XACML PolicySet is utilized to
make the authorization decision via a set of rules in order to allow for access control
decisions such as granting access to a resource, allowing an operation to continue, etc. A
PolicySet can contain multiple Policy structures, and each Policy contains the access
control Rules. As a result, the Policy structure acts as the smallest entity that can be
presented to the security system for evaluation. The collection of Policy structures is
contained in a PolicySet, combined via an algorithm specified by the PolicySet‘s
PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute that targets the particular tree-structured schema.
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5.3 Security Enforcement Policy Generation in XACML
This section concentrates on the third component of our framework in this
dissertation that supports the automatic generation of a security enforcement policy in
XACML from the security design as captured by the new seven UML diagrams (DSCD,
SID, DRSD, LBAC, UD, DD, and AD). To properly generate and XACML policy/rule
pairs for the different UML diagrams and their components, there are a number of key
correlations that can be established between the nomenclature of UML and the
terminology of XACML. These correlations represent meta-mapping statements that
defines the matching between a security design in UML to XACML in order to support a
fully automated process. Specifically, for our purposes, we correlate XACML‘s Policy
and Rules to our security model (see Chapter 3) as follows:


Policy‘s PolicyId attribute value is the string AccessControlPolicy{Model}, where
{Model} serves as a placeholder for LBAC, RBAC or DAC, concatenated to a
unique identifier such as an integer. PolicyId represents a unique identifier that is
used to index and identify any given policy from a group of policies.



Rules‘ RuleId attribute value is the string ProductRule{Model} concatenated to a
unique identifier such as an integer. RuleID, in the same fashion as the PolicyId,
is utilized to index and identify any given rule inside a policy from the rest of the
rules that can be part of said policy.



Rules‘ Description value is the string AccessControlPolicyRule{Model}
concatenated to a unique identifier such as an integer. Description is used to
textually describe the purpose of the rule inside a policy.
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The intent of this section is to transition the seven new UML diagrams to its
realization as an XACML policy through the definition of mapping statements that
represent the actions needed to generate policies for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC
delegations/authorizations, respectively, in Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3. We note that
there is no predefined order to apply the mapping statements at a higher-level (between
RBAC, LBAC and DAC) or at a lower level (each mapping statement). These mapping
statements work in a similar fashion to the UML profile presented in Section 4.2.1, which
means that each mapping statement create a relationship between a component of the
UML diagram and metamodel to a component of the XACML schema. This notion is
further discussed in Section 5.4 with the automatic algorithm for XACML policy
generation.
Each of the first three subsections (5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3) have a unified format of
presentation, structured in three parts: a definition of the mapping statements that
transition the UML diagrams and their components to XACML equivalents; a
demonstration of this mapping process through the use of example UML diagrams; and, a
detailed explanation that illustrates the mapping from UML to equivalent XACML code.
To complete the discussion, Section 5.3.4 explores the case when an application has a
combination of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC in terms of its security capabilities and its
mapping to XACML.

5.3.1 RBAC Capabilities
The generation of RBAC policies with XACML is facilitated due to the fact that
RBAC‘s combination of a role, element, and permission (see Defns. 11 to 29 in Section
3.3) seamlessly aligns to XACML‘s paradigm of <Subjects>, <Resource>, and
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<Actions>. In our previous work (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013; De la Rosa Algarín,
A. et al., 2013), we presented an automated method of achieving this specific goal with
an emphasis on XML. This dissertation extends that effort by generalizing away from
XML and considering a more varied set of operations (e.g., read, aggregate, insert,
update, delete) that can be performed on general-purpose tree-structured documents and
their schemas and instances. Note that while this section and dissertation is based on
XACML policy generation, the work presented herein can easily be reused to generate
policy code in another format. The mapping statements as presented are generalizable to
generate ―code‖ for other target domains; for example, in RBAC, the mapping of roles,
elements, and permissions has to still occur regardless of whether the target is XACML
or SQL DDL and a relational database system.
The mapping statements for RBAC are shown in Table 5.1, and include: a role
mapping statement (R-MS) that takes a role such as Physician and a user such as Elisa to
a <Subject> in XACML; an element mapping statement (E-MS) that takes an attribute
such as FamilyHistory in CCR to a <Resource> in XACML; and, a permission mapping
statement (P-MS) that takes a permission such as update to an <Action> in XACML. As
discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the solid arrows in Figure 5.1, the mappings for
RBAC utilize the DSCD, SID, DRSD, and UD diagrams from Chapter 4. For the R-MS,
the DRSD and UD are utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target> Subject element as
the role and to set the role identifier (using R-MS1) along with the user and user identifier
(using R-MS2). The SubjectMatch‘s MatchId attribute utilizes the function ‗string-equal‘
to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the DRSD (using R-MS3). The XACML policy
for a specific role will have as many Rule constructs as permission combinations shown
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in the DRSD (using R-MS6). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree
is the role from the DRSD (using R-MS7). For the P-MS, the DRSD and SID are utilized
to represent the permissions (operations) that are tied to the respective role. The policy‘s
<Target> element‘s Action child is set to <AnyAction/> in order for the policy to apply to
the role when any request is done (using P-MS1). The ActionMatch’s MatchId attribute
utilizes the ‗string-equal‘ function in a similar fashion to the SubjectMatch’s MatchId
(using P-MS2), while the ActionAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId is set to the
permission‘s operation (e.g., read, aggregate, insert, update, or delete) (using P-MS3). In
the case of the P-MR, the policy‘s rules <Action> children are <Operation> elements
with the <operationName> subchild and <opAccessMode> values which are the DRSD‘s
stereotypes for the element classes (using P-MS4). Last, for the E-MS, the DRSD, DSCD,
and SID are utilized in conjunction to represent those elements that a role can operate
over by virtue of the tied operations in XACML form. In a similar fashion to the policy‘s
<Target> Subject element, the Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that
the higher-level policies apply to the role (using E-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> children
are <element> nodes with element data that corresponds to the element classes in the
DRSD, DSCD, and SID diagrams (using E-MS3).
To provide a realistic example of the usage and application of the mapping statements
and associated process, consider the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, where the user
Elisa has the role of Physician. Consider the DSCD in Figure 4.3 of Section 4.2.1 and the
SID in Figure 4.6 of Section 4.2.2, which provide the basis for defining the DRSD of
Figure 5.6. The UD that corresponds to user Elisa is shown in Figure 5.5, the DRSD that
corresponds to the Physician role is shown in Figure 5.6, while the corresponding

147

generated XACML code is shown in Figure 5.7. Notice that the figures are all labeled
with capital letters. In the UML diagram figures, we will refer to Section A, Section B,
etc., while in the XACML code figures, we will refer to part A, part B, etc.; To begin,
section A of Figure 5.5 denotes the user that will become part of the user/role
combination for a given role‘s policy with the role shown in section B. Figure 5.6 shows
the DRSD‘s role in section A, with section B referring to those elements (resources in
XACML) that a role has some a permission over, and section C indicating those
operations allowed to be performed by the role. At a conceptual level, section A of the
DRSD in Figure 5.6 corresponds to the <Subject> subtree of the XACML policy in
Figure 5.7 (oarts A and B, respectively), while at a higher-level policy <Target>, the user
from Figure 5.5 (section A) and the role (section B) are used in conjunction with the
DSCD in Figure 5.6‘s role (section A).
The R-MS1 and R-MS2 of Table 5.1 are used for Figure 5.7‘s part A, while the RMS7 is used for Figure 5.7‘s part B. In this case, section B in Figure 5.6 denotes the
components of the DRSD that corresponds to the P-MS of Table 5.1. These sections of
the DRSD are used by P-MS4 to result in Figure 5.7‘s part D, which contains the possible
actions the user Elisa under the role of Physician can perform. Lastly, section B of Figure
5.6 denotes the components of the DRSD that corresponds to the E-Ms of Table 5.1,
which map to the <Resource> subtree of the policy in Figure 5.7 (part C). The resulting
policy for RBAC that is generated would permit the role Physician to write the past
medical history element of the CDA (Alschuler et al., 2002) instance that is shown in
Figure 5.7. At the policy level (Figure 5.7), the subject is the role and user (part A lines 713 of Figure 5.7, corresponding to the A and B parts of Figure 5.5), and a match is done
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Mapping
Statement
Type

Involved
UML
Diagram(s)

DRSD, UD

R-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the role and
role identifier set as a <role> subtree with
<roleName> and <roleID> children that corresponds
to the DRSD package name.
R-MS2. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the user name
and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the
UD.
R-MS3. SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function ―stringequal‖ to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the
DRSD.
R-MS4. AttributeValue of the Subject is a string, and the
value is the «DRSD» Role.
R-MS5. SubjectAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId is the role
attribute.
R-MS6. As many Rule per role Policy as permission
combinations.
R-MS7. Subject in Rule is set as the Subject in the higherlevel <Target> (role).

DRSD, SID

P-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Action set to
<AnyAction /> to ensure that the higher-level policy
applies to the role.
P-MS2. ActionMatch’s MatchId uses the function ―stringequal‖.
P-MS3. ActionAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId set to the
operation‘s tag (e.g. read, aggregate, insert, update,
delete).
P-MS4. Rule’s <Actions> children are <Operation> with the
operation name (<operationName>) and access mode
(<opAccessMode>) that correspond to the stereotypes
of the +access() method in the «element» classes in
the DRSD package.

DRSD,
DSCD, SID

E-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level
policies applies to the role.
E-MS2. Each Resource‘s ResourceMatch has a MatchId that
determines the usage of the function ―string-equal‖.
E-MS3. Rule’s <Resources> children are <element> with the
element identifier (<elementID>) and element name
(<elementName>) that correspond to the «element»
classes in the DRSD, DSCD and SID packages.

R-MS
(Role
Mapping
Statements)

P-MS
(Permission
Mapping
Statements)

E-MS
(Element
Mapping
Statements)

Mapping Statements

Table 5.1: RBAC Mapping Statements.
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based on the attributes of the role, where a unique ID could exist that would be denoted in
part A by the <ruleID> element in line 9 and <id> element in line 12 of Figure 5.7. Once
this is verified, the rule ‗simple-RBAC-rule‘ (lines 21-42 of Figure 5.7) would be
evaluated to determine if the triple of role, element, and operation match. This is
represented by the role in part B, lines 23-28 of Figure 5.7 corresponding to the section B
of Figure 5.5 and section A of Figure 5.6, by the element in part C, lines 29-34 of Figure
5.7, corresponding to the classes of Figure 5.6 with section B denoting their names, and
by the operation in part D, lines 35-40 of Figure 5.7, corresponding to the C parts of
Figure 5.6. As result, the user/role is allowed to perform the insert operation on the past
medical history element as denoted by the Effect=‖Permit‖ of the XACML rule in line 21
of Figure 5.7.

«RoleAssignment»

A

«User»
Elisa

«CLRAssignment»

«DRSD»
Physician

«LBAC»
S

B

C

Figure 5.5: A User Diagram of User Elisa under Role Physician with a Clearance of
Secret (S).
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«DRSD»
Physician

A
«element»

«element»
ref:patient

«read»«write»
+ access()

caption : string = {“Allergies, Assessment,
Past Medical History”}
«read»«aggregate»«insert»«update»
+ access()

«element»

«element»

ref:legal_authenticator

ref:originating_organization

«read» + access()

«read» + access()

«element»
caption : string = {“Vital Signs”}

B

«read»«aggregate»«insert»«update» + access()

C

Figure 5.6: A DRSD for the Role of Physician in the Healthcare Scenario of Section
2.6.
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-rbac-policy"
2.
RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
3.
<Description>This is a pseudocode example of an
4.
XACML policy with RBAC capabilities for role
5.
Physician and user Elisa</Description>
6.
<Target>
7.
<Subjects>
8.
<role>
9.
<roleID>5</roleID>
10.
<roleName>Physician</roleName>
11.
</role>
12.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
13.
</Subjects>
14.
<Resources>
15.
<AnyResource/>
16.
</Resources>
17.
<Actions>
18.
<AnyAction/>
19.
</Actions>
20.
</Target>
21.
<Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
22.
<Target>
23.
<Subjects>
24.
<role>
25.
<roleID>5</roleID>
26.
<roleName>Physician</roleName>
27.
</role>
28.
</Subjects>
29.
<Resources>
30.
<element>
31.
<elementID>el-3</elementID>
32.
<elementName>Past Medical History</elementName>
33.
</element>
34.
</Resources>
35.
<Actions>
36.
<operation>
37.
<operationName>insert</operationName>
38.
<opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode>
39.
</operation>
40.
</Actions>
41.
</Target>
42.
</Rule>
43. </Policy>

A

B

C

D

Figure 5.7: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with RBAC Capabilities.
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5.3.2 LBAC Features
LBAC capabilities involve three major components: the user‘s clearance level, the
element‘s classification (sensitivity), and the access modes of the operation being
performed against the target element. In Section 4.2.4, we introduced the LSID to
graphically represent the LBAC attributes of elements to be secured. To properly generate
an XACML policy that supports LBAC, we leverage DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD in
combination with constructs of the XACML specification. Recall that the UD contains
the LBAC characteristics tied to a specific user, providing us the information necessary to
complete the user‘s clearance level component of an LBAC policy. In turn, the LSID
provides us with the element‘s classification (sensitivity) with respect to the access modes
permitted (read and/or write) against the elements of the LSID. To represent this in an
XACML policy, we designate the target of a policy, <Target>, with a <Subject> value
equal to the name of the user. This produces a policy-level target that is specific for a
user. The LBAC rule of the policy leverages the LBAC user object from Definition 6 in
Section 3.4, including the clearance level, mapped to the rule‘s <Target> <Subject>
subtree. Then, the resource‘s LBAC characteristics denoted in the LSID, mapped to the
rule‘s <Target> <Resources> and <Actions> subtrees.
The mapping statements for LBAC are shown in Table 5.2, and include: a subjectuser mapping statement (SU-MS) that takes a user such as Elisa to a <Subject> in
XACML; an action-operation mapping statement (AO-MS) that takes a permission such
as insert or delete to an <Action> in XACML; and, a resource-element mapping
statement (RE-MS) that takes an element such as such as FamilyHistory in CCR to a
<Resource> in XACML. As discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the dashed arrows
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in Figure 5.1, the mappings for LBAC utilize the DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD from
Chapter 4. For the SU-MS, the UD is utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target>
Subject element as the user and user identifier (using SU-MS1). The SubjectMatch‘s
MatchId attribute uses the function ‗string-equal‘ to evaluate the user‘s name as modeled
in the UD (using SU-MS2). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree is
the user from the UD (using SU-MS3) along with the user‘s clearance (using SU-MS4).
For the AO-MS, the UD and LSID are utilized. The policy‘s <Target> element‘s Action
child is set to <AnyAction/> in order for the policy to apply to the user when any request
is performed (using AO-MS1). The ActionMatch’s MatchId attribute utilizes the ‗stringequal‘ function in a similar fashion to the SubjectMatch’s MatchId (using AO-MS2),
while the ActionAttributeDesignator’s AttributeId is set to the permission‘s operation
(e.g., read, aggregate, insert, update, or delete) (using AO-MS3). In the last case for the
AO-MR, the policy‘s rules <Action> children are <Operation> elements with the
<operationName> subchild and <opAccessMode> values equal to the LSID‘s member
definitions (using AO-MS4). Lastly, for the RE-MS, the DSCD, SID and LSID are
utilized in conjunction. In a similar fashion to the policy‘s <Target> Subject element, the
Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that the higher-level policies apply
to the user (using RE-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> children are <element> nodes with
element data that correspond to the element classes in the DSCD, SID and LSID
diagrams (using RE-MS3).

153

Mapping
Statement
Type

Involved
UML
Diagram(s)

Mapping Statements

UD

SU-MS1.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the
user and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the
«User» package of the UD.
SU-MS2.
SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function
―string-equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s name and id as
modeled in the UD and the security model.
SU-MS3.
Subject in Rule is set as the Subject in the
higher-level <Target> (user).
SU-MS4.
Subject in Rule is extended with a
<clearance> element that corresponds to the LBAC
clearance from the UD.

UD, SID,
LSID

AO-MS1.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Action set to
<AnyAction /> to ensure that the higher-level policy
applies to the user.
AO-MS2.
ActionMatch‘s MatchId uses the function
―string-equal‖.
AO-MS3.
ActionAttributeDesignator‘s AttributeId set
to the operation‘s tag (e.g. read, aggregate, insert, update,
delete).
AO-MS4.
Rule‘s <Actions> children are <Operation>
with the operation name (<operationName>) and access
mode (<opAccessMode>) that corresponds to the
members of the stereotyped «element» classes of the
LSID.

DSCD, SID,
LSID

RE-MS1.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level policies
applies to the user.
RE-MS2.
Each Resource‘s ResourceMatch has a
MatchId that determines the usage of the function
―string-equal‖.
RE-MS3.
Rule‘s <Resources> children are <element>
with the element identifier (<elementID>), element name
(<elementName>),
LBAC
classification
(<classification>), and access mode (<accessMode>) that
corresponds to the stereotyped «element» class of the
LSID.

SU-MS
(Subject User
Mapping
Statements)

AO-MS
(Action
Operation
Mapping
Statements)

RE-MS
(Resource
Element
Mapping
Statements)

Table 5.2: LBAC Mapping Statements.
To continue the realistic example of the usage and application of the mapping
statements and associated process from the prior section, we reuse the UD in Figure 5.5,
introduce an LSID in Figure 5.8 that corresponds to the SID of the prior section, with the
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corresponding generated XACML code from DSCD, SID, LSID, and UD is shown in
Figure 5.9. The UD and section A in Figure 5.5 allows for the generation of the policy‘s
target, specifically the user Elisa part A, line 8 in Figure 5.9. When a request by user Elisa
is made on the system that involves one of the elements in the LSID (Figure 5.8), this
policy is matched against the name in lines 6-16 of Figure 5.9, and then the rule in lines
17-41 of Figure 5.9 is checked for validity. Elisa is assigned a clearance level of secret
(S), denoted by <clearance> element inside the rule in line 23 in part B of Figure 5.9,
corresponding to the section C of Figure 5.5. When Elisa tries to perform an insert with
an access mode of write, denoted by <opAccessMode> in line 37 in part C of Figure 5.9,
the effect of the policy is Permit in line 17 of Figure 5.9, and she will be allowed to
continue. The element that is targeted in lines 29-33 in part C of Figure 5.9) corresponds
to the ‗Past Medical History‘ element class in the LSID of Figure 5.8. Note that the
members of the «element» class in the LSID package in Figure 5.8 for the ‗Past Medical
History‘ element class is classified (c) for when the access mode is read, and, secret (s)
for when the access mode is write. This property is matched in lines 30 and 31 in part C
of Figure 5.9.
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«SecureInformation»
ClinicalDocumentArchitectureSystem
«element»
«ref» name=“legal_authenticator”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“patient”
{ am=read, cls=u }
{ am=write, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Assessment”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«ref» name=“Vital Signs”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=c }

«element»
«ref» name=“originating_organization”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Allergies”
{ am=read, cls=c }
«element»
«name» “Past Medical History”
{ am=read, cls=c }
{ am=write, cls=s }

Figure 5.8: An LSID for HL7 CDA Elements from the Scenario of Section 2.6.
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-lbac-policy"
2.
RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
3.
<Description>This is a pseudocode example of an
4.
XACML policy with LBAC capabilities for user
5.
Elisa</Description>
6.
<Target>
7.
<Subjects>
8.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
9.
</Subjects>
10.
<Resources>
11.
<AnyResource/>
12.
</Resources>
13.
<Actions>
14.
<AnyAction/>
15.
</Actions>
16.
</Target>
17.
<Rule RuleId="simple-LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
18.
<Target>
19.
<Subjects>
20.
<user>
21.
<id>6</id>
22.
<name>Elisa</name>
23.
<clearance>S</clearance>
24.
</user>
25.
</Subjects>
26.
<Resources>
27.
<element>
28.
<elementID>el-3</elementID>
29.
<elementName>Past Medical History</elementName>
30.
<classification>S</classification>
31.
<accessMode>write</accessMode>
32.
</element>
33.
</Resources>
34.
<Actions>
35.
<operation>
36.
<operationName>insert</operationName>
37.
<opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode>
38.
</operation>
39.
</Actions>
40.
</Target>
41.
</Rule>
42. </Policy>

A

B

C

Figure 5.9: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with LBAC Capabilities.
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5.3.3 DAC Delegations and Authorizations
This section focuses on both delegation (DD) and authorization (AD) from our model
as presented in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.2.7, respectively. For delegation, XACML has builtin support that allows the delegator to delegate partial or complete authority to another
user in the system. This mechanism avoids the need to modify the original security policy
since it effectively decouples the delegation rights and the access rights, thereby
simplifying the policy generation process. However, the XACML‘s delegation component
does not have a way to enforce which user can receive what roles, which is crucial to our
approach. This effectively turns delegation into a discretionary non-checked operation. In
order to support the delegation of roles to predetermined users, namely, delegable users
as defined in Section 3.5 with Definition 33, we extend the XACML schema with nonnormative constructs that support the creation of specific rules regarding role delegation
with the purpose of integrating the delegation permissions on a user basis. Recall from
Section 3.5, that in order to have proper role delegation, there is a set of original users
(Definition 32 of Section 3.5) that can delegate their roles and a set of delegable users
(Definition 33 of Section 3.5) that can receive specific roles. This means that roles can be
treated as resources that can be interchanged between users of an application, albeit
limited in only one direction and only when an original user delegates it to a delegable
user. The roles also have properties, namely, the permissions that are defined as part of a
policy, such as pass-on authority for second-level delegations. To support all of these
capabilities, we extend the XACML schema with a <DelegationTargets>. The
<DelegationTargets> element that acts as a holder of all of the delegable users that can
receive the role being treated as a resource. The delegation targets are users from the
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delegable users set (see Definition 33 of Section 3.5) that can receive the role that is
matched from the policy. To generate the delegation portion of the XACML policy, we
define mapping rules between the Delegation Diagram (DD) of Section 4.2.6 and the
extended concepts of XACML.
The mapping statements for DAC delegations are shown in Table 5.3, and include: a
delegation subject-original user mapping statement (DSOU-MS) that takes a user such as
Elisa to a <Subject> in XACML; a delegation resources-role mapping statement (DRRMS) that takes a role such as Physician to a <Resource> in XACML; and, a delegation
targets-delegable user mapping statement (DTDU-MS) that takes a delegable user such
as Samantha or Emliy to a <DelegationTargets> extended element in XACML. As
discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the long dash dot arrows in Figure 5.1, the
mappings for DAC delegations utilize the UD, DD and DRSD from Chapter 4. For the
DSOU-MS, the UD and DD are utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target> Subject
element as the user and user identifier (using DSOU-MS1). The SubjectMatch‘s MatchId
attribute uses the function ‗string-equal‘ to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the
DRSD (using DSOU-MS2). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree is
the user from the UD (using DSOU-MS3). For the DRR-MS, the DRSD and DD are
utilized in conjunction. In a similar fashion to the policy‘s <Target> Subject element, the
Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that the higher-level policies apply
to the user (using DRR-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource> children are <role> nodes with role
data that correspond to the role packages in the DRSD and DD (using DRR-MS2). Last,
for the DTDU-MS, the UD, DRSD and DD are utilized to represent those users that are
allowed to receive the role from a delegation operation in XACML form. The policy
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rule‘s newly introduced <DelegationTargets> element is set to the user of those classes
insider the DelegationDiagram package of the DD (using DTDU-MS1).
Mapping
Statement
Type

Involved
UML
Diagram(s)

UD, DD

DSOU-MS1. XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the
user and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the
«User» package of the DD.
DSOU-MS2. SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function
―string-equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s name and id as
modeled in the DD and the security model.
DSOU-MS3. Subject in the Delegation Rule is set as the
Subject in the higher-level <Target> (user), the «User»
package from the DD.

DRSD, DD

DRR-MS1.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level policies
applies to the user.
DRR-MS2.
Rule‘s <Resources> children are <role>
elements with the role identifier (<roleID>) and role
name (<roleName>) that corresponds to the «DRSD» of
the DD.

UD, DRSD,
DD

DTDU-MS1. Rule‘s <DelegationTargets> children are
<User> with the user identifier (<id>) and user name
(<name>) that corresponds to the «User» classes of the
«DelegationDiagram» package in the DD.

DSOU-MS
(Delegation
Subject
Original
User
Mapping
Statements)
DRR-MS
(Delegation
Resources
Role
Mapping
Statements)

Mapping Statements

DTDU-MS
(Delegation
Targets
Delegable
User Element
Mapping
Statements)

Table 5.3: DAC Delegation Mapping Statements.
Continuing the example, the DD from Section 4.2.6 is reintroduced in Figure 5.10 to
explain the mapping relations between the DD and XACML, with the corresponding
generated XACML code from DRCD, UD, and DD is shown in Figure 5.11. Figure 5.10
shows a sample of the role delegation from the user Elisa in section A which corresponds
in Figure 5.11 to parts A and B, lines 7-9 and 19-24, respectively. In addition, in Figure
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5.10, the role of Physician in section B corresponds to part C, lines 26-31 of Figure 5.11,
which is part of the ‗simple-DAC-delegation-rule‘. Note that the high-level target of the
policy in lines 6-16 of Figure 5.11 that has the user Elisa with identifier 6 in line 8 of
Figure 5.11, establishes the linkage to all for a delegation rule that states she can delegate
the role Physician from section B of Figure 5.10 in lines 26-31 of Figure 5.11 to either
Samantha or Emily (section C of Figure 5.10), with the user Samantha chosen with
identifier 30 in part D, line 34 of Figure 5.11, denoting that she is a user part of the
<DelegationTargets> element. Note that, as mentioned in the introduction of Section
5.3.3, the <DelegationTargets> element is a non-normative component of XACML. We
chose to extend the schema with this element to make the logic of delegating roles more
streamlined.

A

«User»
Elisa

«Delegation»

«RoleAssignment»

B

«DRSD»
Physician

«DelegationDiagram»
Delegations

«User»
Samantha

«User»
Emily

C

Figure 5.10: A Delegation Diagram for User Elisa and Role Physician.
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1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-dac-policy"
2.
RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
3.
<Description>This is a pseudocode example of an
4.
XACML policy with DAC capabilities for user
5.
Elisa</Description>
6.
<Target>
7.
<Subjects>
8.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
9.
</Subjects>
10.
<Resources>
11.
<AnyResource/>
12.
</Resources>
13.
<Actions>
14.
<AnyAction/>
15.
</Actions>
16.
</Target>
17.
<Rule RuleId="simple-DAC-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit">
18.
<Target>
19.
<Subjects>
20.
<user>
21.
<id>6</id>
22.
<name>Elisa</name>
23.
</user>
24.
</Subjects>
25.
<Resources>
26.
<Roles>
27.
<role>
28.
<roleID>2</roleID>
29.
<roleName>Physician</roleName>
30.
</role>
31.
</Roles>
32.
</Resources>
33.
<DelegationTargets>
34.
<user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user>
35.
</DelegationTargets>
36.
</Target>
37.
</Rule>
38. </Policy>

A

B

C

D

Figure 5.11: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with Delegation Capabilities.
Authorization follows the delegation process, discussed in Section 3.6 with
Definitions 35 and 36, to be defined over schemas and instances assigned to users. This
requires the definition of authorizations in an XACML policy similar to assigning a user
a clearance. To generate authorization related code for an XACML policy, we leverage
AD from Section 4.2.7 and the <Resources> subtree of the <Rule> structure of XACML.
In this case, the <Subject> subtree in the higher-level Policy <Target> is the user with
his/her identifier and name. The resources under the rule would include the schema and
instance identifiers as discussed in Section 3.1 with Definition 3, and represented as the
new UML DD in Section 4.2.7.
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The mapping statements for authorizations are shown in Table 5.4, and include: a
subject-user authorization mapping statement (SUA-MS) that takes a user such as Elisa
and a role such as Physician to a <Subject> in XACML; and, a resources schemasinstances mapping statement (RSI-MS) that takes a schema and/or instance such as CDA,
CCR, or Carol Smith‘s record from Section 2.6 to a <Resource> in XACML. As
discussed in Section 5.1 and shown using the long dash dot-dot arrows in Figure 5.1, the
mappings for authorizations utilize the DSCD, DRSD, UD, and AD from Chapter 4. For
the SUA-MS, the UD, DRSD, and AD are utilized to set the XACML policy‘s <Target>
Subject element as the user and user identifier (using SUA-MS1) and the respective role
and role identifier (using SUA-MS2). The SubjectMatch‘s MatchId attribute uses the
function ‗string-equal‘ to evaluate the user‘s role as modeled in the DRSD (using SUAMS3). Finally, the Subject element in the Rule‘s <Target> subtree is the user from the UD
and AD (using SUA-MS4. For the RSI-MS, the AD and DSCD are utilized to set the
schemas and instances that are to be authorized for the user/role combination in XACML
form. The policy‘s <Target> Resource element is set to <AnyResource/> to ensure that
the higher-level policies apply to the user (using RSI-MS1). The Rule’s <Resource>
children are <Schemas> or <Instance> nodes with element data that correspond to the
element classes in the DSCD and AD diagrams (using RSI-MS2).
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Mapping
Statement
Type

SUA-MS
Subject
(User)
Mapping
Statements

Involved
UML
Diagram(s)

Mapping Statements

SUA-MS1.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the
user and user identifier set as a <user> subtree with
<name> and <id> children that corresponds to the «User»
package of the AD.
SUA-MS2.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Subject is the
role and role identifier set as a <role> subtree with
UD, DRSD,
<roleName> and <roleID> children that corresponds to
AD
the DRSD package name.
SUA-MS3.
SubjectMatch‘s MatchId uses the function
―string-equal‖ to evaluate the user‘s name and id as
modeled in the AD and the security model.
SUA-MS4.
Subject in the Authorization Rule is set as
the Subject in the higher-level <Target> (user), the
«User» package from the AD.

RSI-MS
Resources
(Schemas
and
Instances)
Mapping
Statements

AD, DSCD

RSI-MS1.
XACML Policy‘s <Target> Resource set to
<AnyResource /> to ensure that the higher-level policies
applies to the user.
RSI-MS2.
Rule‘s <Resources> children are <Schemas>
and <Instances> elements that correspond to the with the
«DSCD» and «Instance» components of the
«AuthorizationDiagram» package.

Table 5.4: Authorization Mapping Statements.
In the final step for the example of XACML generation, we reintroduce the AD from
Section 4.2.7 in Figure 5.12 for user Elisa under the role of Physician who is being
authorized to Carol Smith‘s instance (and relevant schemas), with the corresponding
generated XACML code from DSCD, DRSD, UD, and AD is shown in Figure 5.13. In
this policy, the user Elisa from Figure 5.10 in section A corresponds to section A in Figure
5.12, has the identifier 6 that leads to the subject definition in part A, lines 7-10 of Figure
5.13 that correspond to parts A and B of Figure 5.12. In the example, Elisa is authorized
by the rule with identifier ―simple-DAC-rule‖ to the CCR schema in part C, lines 24-29
of Figure 5.13, that corresponds to the section C of Figure 5.12, as well as to Carol Smith
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instance in part D, lines 30-35 of Figure 5.13, that corresponds to section D of Figure
5.12.
«AuthorizationDiagram»
Authorizations

A

«User»
Elisa

«Authorization»

«DSCD»
CCR

C
«Instance»
Carol Smith

«RoleAssignment»
«has»

B

«DRSD»
Physician

D

«Instance»
John Jones

Figure 5.12: Authorization Diagram for User Elisa.
1. <Policy PolicyId="ada-example-dac-policy"
2.
RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
3.
<Description>This is a pseudocode example of an
4.
XACML policy with DAC capabilities for user
5.
Elisa</Description>
6.
<Target>
7.
<Subjects>
8.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
9.
<role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>
10.
</Subjects>
11.
<Resources>
12.
<AnyResource/>
13.
</Resources>
14.
<Actions>
15.
<AnyAction/>
16.
</Actions>
17.
</Target>
18.
<Rule RuleId="simple-DAC-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit">
19.
<Target>
20.
<Subjects>
21.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
22.
</Subjects>
23.
<Resources>
24.
<Schemas>
25.
<schema>
26.
<schemaID>sId1</schemaID>
27.
<schemaName>CCR</schemaName>
28.
</schema>
29.
</Schemas>
30.
<Instances>
31.
<instance>
32.
<instanceID>iId1</instaneID>
33.
<instanceName>Carol Smith</instanceName>
34.
</instance>
35.
</Instances>
36.
</Resources>
37.
</Target>
38.
</Rule>
39. </Policy>

A

B

C

D

Figure 5.13: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy with Authorization Capabilities.
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5.3.4 Interplay of RBAC, LBAC and DAC
Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 detailed the mapping statements to support RBAC,
LBAC, or DAC individually in XACML. When an application is to be comprised with
capabilities from all three of these access control models, a comparison must be
performed between users, clearances, roles, permissions, elements targeted by the
permissions, the element‘s sensitivity levels, and authorizations in order to determine if
the combination has any potential conflicts or inconsistencies. This interplay supports the
authorization of a user as given in Definition 6 in Section 3.6 that involves a user with a
role, clearance, and delegation. To allow the definition of policies that support multiple
access control models, the security definitions for RBAC, LBAC, and DAC, must be
compared with one another. From the perspective of XACML, one approach to
accomplish this comparison would be to list all of the permitted rules for the user/role
pair (including rules for RBAC and LBAC), and endeavor to determine if there are
conflicts in terms of access among the permitted rules. The result of this would produce a
set of security policies, one for each permission in the security definitions for the user.
The problem with this approach occurs when there is a large amount of users which
results in a large set of security policy instances that would be difficult to manage
properly. While easies to implement, it is difficult to manage due to numerous rules
across numerous policies which could result in poor performance when fetching the
relevant policies affecting one user in one scenario. A second approach to support the
integration of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC leverages the <Condition> element of the
XACML 3.0 schema, which is used to further augment the form of the <Rule> element‘s
<Target> by presenting the capability of comparing two or more attributes with a set of
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normative functions (e.g. integer-greater-than-or-equal, etc.).. The intent is to pair a
<Condition> element with each rule as needed in order to perform necessary consistency
checks. Utilizing the <Condition> element for each rule could allow the LBAC
requirements that govern operations over elements to be realized as an extra component
of an already existing RBAC rule. Another potential benefit of leveraging the
<Condition> element is to more easily support LBAC read and write features such as
simple-integrity, simple-security, liberal-*, etc. as discussed in Section 3.4.
To illustrate this second approach, Figure 5.14 has an example of an XACML
condition that would be part of a rule for the example of user Elisa and role Physician.
The <Condition> XACML code segment results from the transformation of the mapping
statements of Section 5.3.2 to support the enforcement of LBAC clearance vs.
classification dominance. The first step of this transformation searches those permissions
in RBAC that match the <Action> and <Resources> elements, and then generates the
<Condition> logic to substitute for the LBAC logic of Section 5.3.2. This condition
follows the logic of simple-integrity, or write-down and no write-up (see Section 3.4).
This means that a user can write elements with a lower sensitivity level when compared
to their clearance level, but would not be allowed to write those elements with a higher
sensitivity. The first <Apply> in line 2 of Figure 5.14 utilizes the comparator integergreater-than-or-equal, which takes two elements as parameters. The first is the attribute
that denotes the user‘s clearance as shown in lines 4-6. The second attribute denotes the
element‘s sensitivity in lines 8-10. If this condition were evaluated to be true, which
means that the clearance is greater than or equal to the sensitivity by the function from
line 2, then the condition would return true and the rule would be permitted.
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The end result of utilizing the <Condition> element is the creation of only one policyper-user as contrasted with the first approach discussed above. This is shown in Figure
5.16 where for the user Elisa, there are groups of each of the RBAC permissions under
one rule each, and injects the necessary XACML logic in the form of <Condition> when
there is a need to support LBAC as shown in line 18. The DAC delegations and
authorizations in lines 23-34 in Figure 5.16, live at the policy-level and are separate rules
of the policy. This procedure allows a security architecture to only fetch one policy when
handling the security of one user. As a result, this one policy with respect to a user
realizes Defn. 6 of Section 3.6 by including all of the necessary security requirements to
only one object, resulting in all of the security requirements are included in the user
object, which is translated in XACML to only one policy per user. Following the scenario
of Section 2.6, for users Brock Ketchum, Elisa Fakington, Leroy, Jenkins, and Gail (5
users in total), the result of the policy mapping process would produce 5 XACML policy
instances, one for Brock, one for Elisa, etc.
1. <Condition>
2.
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
3.
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only">
4.
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
5.
{userClearance}
6.
</AttributeValue>
7.
</Apply>
8.
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
9.
{elementSensitivity}
10. </AttributeValue>
11. </Apply>
12. </Condition>

Figure 5.14: XACML Condition Pseudo-code for the LBAC Component of an RBAC +
LBAC Rule.

5.4 Algorithm for Automatic Generation of XACML
The process of generating an XACML policy from the seven new UML diagrams
(DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, UD, DD, and AD) of Chapter 4 can be automated with an

167

algorithm, as shown by Figure 5.15. The new UML diagrams along with the document
schemas serve as the parameters, while the XACML schema is utilized as template for
the resulting instances. While the mapping statements across the access control models
(RBAC, LBAC, DAC) do not require any predetermined order to be applied (for
example, DAC delegation and authorization mapping statements could be applied before
RBAC mapping statements), for the purpose of automation, we prioritize some aspects of
the process. From a high-level perspective, as shown in Figure 5.15, the first step is to
iterate over every user of the information system that requires security. Once a user is
selected (e.g., Elisa from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6), the next step is to find
that user‘s role and the respective DRSD that describes all of the permissions over every
element. Then, by iterating over every permission in the relevant DRSD, the algorithm
creates an XACML <Rule> object that would map the role to the <Subject>, the elements
to the <Resources>, and the permissions (operations) to the <Actions>. Then, after that
initial mapping is done, a check for LBAC features is done. If any LBAC features exist,
such as simple-security, simple-integrity, etc., a <Condition> element is added to that
rule. This process is repeated over every permission, resulting in one <Rule > with a
<Condition> element if LBAC is needed (see Figure 5.14 again) for each permission in
the DRSD. This iteration is repeated for every role the user might hold. After the
mappings over RBAC and LBAC capabilities are complete, then delegations and
authorizations are tackled. For each delegation and authorization, a <Rule> element is
created that would map the schemas and instances to <Resources> inside the rule for
authorization, or roles and delegable users to <Resources> and <DelegationTargets>
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respectively, for delegation. The end result of this high-level process is the creation of
one XACML policy instance per user, which could be readily deployed.
For each user (UD)

For each role (UD, DRSD)

For each permission (DRSD)

Create <Rule>
Match role to <Subject>
(UD, DRSD)
Match elements to <Resources>
(DSCD, SID, DRSD)
Match permissions to <Actions>
(DRSD, SID)
If LBAC features exist/needed
Add <Condition> to <Rule>
(UD, DSCD, SID, LSID)

For delegations & authorizations

Create DAC <Rule> elements
for delegations & authorizations

Match schemas, instances and roles to
<Resources>, Users to <DelegationTargets>
(UD, DRSD, DD, AD, DSCD)

Complete XACML Policy

Figure 5.15: High-level Algorithm for XACML Generation from UML Extensions.
The high-level algorithm of Figure 5.15 can be transitioned to a more detailed pseudo
code version as given in for the automatic generation of XACML that leverages the UML
extensions of Chapter 4 and the mapping statements of Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and
5.3.4. The first step, as shown in line 3 of Figure 5.16 is to generate the XACML
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description header as discussed in the introduction of Section 5.3. This process involves
generating the PolicyID attribute of the <Policy> and the <Description> content of the
<Policy>. The second step in line 4 of Figure 5.16 corresponding to the first step in
Figure 5.15, involves a loop over each User in the system. For each user (line 4 of Figure
5.16), the roles that are tied to that user are identified (line 6 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the
UD and DRSD. After this list of roles has been found, an iteration over the roles (line 7 of
Figure 5.16) is performed. Following a similar procedure as before, the list of
permissions tied to that role is fetched using the DRSD (line 9 of Figure 5.16). Following
this, a loop over each of the permissions tied to the role denoted by DRSD (line 10 of
Figure 5.16) is performed. The first step inside this loop is creating a <Rule> element
(line 12 of Figure 5.16), followed by the three mappings. First, a map of the <Subject> is
performed (line 13 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the R-MS from Section Table 5.1. Then, a
map of the <Resources> is performed (line 14 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the E-MS from
Table 5.1. The last step inside this loop maps the <Actions> (line 15 of Figure 5.16)
utilizing the P-MS from Table 5.1. After the RBAC permission mapping segment of the
algorithm is complete (lines 12-15 of Figure 5.16), a check is performed if LBAC support
is desired (line 16 of Figure 5.16). If true, the <Condition> element is created (line 18 of
Figure 5.16) by utilizing the UD, DSCD, SID, and LSID and following the SU-MS, AOMS, and RE-MS of Table 5.2, followed by the transformation to the <Condition> element
discussed in Section 5.3.4.
After the loops over permissions and roles are complete, a check for delegations in
line 23 of Figure 5.16 is performed. For each of the delegation rules (line 23 of Figure
5.16), a <Rule> is created (line 25 of Figure 5.16), followed by a <Resource> map using
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the DRSD and DD as discussed with the DRR-MS of Table 5.3. Then, the delegation
targets are mapped (line 27 of Figure 5.16) utilizing the UD, DRSD, and DD with the
DTDU-MS of Table 5.3. Once the loop over delegations is completed, a loop over
authorizations starts (line 29 of Figure 5.16). The first step inside this loop creates a
<Rule> (line 31 of Figure 5.16) followed by a <Subject> map utilizing the SUA-MS of
Table 5.4 with the UD and AD, and ends with the <Resources> map utilizing the RSI-MS
of Table 5.4 with the AD and DSCD.
The result of executing the algorithm in Figure 5.16 is an instance of an XACML
<Policy> as shown in Figure 5.17 for user Elisa (line 5, 37 and 52 of Figure 5.17) and
role Physician (line 13 and 41 of Figure 5.17) with the security requirements defined in
the UML extensions of Chapter 4 that are built upon the model of Chapter 3 and created
from the healthcare scenario of Section 2.6. In this policy, RBAC and LBAC features are
found under the same rule in lines 10 to 32 of Figure 5.17. Note that this policy applies
the function greater than or equal to figure out whether the condition under the
insert/write rule is allowed as given in line 21 of Figure 5.17. Since the clearance of user
Elisa (line 27 of Figure 5.17) and the classification of Past Medical History (line 29 of
Figure 5.17) are equal, the condition is valid. The resulting enforcement would then
depend on whether the schema and/or instance in which the operation is being tried on is
authorized. Delegations and authorizations, from lines 34 to 63 in Figure 5.16, are
translated as is from the mapping statements since they have no effect on the documentlevel operations. That is, all of the authorizations for the user Elisa (lines 49 to 63 of
Figure 5.17) and her delegation of roles to users such as Samantha (lines 34 to 48 of
Figure 5.16) have no impact on the decision of whether the insert operation (line 20 of
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Figure 5.17) is permitted or not. While RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal, the policy
follows the nature of DAC delegations and authorizations being in a different layer of the
access control model. Note that not all of the permissions of the Physician DRSD are
represented in this policy due to space reasons. As discussed earlier in this section, each
permission would be represented as a <Rule> element in the XACML Policy instance.
The complete policy for the user Elisa and role of Physician can be found in Appendix A.
1. RBAC_LBAC_DAC_XACML_generation(DSCD, SID, DRSD, LSID, UD, DD, AD)
2. {
3.
Generate_XACML_Description_Header() // lines 1-2 of Fig. 5.17
4.
foreach(User as currentUser)
5.
{
6.
role_list = Find_Role(UD, DRSD);
7.
foreach(role_list as currentRole)
8.
{
9.
permission_list = Find_permissions(DRSD);
10.
foreach(permission_list as currentPermission)
11.
{
12.
XACML.createRule(); // lines 10-36 of Fig. 5.17
13.
XACML.mapSubject(UD,DRSD); // lines 12-14 of Fig. 5.17
14.
XACML.mapResources(DSCD,SID,DRSD); // lines 15-18 of Fig. 5.17
15.
XACML.mapActions(DRSD,SID); // lines 19-22 of Fig. 5.17
16.
if(LBAC)
17.
{
18.
XACML.createCondition(UD,DSCD,SID,LSID); // lines 24-35 of Fig. 5.17
19.
}
20.
}
21.
}
22.
}
23.
foreach(Delegation)
24.
{
25.
XACML.createRule(); // lines 37-51 of Fig. 5.17
26.
XACML.mapResources(DRSD,DD); // lines 42-46 of Fig. 5.17
27.
XACML.mapTargets(UD,DRSD,DD); // lines 47-49 of Fig. 5.17
28.
}
29.
foreach(Authorization)
30.
{
31.
XACML.createRule(); // lines 52-66 of Fig. 5.17
32.
XACML.mapSubject(UD,AD); // lines 54-56 of Fig. 5.17
33.
XACML.mapResources(AD,DSCD); // lines 57-64 of Fig. 5.17
34.
}
35. }

Figure 5.16: Pseudo-code for XACML Policy Instance Generation Algorithm.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

<Policy PolicyId="ada-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
<Description>Omitted due to length.</Description>
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources><AnyResource/></Resources>
<Actions><AnyAction/></Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>
</Subjects>
<Resources><element>
<elementID>el-3</elementID>
<elementName>Past Medical History</elementName>
</element></Resources>
<Actions><operation>
<operationName>insert</operationName>
<opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode>
</operation></Actions>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only">
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">Secret</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">Secret</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
… // Remainder of permissions omitted due to space
<Rule RuleId="simple-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Roles><role>
<roleID>2</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName>
</role></Roles>
</Resources>
<DelegationTargets>
<user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user>
</DelegationTargets>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="simple-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources><Schemas><schema>
<schemaID>4</schemaID>
<schemaName>Schema 4</schemaName>
</schema></Schemas>
<Instances><instance>
<instanceID>4,2</instaneID>
<instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName>
</instance></Instances></Resources>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>

Figure 5.17: Resulting XACML Policy for User Elisa and Role Physician.
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5.5 Related Research in Policy Generation and Integration
In this chapter we presented a way of generating XACML that effectively integrated
capabilities from LBAC, RBAC and DAC. Related work on this area of research usually
focuses in integrating existing policies into one. The work of (Damiani et al., 2000)
presents an access control system that embeds the definition and enforcement of the
security policies in the structure of the XML documents in DTDs in order to provide
customizable security. This provides a level of generalization for documents that share
the same DTD, similar to our work where security policies act against XML schemas to
control XML instances. Two differences are: their work targets outdated XML DTD‘s
while ours utilizes schemas, and their polices are embedded into both DTD and instance,
requiring changes to instances when policies change; our work allows changes with no
impact on instances.
Another effort (Damiani et al., 2008) details a model that combines the embedding of
policies and rewriting of access queries to provide security to XML datasets. The XML
schema is extended with three security attributes: access, condition, and dirty. While this
work is similar to our work by targeting security in XML instances via policies, it differs
by requiring changes to instance when the policy is modified and does not consider XML
document writing (see Section 5.3). Efforts by (Bertino & Ferrari, 2002; Bertino,
Carminati, & Ferrari, 2004) present Author-X, a Java-based system for DAC in XML
documents that provides customizable protection to the documents with positive and
negative authorizations. Author-X employs a policy-based DTD document that prunes an
XML instance based on the security policies, which is similar to our approach, but
focuses on discretionary access control where we focus on RBAC. The work of (Leonardi
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et al., 2010) considers the scenario of a federated access control model, in which the data
provider and policy enforcement are handled by different organizations. This approach
relates to ours with regards to the separation of the security policies from the data to be
handled, but differs in the specifics of where the policies‘ details are stored.
The work of (Kuper et al., 2005) has presented a model consisting of access control
policies over outmoded DTD‘s with XPath expressions to achieve XML security. Their
model is similar to ours, as it aims to provide different authorized views of an XML
document based on the user‘s credentials. However, the significant difference is that this
approach combines query rewriting and authentication methods, whereas our approach
can be applied to any non-normative XACML architecture (having a policy enforcement
point) for both reading and updating, as well as XPath or XQuery queries. The work of
(Müldner et al., 2009) presents an approach of supporting RBAC to handle the special
case of role proliferation, which is an administrative issue that happens in RBAC when
roles are changed, added, and evolve over time, making security of an organization
difficult to manage. Our approach doesn‘t address role proliferation; however, by
separating our security into an XACML policy, we do insulate role proliferation from
impacting an application‘s XML schemas and instances.
Policy integration approaches vary from similarity finding to specialized algebraic
approaches. For example, (Mazzoleni, Bertino, Crispo, & Sivasubramanian, 2006;
Mazzoleni, Crispo, Sivasubramanian, & Bertino, 2008) presents a policy integration
methodology to find similarity of policies on distinct levels (rule effects, targets, roles),
and integrating over a set of defined rules, also considering policy decision conflicts.
Another approach (Rao, Lin, Bertino, Li, & Lobo, 2009) proposes an algebraic solution
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to the problem to integrate complex security policies at a granular detail with an algebra
that consists of five unary operations (three binary and two unary). This algebra is
utilized as part of a framework (to achieve the generation of an instance policy
automatically. Like (Mazzoleni et al., 2008), this approach also focuses on the instance
level, creating a dependency on the OASIS XACML specification and policy structure to
achieve proper results. The use of these methods would be impossible on security
requirements defined in any other method (e.g., a database table with security rules,
policies modeled with a different language, etc.).
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Chapter 6
Secure Information Engineering Process and
Enforcement with Mobile Apps
In this chapter, we discuss the secure information engineering process (SIEP) that
leverages the security model presented in Chapter 3, the seven new UML diagram and
respective metamodel extensions presented in Chapter 4, and the policy mapping process
presented in Chapter 5. Over the past five years, one major focus of our research group
has been on extending UML with new diagrams to realize a secure software engineering
process for RBAC, MAC, and DAC, shown in Figure 6.1 (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2014)
using separate concerns for functional, collaboration, and information application
characteristics. First, from a functional perspective focused on object-oriented design, a
framework of composable security features was defined (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010)
that preserves separation of security concerns from models to code through the extension
of UML with new diagrams for RBAC, DAC, and MAC coupled with the automatic
generation of enforcement code in AspectJ (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010). Second, from
a collaboration perspective, a framework for secure, obligated, coordinated, and dynamic
collaboration was developed (Berhe et al., 2010) that extended NIST RBAC to allow for
the definition and enforcement of security with new UML diagrams for collaborative
RBAC applicable to situations when individuals need to interact with one another in
certain ways to achieve a common goal. Third, from an information perspective, the
work presented in this dissertation has focused on the definition of a modeling and design
framework with enforcement process for information-based applications.
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The objective of this chapter is to present a secure information engineering process
for security and/or software engineers concerned with information security can follow to
provide security assurance for the information that must be both modeled and protected.
In order to achieve SIEP the underlying security model from Chapter 3 creates the logical
base in which the seven new UML diagrams of Chapter 4 are defined from, with the
policy generation process of Chapter 5 utilized to produce enforcement policies for the
new UML diagrams that target information schemas that can be readily deployed and
used for enforcement.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into three major sections. Section 6.1
covers the secure software engineering work that we published that considered
functional, collaborative and information security concerns in combination (PavlichMariscal et al., 2014) and serves as the basis of the SIEP in this chapter. Then, in Section
6.2, the SEIP is presented which utilizes the security model from Chapter 3, the UML
extensions of Chapter 4, and the policy generation process from Chapter 5 for a design
and development cycle for information security. Finally, in Section 6.3, we complete the
discussion using the prototype mobile application tailored for the healthcare domain,
from Section 2.6, which includes a high-level enforcement architecture in and its
realization in our mobile personal health assistant (PHA) application.

6.1 Secure Software Engineering
Figure 6.1 details a secure software engineering process for functional, collaborative,
and information modeling and design. From a functional perspective, (Pavlich-Mariscal
et al., 2010) extended UML to represent RBAC, DAC, and MAC (see upper portion of
Figure 6.1) via the introduction of the Role Slice Diagram, the User Diagram, the
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Delegation Diagram, and MAC extensions coupled with a Secure Subsystem Diagram
(middle right hand side of Figure 6.1). The Secure Subsystem Diagram denotes the subset
of an application‘s overall classes and methods that are restricted and require permissions
to be in place for authorized users, as we previously discussed in Section 4.2.2. The Role
Slice Diagram denotes RBAC policies, providing the role slice, a stereotyped package
that represents the permissions assigned to a role. A role slice uses method-based
permissions to allow or deny users to access specific operations, regardless of the object
to which it is applied. The Delegation Diagram can be utilized to represent all of the rules
of delegation between roles. This diagram provides the delegation slice, a stereotyped
package that contains all of the roles that a user can delegate authority to another user,
who may also be allowed to further delegate the role. The User Diagram has stereotyped
packages to denote users and stereotyped dependency relations to represent user-role
assignments. MAC extensions enhance the previous three diagrams with sensitivity levels
(e.g., confidential, secret, top secret) and their ordering relations to indicate
classifications of methods, clearances of role slices, and, implicitly, to declare access
constraints based in the relation between classifications and clearances. From an
enforcement perspective, once defined, the diagrams are utilized to generate aspectoriented enforcement code in AspectJ (bottom portion of Figure 6.1) that is able to verify,
at runtime, whether the active user has a role with permissions over the protected method
and grants or denies access accordingly. The end result is that aspects can effectively
modularize access control concerns and enhance traceability from design to code.
From a collaborative perspective, (Berhe et al., 2010) (lower middle left of Figure
6.1) has focused on the extension of RBAC to define collaboration and sharing
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capabilities across a workflow. Collaborative computing has emerged in many domains,
with users interacting with one another towards some common goal. For example, in a
health care setting, a patient‘s many providers (e.g., internist, cardiologist, physical
therapist, etc.) need to interact with one another against a common set of data (patient‘s
medical record). Unlike traditional security that defines separation of duty and mutual
exclusion to prohibit what users can do, in a collaborative setting, the key is on defining
when and how users collaborate. Thus, the work extended RBAC with a set of UML
diagrams for collaboration on duty and adaptive workflow (Berhe et al., 2010) that
interacts with our functional extensions in the top of Figure 6.1 (Pavlich-Mariscal et al.,
2010): the Extended Role Slice Diagram, the Team Slice Diagram, the Workflow Slice
Diagram, and the Obligation Slice Diagram. The Extended Role Slice Diagram defines
the roles and privileges for each user within each collaboration step. The Team Slice
Diagram defines the team members and their participation in the various collaboration
steps. The Workflow Slice Diagram defines the steps and connections among them for a
given team and specific collaboration. Lastly, the Obligation Slice Diagram defines the
required permissions and participations for a particular collaboration. In addition, we
provide the mapping of these new UML based collaboration design-time diagrams to
actual machine-readable code-based policies for runtime enforcement.
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Figure 6.1: Secure Software Engineering.
Finally, from an information perspective, (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013)
(middle-right of Figure 6.1) has emphasized the control of information created by one
application to be shared and/or exchanged with other applications. One dominant
approach for information exchange is the use of tree-structured documents, such as the
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 1998). In the case of XML, defining
XML schemas has become an integral part of the application development process to
handle exchange form database to server, from server to end user, among different
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databases, etc. In support of information-based security, we have extended UML with
seven new diagrams: the Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), the Secure
Information Diagram (SID), the Document Role Slice Diagram (DRSD), the LBAC
Secure Information Diagram (LSID), the User Diagram (UD), the Delegation Diagram
(DD), and the Authorization Diagram (AD). The DSCD models the original treestructured schema as a UML diagram. The SID identifies the subset of elements from the
original schema that require some sort of security definition. The DRSD introduces
RBAC capabilities that target elements of the original schema. The LSID extends the SID
with LBAC features such as classifications in elements. The UD models the users and
their properties of the information system. The DD represents the role-delegation
capabilities between original users and delegable users. Lastly, the AD models the
authorized schemas and instances for a respective user/role pair. These seven new
diagrams allow us to automatically generate enforcement policies with the eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) via a mapping process as presented in
Chapter 5. In turn, these enforcement policies can be readily deployed into any security
architecture that utilizes the XACML specification‘s processing model. With these seven
new UML diagrams augmented with the policy mapping process, a software engineer can
consider and produce security enforcement code that targets information content by
modeling the original schema (producing the DSCD), augmenting it with security
features with respect to the different roles and permissions (producing the SID, DRSD,
LSID, and AD), and then automatically creating an enforcement policy with the mapping
process (XACML).
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6.2 The Secure Information Engineering Process (SIEP)
The secure information engineering process (SIEP) is intended to provide both
security and/or software engineers with the ability to support RBAC, LBAC and DAC of
tree structured documents integrated with the overall design, development, deployment,
and maintenance of an information application, as shown in Figure 6.3, and consists of
five main ordered tasks that are further divided into smaller sub-tasks. To help drive the
discussion of Figure 6.3, we reintroduce all of the diagrams presented in Section 4.2
using Figure 6.2 where: diagram A is the DSCD from Figure 4.5 in Section 4.2.1;
diagram B is the UD from Figure 4.9 in Section 4.2.5; diagram C is the SID from Figure
4.6 in Section 4.2.2; diagram D is the DRSD from Figure 4.7 in Section 4.2.3; diagram E
is LSID from Figure 4.8 in Section 4.2.4; diagram F is the DD from Figure 4.10 in
Section 4.2.6; and, diagram G denotes AD from Figure 4.11 in Section 4.2.7. In the
remainder of this section, we explore SIEP in Figure 6.3 utilizing the diagrams (A to G)
and explaining the steps and actions of a security and/or software engineer1.
To begin, the first major step in SIEP labeled (1) in the top portion of Figure 6.3 is the
design of the main security component of the application. This can include functional and
collaborative application characteristics. such as those presented by (Pavlich-Mariscal et
al., 2010) and (Berhe et al., 2011), and is primarily focused in the controlling access to
the application programming interfaces (APIs) and their methods (functional) coupled
with the definition of the detailed workflows of users and their interactions towards a
particular task (collaboration) . The second major step in SIEP labeled (2) in Figure 6.3 is
the initial information security design. For this step, an engineer defines a DSCD (see
1

Note that from this point forward, the use of the term engineer refers to either a security engineer or
software engineer that is involved with designing the information security of an application.
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diagram A of Figure 6.2) for the tree-structured schema that the information application
will be utilizing labeled (2.1) in Figure 6.3, and then defines the general information
security requirements labeled (2) in Figure 6.3). These general information security
requirements can include, but are not limited to, roles of users that will be utilizing the
information presented by the system, their permissions, the user‘s clearance levels and
the information‘s sensitivity, as well as delegation and authorization aspects of the
security definitions. Step (2.2) acts as the catalyst for the refinement of initial version of
the UD (see diagram B of Figure 6.2), for the users of the information system.
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Figure 6.2: Diagrams Used through the Secure Information Engineering Process.
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The third major step labeled (3) in Figure 6.3 provides and ability to define the
different aspects of the information security design initially presented by the security
model in Chapter 3 and the UML diagram extensions in Chapter 4. This initial step can
define one or more SIDs (see diagram C of Figure 6.2) in Figure 6.3 labeled (3.1) that
will identify the respective subsets of the DSCDs that require requires some level of
security via the projection operation in Chapter 3, Definition 8. Step (3) in Figure 6.3 has
three possible options for the engineer: the left path of Figure 6.3 labeled (3.2.a) and
(3.2.b) for RBAC; the center path of Figure 6.3 labeled (3.3.a) and (3.3.b) for LBAC;
and, the right path of Figure 6.3 labeled (3.4.a) and (3.4.b) for DAC and authorization.
While all three paths as optional, the engineer must include one path as part of the SIEP
associated with Step (3) in order to proceed through the step and terminate in step (3.5)
for the UD definition in Figure 6.3, with the potential to loop back to Step (3.1) as the
design is developed in iterations over time.
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Figure 6.3: A Secure Information Engineering Process for RBAC, LBAC and DAC.
In the case of the left path in Figure 6.3 labeled (3.2.a) and (3.2.b) for RBAC
capabilities, the engineer is able to begin to define roles and permissions as realized with
the DRSD (see diagram D of Figure 6.2). The left path has feedback loops that allow the
engineer to revisit the requirements and definitions of RBAC properties in order to
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provide a robust security policy. In the case of the middle path in Figure 6.3 labeled
(3.3.a) and (3.3.b), the LBAC requirements are realized by the engineer by first defining
the sensitivity levels, which will act as the classification levels for elements and clearance
levels for users (3.3.a) and by second creating the LSID (see diagram E of Figure 6.2) for
the application‘s tree structured schema (3.3.b). The engineer can also use the LBAC
feedback loops to polish these security requirements iteratively. . In the case of the right
path in Figure 6.3 labeled (3.4.a) and (3.4.b), DAC and authorizations are defined by the
engineer, first by creating the DD (see diagram F of Figure 6.2) and second by specifying
the AD (see diagram G of Figure 6.2). Again, for this step, the engineer can loop back for
revisions and subsequent iterations. Step (3.5) of Figure 6.3 allows the engineer to refine
UD (see diagram B of Figure 6.2), where the users are tied to their RBAC roles and
LBAC clearance levels. From Step (3.5), the engineer can either proceed to Step (4) or
loop back to (3.1) in order to continue to iterate and create the design.
Once this step is complete, the engineer can then generate enforcement security
policies (Step 4) by the mapping process presented in Chapter 5. After the process of
defining roles, permissions, classification (sensitivity) levels for elements, authorizations
and delegations is complete; an opportunity to further refine the security design follows
looping back from (3.5) to (3.1) in Figure 6.3. Once the security design is properly
refined, a direct mapping of the UML diagrams to enforcement policies in XACML is
done in the major Step (5) in Figure 6.3, following the process presented in Chapter 5
with the mapping statements for RBAC, LBAC and DAC delegations and authorizations.
This fifth step marks the final part of the secure information engineering process, yielding
an information secure system via the product of enforcement policies.
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6.3 Prototype Mobile PHA Application with Enforcement
Over the past few years, we have been developing two Personal Health Assistant
(PHA) (De la Rosa Algarín, A. et al., 2013) mobile application (for Android (Burnette,
2009) and iOS (Goadrich & Rogers, 2011)) for medication management and
reconciliation that allows: a PHA-Patient app that allows patients to view and update
their personal health record stored in their Microsoft HealthVault (MSHV) (Microsoft
HealthVault.2014) account and authorize medical providers to access certain portion of
PHI; and, a PHA-Provider app where providers are able obtain the permitted information
from their respective patients that they have been authorized to view. PHA-Patient
(upper screenshots of Figure 6.4) allows users to perform a set of actions regarding their
health information. A user can view and edit their medication list, allergies, observations
of daily living (ODLs/Wellness Diary) and set security policies for read/write permissions
on their tied providers by role. Security settings can be set at a fine granular level, and
each provider gets view/update authorizations to the different information components
available in PHA. Using this information, The PHA-Provider (lower screenshots of
Figure 6.4) allows the users (health professionals or medical providers) to view and edit
the medical information of their patients as long as there are permitted to do so as
dictated by the security settings created by the user (patient). By logging in with their
personalized account, a list of patient tied to the provider is displayed. Upon selecting a
patient, the information associated with that patient can be viewed and updated.
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Figure 6.4: Main Screens of PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider Versions.
In order to demonstrate the security framework presented in this dissertation in an
actual working healthcare application, we leverage both PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider
to supply an example that transitions the new UML diagrams as given in Chapter 4 and
utilized in SIEP in a working prototype to demonstrate the process. We focus on PHAProvider which is capable of enforcing general security via the software‘s design as well
as enforcing XACML policies generated via the process of Chapter 5 and Step (5) of
Figure 6.3. The provider version of PHA is the analog of the application commissioned
by the Get Better Clinic of the scenario in Section 2.6.
The remainder of this section is organized into six subsections that explain the way
that the PHA architecture enforces security that leverages RBAC, LBAC and DAC in the
form of an enforcement XACML policy. In Section 6.3.1, we discuss the general PHA
architecture, describing the communication between the information system and mobile
189

application components. In Section 6.3.2, we describe how the general security,
consisting of log in authentication and authorization, is handled between PHA-Provider
and the RESTful services. In Section 6.3.3, we discuss the set of steps followed to
enforce RBAC capabilities defined in the security policy that results from the SIEP of as
presented in Section 6.3. In Section 6.3.4, we review the steps that are followed to
properly enforce LBAC features, including read and write capabilities with different
classifications and clearance levels. Lastly, in Section 6.3.5, we explore role delegation
and the steps followed from the perspective of the HVMLS.

6.3.1 The PHA Architecture
The personal health record Microsoft HealthVault (MSHV) acts as the data source for
PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider, and stores information in a proprietary format which to
be exported via a .NET API which can then be used to generate a CCR compliant.
MSHV, acts as the PHA‘s data source (top of Figure 6.5) where a user can save
demographic and health information, including medications, allergies, procedures,
conditions, etc. MSHV stores this information in a proprietary format that can be
exported via as XML structures that can be turned into a Continuity of Care Record
(CCR) (Kibbe et al., 2004) schema compliant XML instance. To recreate the typical
XACML enforcing architecture, our MSHV Middle-Layer Server (center of Figure 6.4)
acts as the contained solution of policy access, information, decision, and enforcement
points. The extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) policies created and
stored in the MSHV account of each respective user (acting as the policy retrieval point)
limits access to MSHV to through the MSHV Middle-Layer Server, which handles the
requests (where data is sent as JavaScript Object Notation, or JSON (Crockford, 2006))
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of PHA for both the patient and provider versions (middle and bottom of Figure 6.5). To
store the relations (mappings) between the authorized list of providers and their
respective patients (used in both PHA-Patient and PHA-Provider), our Middle-Layer
Server uses MySQL (Kofler, 2001) with a RESTful (Masse, 2011) API done in PHP
(Schlossnagle, 2004) with the Slim Framework (Lockhart, 2012). With this
implementation, the server acts as a generic, common point of access for different
applications by utilizing web services mapped to MSHV‘s API.
JSON is utilized for the communication of PHA and the Middle-Layer Server (middle
and bottom of Figure 6.5), allowing us to insure a uniform communication with any
application (not only PHA) that can be created for users. The communication between the
patient version and the HealthVault Middle-Layer Server (HVMLS) (middle and lower
left of Figure 6.5) is done with unmodified JSON objects, while the communication
between the provider version and the Middle-Layer Server (middle and lower right of
Figure 6.5) is combination of unmodified (for the initial request of patients) and filtered
(for the resulting data allowed by the policies enforced) JSON. Requests done by the
PHA-Patient are translated to and from MSHV objects (upper left of Figure 6.5), since
the patient is the owner of the data. Requests done by the PHA-Provider determine the
format of the data to be utilized (upper right of Figure 6.5). If a provider is requesting
information in the patient‘s CCR document, then data from MSHV is exported as a CCR
schema compliant XML document with policy enforcement performed, whereas any
input from the provider to MSHV is first received as a JSON payload, converted to an
XML document based on the CCR schema, enforced with policies, and once authorized,
translated to MSHV objects for write back.
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Figure 6.5: Microsoft HealthVault – Middle-Layer – PHA General Architecture.

6.3.2 General Security
The general security of PHA-Provider consists of managing the users and their log in
credentials. As a first layer of security, in order to utilize the capabilities of the
application, users must log in with their credentials stored behind the HVMLS service
(via the use of a MySQL database). In order to verify validity of a user‘s credentials,
PHA-Provider sends a request to the HVMLS service (Figure 6.6) endpoint
auth/provider/login. In this POST request, the payload sent to the server consists of the
username and password. If login is successful, a message in JSON syntax
[{“authentication”: ”SUCCESS”}]

is sent to the user. If the login is invalid, a message in
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JSON syntax

[{“authentication”: ”FAILED”}]

is sent and no access is granted. As an extra

layer of general access to the application, a user can set a PIN code that consists of 4
digits in order to expedite future login attempts once the credentials have been typed.
This PIN code is stored in a salted hash (Salted password hashing - doing it right.2014)
form in the device‘s internal storage via the implementation of application default
properties, and is not stored in the back-end server.

Figure 6.6: Sample of HVMLS RESTful Service Endpoints.
Once a successful login in PHA-Provider has occurred, the user (a provider) is
greeted by their information screen (upper right of Figure 6.7) with the option to see their
authorized patients (lower right of Figure 6.7). In these screens, the user can change their
details with respect to contact information and primary role, or see the list of patients they
have with respect to a specific role. For example, the user Elisa could have 3 different
patients under her role of Physician, but under a different role she could have none.
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Figure 6.7: Main Screens of PHA-Provider.
When the successful login has been completed, the user‘s default role is broadcasted
by the server to the application. In this process, all of the relevant XACML (Godik et al.,
2002) policies generated via the process in Chapter 5, stored in the server, are fetched
into memory to be utilized for enforcement per each request of PHA-Provider. In the
example shown in Figure 6.8, with user Elisa under the role of Physician following the
healthcare scenario of Section 2.6, the server fetches all the XACML policies that have a
higher level target with a <Subject> subtree that consist of a <user> element with Elisa‘s
details (user identifier and name). As an example, we revisit Figure 5.16 of Section 5.4
and reintroduce it as Figure 6.8 below. In this generated policy, for user Elisa (line 5, 40
and55 of Figure 6.8) and role Physician (line 13 and 44 of Figure 6.8) contains the RBAC
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capabilities (lines 10-36 of Figure 6.8), LBAC features (lines 10-36 of Figure 6.8) and
DAC delegations and authorizations (lines 37-66 of Figure 6.8).

6.3.3 RBAC Security Capabilities
In this section, we describe the way that the RBAC component of the XACML policy
is enforced when handling reading and writing requests on XML instances whose schema
has been secured. From Section 6.2, we assume that a patient has used PHA-Patient to
authorize a provider with view and update capabilities on their data stored in MSHV. This
authorization in PHA-Patient essentially supplies some of the user/role/permissions that
are to be enforced against a particular provider as authorized by a patient. Assuming that
this has occurred, the focus is on the usage of PHA-Provider in order to detail the process
and steps that are taken when a user of the PHA-Provider attempts to access data on an
authorized patient, and to serve as an explanation of the way that the CCR XML is
securely controlled in its access by a medical provider. The enforcement of security in
reading and writing requests is handled by the HVMLS (center portion of Figure 6.5).
The process of securing the CCR instance for operations that have an access mode of
‗read‘ (read and aggregate, see Defn. 34 of Section 3.4) is shown as a set of
interconnecting steps in the flowchart of Figure 6.9, and begins with a request from the
PHA-Provider. When an initial request is made, the server retrieves the list of patients
tied to the provider pertaining information. When a patient is selected, the server retrieves
two XML documents: the complete CCR instance and the XACML policy that targets the
schema with respect to that user and their current role. When these two XML documents
are retrieved, the server enforces security on the CCR instance by filtering and removing
elements from the instance as directed by the XACML policy generated from the user
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65. <Policy PolicyId="ada-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
66. <Description>Omitted due to length.</Description>
67. <Target>
68. <Subjects>
69. <user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
70. </Subjects>
71. <Resources><AnyResource/></Resources>
72. <Actions><AnyAction/></Actions>
73. </Target>
74. <Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
75. <Target>
76. <Subjects>
77. <role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>
78. </Subjects>
79. <Resources><element>
80. <elementID>el-3</elementID>
81. <elementName>Past Medical History</elementName>
82. </element></Resources>
83. <Actions><operation>
84. <operationName>insert</operationName>
85. <opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode>
86. </operation></Actions>
87. </Target>
88. <Condition>
89. <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
90. <Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only">
91. <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
92. Secret
93. </AttributeValue>
94. </Apply>
95. <AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
96. Secret
97. </AttributeValue>
98. </Apply>
99. </Condition>
100.
</Rule>
101.
<Rule RuleId="simple-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit">
102.
<Target>
103.
<Subjects>
104.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
105.
</Subjects>
106.
<Resources>
107.
<Roles><role>
108.
<roleID>2</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName>
109.
</role></Roles>
110.
</Resources>
111.
<DelegationTargets>
112.
<user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user>
113.
</DelegationTargets>
114.
</Target>
115.
</Rule>
116.
<Rule RuleId="simple-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit">
117.
<Target>
118.
<Subjects>
119.
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
120.
</Subjects>
121.
<Resources><Schemas><schema>
122.
<schemaID>4</schemaID>
123.
<schemaName>Schema 4</schemaName>
124.
</schema></Schemas>
125.
<Instances><instance>
126.
<instanceID>4,2</instaneID>
127.
<instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName>
128.
</instance></Instances></Resources>
129.
</Target>
130.
</Rule>
131.
</Policy>

Figure 6.8: XACML Enforcement Policy for User Elisa and Role Physician.
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preferences. In terms of the XACML given in Figure 6.8, this would correspond to the
read operation inside the <Rule> element. Since the PHA-Provider handles information
in JSON format at the front-end, the last step of securing the CCR instance is converting
the filtered XML into an equivalent JSON object (as shown in the JSON calls in the right
side of Figure 6.9). This equivalent JSON object is then utilized by PHA-Provider to
present the patient data to the provider who is able to view and update as necessary.
The process of securing the CCR XML for operations that have a write access mode
(insert, update and delete, see Defn. 34 of Section 3.4) is shown as a set of
interconnecting steps in the flowchart of Figure 6.10, and begins with a request from
PHA-Provider. When a provider wants to update a patient‘s record (e.g., medication), the
request is sent to the HVMLS tied to the update data as a JSON object (see right side of
Figure 6.10) that verifies the target on which the rules of the requester‘s XACML Policy
act upon, and evaluates the requester‘s role against the policy in order to determine if the
write is allowed. This was shown in Figure 6.8 with the insert <operation> in lines 19-22.
If the user requesting an update operation has a role with a permission that allows it to
occur, the CCR instance is updated with the sent data, and validated with the CCR
schema before the write-back to MSHV. If validation against the schema is successful,
then the write-back occurs, and the update performed by the provider is saved in the
patient‘s MSHV record. If the requester has a role that is not allowed to perform writing
operations on the desired element, HVMLS drops the request. While XPath and XQuery
do not allow the process to update an XML instance, our approach as given in Figure
6.10 provides a means for updating XML documents (e.g. CCR instances) that is
controlled via an XACML security policy with the assistance of HVMLS.
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to requester’s role

NO

Drop Request:
Deny access

Filter CCR XML
instance

Package as equivalent
JSON for PHA

Respond Request:
JSON

Figure 6.9: Enforcing Reading Permissions.
Initial Request:
Information Update

JSON Data
Payload

Evaluation of target and policy
writing rules

Is user/role
authorized and
allowed?

YES

Write-back to CCR XML
instance

NO
Drop Request:
Deny access

Validation of updated
CCR with schema

Validation passed?

YES

Save data in
HealthVault

NO
Drop Request:
Invalid

Respond Request:
Success

Figure 6.10: Enforcing Writing Permissions.
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6.3.4 LBAC Security Features
In this section, we explain the way that the LBAC component of the XACML policy
is enforced when handling reading and writing requests such as those in Section 6.2.2.
Following the same assumptions of Section 6.2, we assume that the engineer has set
classification levels to the different segments of the health record and a clearance level to
the user. In the case of Elisa, her clearance level is Secret as defined by the segment in
lines 34-25 of Figure 6.8. The process of securing the CCR instance with LBAC features
for operations across the two access modes (read and write, see Defn. 34 of Section 3.4)
is shown as a set of connecting steps in Figure 6.11. When the initial request is made on
behalf of PHA-Provider, the server responds by evaluating the target, policy rules, and
LBAC features used by the security architecture by using the requested element‘s
classification and the user‘s clearance. If the user‘s clearance equals or exceeds what is
required (e.g., simple-security, simple-integrity, etc. as discussed in Section 3.4), the
server continues to read the XML instance‘s segment and generate output (responding the
request with a success as shown in the right-most path of Figure 6.11) or validates the
updated CCR with the schema in a similar fashion as the RBAC write from Section 6.3.3.
If the validation is successful, in the case of operations with a write access mode, then the
data is saved in HealthVault and a response of success is provided to the application. If
the validation is not successful, then the attempt was not legal and the request is dropped
without any changes done to the saved data in HealthVault.
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Initial Request:
Information Update

JSON Data Payload
(if write)

Evaluation of target, policy rules
and LBAC features

YES
Is User authorized and
clearance proper?

NO

Read XML instance and output
or
Write-back to CCR XML
instance

IF READ

IF WRITE

Drop Request:
Deny access

Validation passed?

Validation of updated
CCR with schema

YES

Save data in
HealthVault

Respond Request:
Success

NO
Drop Request:
Invalid

Figure 6.11: Enforcing LBAC Features for Operations with Read/Write Access Modes.

6.3.5 DAC Delegations
Enforcing security for delegation follows the steps in Figure 6.12. When the request
to delegate a role is performed, the server verifies the user initiating the request (which
can be an original user or a delegable user) and the receiving user against the user objects
and their properties in the MySQL database. If the initiating user is an original user (see
Defn. 36 of Section 3.5) and the receiving user is a delegable user (see Defn. 37 of
Section 3.5), the update is recorded in the database and the role is deactivated for the
original user. If the initiating user is a delegable user, then the server verifies whether
there is a pass-on delegation authority for that role (see Defn. 38 of Section 3.5). If there
is no pass-on delegation, the request is dropped and a response of invalid is sent to the
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application. If there is pass-on delegation, then the process follows the same order as if
the initiating user is an original user.
Initial Request:
Information Update

Delegate Role and
Respond Request:
Success

Evaluate the Initiating User and the
Receiving User

Is the Initiating User
an Original user?

YES

YES

Is the receiving user a
delegable user allowed to
perform the sent role?

NO
Is the Initiating User a
Delegable User

NO

Drop Request:
Invalid

Is there Pass-On
Delegation?

NO

NO

Figure 6.12: Enforcing Security in Role Delegation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The work presented in this dissertation is summarized as a security framework for
tree-structured documents that leverages RBAC (Ferraiolo et al., 2001), LBAC (Sandhu,
1993) and DAC (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). The main objectives have been four-fold:
create an underlying security model that abstracts away from specific document formats
(e.g. XML (Bray et al., 1998), JSON (Crockford, 2006), etc.) and considers their most
basic form as tree-structured containers while supporting RBAC, LBAC and DAC
capabilities as an integrated solution; representing the underlying security model with
extensions to the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Fowler, 2004) model and
metamodel layers by leveraging previous work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and
(Berhe et al., 2010) that focused on functional and collaborative security, resulting in
seven new diagrams that graphically represent the document‘s schema, the role slices,
users, delegation and authorization properties; the introduction of an enforcement policy
generation process that leverages those new seven UML extensions to create instances of
policies ready to be deployed, exploiting XACML (Godik et al., 2002) as the language of
choice; and, a secure information engineering process that utilizes all the previously
discussed objectives to introduce a development cycle that focuses on information
security, a process that could be integrated into those presented by (Pavlich-Mariscal et
al., 2010) and (Berhe et al., 2010). The driving motivation for these four objectives has
been illustrated with the healthcare domain by presenting a realistic scenario where a
need for granular information security is necessary when multiple users, roles, clearances
and information are present.
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The remainder of this conclusion is organized as follows. Section 7.1 summarizes the
dissertation, discussing the four main objectives mentioned above in further detail. Using
this as a basis, Section 7.2 discusses the research contributions of this dissertation,
primarily in the areas of information security and access control models, UML extensions
for information security, policy generation processes, and secure information engineering.
Then, on Section 7.3, we detail the ongoing and future research directions that include,
but are not limited to, support for non-orthogonal RBAC and LBAC security
requirements, other access control models (e.g. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
(Yuan & Tong, 2005)), and compartments for a greater level of security by isolating
information with respect to roles and users.

7.1 Summary of the Dissertation
The work presented in this dissertation tackles the areas of motivation and need for
information security for those applications that require granular security assurance in
personal and/or protected information; security and access control models such as RBAC,
LBAC and DAC that are required to not only provide a basic level of security, but also
interact with each other as an integrated solution to provide a more robust security
mechanism; enforcement policy generation that is automatic and formal; and, a secure
information engineering process that combines all the previous aspects into a formal
development cycle process for security administrators and software developers to utilize.
In support of these research areas, the discussion was organized throughout six chapters.
Information modeling is focused on representing, using, and exchanging information
in large-scale applications that include healthcare collaborative and non-collaborative
scenarios that use the Health Level 7‘s clinical document architecture (Alschuler et al.,
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2002) or the continuity of care record (Kibbe et al., 2004). Chapter 1 presented the
motivation and need for information security from a broad domain perspective. In
Chapter 1 we discussed how these information systems may support a wide range of data
formats such as XML, JSON, RDF and OWL. These information applications data often
have a tree structure of index and entity nodes that allows for information to be modeled
via schemas (that define structure) which can be used as blueprints for the creation of
new documents (instances) and their validation (enforcement). In such settings, where
sensitive data is utilized by users for time-critical applications, security that is achieved
via access control is a paramount concern. These applications all present unique
challenges to the objective of providing a high-degree of protection to information. The
overarching need is the ability to provide granular access control in support of
information modeling for structured documents is based on security policies defined in an
local manner (e.g., institutions) and guidance defined and enforced at a more global scope
(e.g., legal entities and active pieces of legislation), has proven to be difficult to achieve.
Chapter 2 reviewed background concepts utilized throughout this dissertation in a
wide range of areas to support the detailed material in the remaining chapters. First,
Section 2.1 briefly reviews XML and its usage in the two dominant healthcare standards:
HL7 CDA and CCR. Next, Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present the various access control
models that are utilized in support of the work in this dissertation, respectively: RBAC to
support roles, LBAC to support classification and clearance levels, and DAC to allow
both authority and privileges to be passed from one user to another. Then, Section 2.5
presented a set of assumptions for the healthcare domain, more specifically, detailing the
way that health information technology (HIT) systems leverage private and protected
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information in interacting with patients for care and treatment. Section 2.6 presented a
scenario of information usage in the healthcare domain using the two dominant standards
(HL7 CDA and CCR) with an emphasis on the way to secure the information across
differing degrees of granularity and requirements. Using this as a basis, Section 2.7
introduced the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (Fowler, 2004) and its metamodeling
capabilities that are going to be utilized throughout this dissertation to define the new
UML diagrams to support the modeling of XML and LBAC/RBAC/DAC. Lastly, Section
2.8 introduced XACML, a language utilized to create formal and enforceable security
policies for XML documents.
The objective of Chapter 3 was to propose a security model for tree-structured
documents that includes the ability to define RBAC, LBAC and DAC for information
systems. The model presented in Chapter 3 defines the underlying concepts and
capabilities that served as a foundation for the definition of new UML diagrams to model
RBAC, LBAC, and DAC for tree-structured documents, with the intent to achieve finegrained information security via access control as part of the overall software engineering
process for information systems. The inclusion of security as part of an information
system‘s design facilitates the modeling of RBAC, LBAC, and DAC at a schema-level
that is then realizable against its instances. The key intent of our approach is for a
schema-level security solution that defines and enforces fine-grained control of an
information system‘s instances for: non-destructive (document-level) operations that
utilize instances as a source of information (e.g., read and aggregate); destructive
(document-level) operations that modify instance(s) to reflect a change (e.g., insert,
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update, delete); and, other types of operations (policy-level) that act in the instance as a
whole and not in the intrinsic data found within.
Building from the model of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presented the second major
component of our security framework for tree-structured documents involves the
realization of the security model as a series of new UML diagrams that capture the
characteristics of the security model and allow us to augment the software engineering
process of UML with an information engineering process for tree-structure documents.
Recall from Section 2.7 that UML provides a large variety of diagrams for the
visualization of different software requirements: class, component, deployment, activity,
use-case, state-machine, communication, sequence, etc. UML provide the benefit of
reducing misinterpretation and promoting simple communication of domain requirements
with its visual notation (Lange & Chaudron, 2005). However, while UML can be utilized
to define security requirements, what is lacking in UML is actual diagrams that are
dedicated to, in our interest, access control models (RBAC, LBAC, and DAC) that allow
the definition of security requirements using new security UML diagrams that seamlessly
integrate with the UML model and unified design process. This is particularly true for
domains such as healthcare where the information to be utilized is private and often
governed by legal constructs that assure its proper use and dissemination, as we have
described in Section 2.6 and illustrated with a detailed example for our security model of
Chapter 3.
With the introduction of the UML extensions of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presented the
third component of our framework that supports the automatic generation of a security
enforcement policy when given a security design for a set of schemas as captured in our
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new UML diagrams. UML has a long history for the automatic generation of code
(REFS) in varied languages; our usage of our new UML diagrams to generate a security
policy is consistent with this usage. In this chapter, we present a process for the
generation of enforcement policies that transitions a UML design containing a Document
Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), a Secure Information Diagram (SID), a Document Role
Slice Diagram (DRSD), lattice-based access control SID (LSID), a User Diagram (UD), a
Delegation Diagram (DD), and an Authorization Diagram (AD); see respectively
Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.7. To support the automatic generation of a security enforcement
policy, we define a set of mapping statements (MSs) that are utilized to define the
conditions under which the combination of the various diagrams (DSCD, SID, DRSD,
LSID, UD, DD, and AD) can be utilized to support the creation of respective policies for
RBAC, LBAC, DAC, and authorization. A mapping rule (MR) is defined to take the
security model concepts and capabilities to Chapter 3 that both underlie correspond to
different portions of the new the UML diagrams of Chapter 4 and use this combination to
yield a portion of the security policy.
Then, in Chapter 6, we discussed the software engineering process that leverages the
security model presented in Chapter 3, the UML diagram and metamodel extensions
presented in Chapter 4, and the policy mapping process presented in Chapter 5. Over the
past five years, major focus has been on extending UML with new diagrams that supports
secure software engineering for RBAC, MAC, and DAC (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2014).
First, from a functional perspective that focuses on object-oriented design, a framework
of composable security features was defined (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) that preserves
separation of security concerns from models to code through the extension of UML with
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new diagrams for RBAC, DAC, and MAC with the automatic generation of enforcement
code that allowed the security definitions to be separated (untangled) from the code.
Second, from a collaboration perspective, a framework for secure, obligated, coordinated,
and dynamic collaboration was developed (Berhe et al., 2010) that extended the NIST
RBAC to allow for the definition and enforcement of security with new UML diagrams
for collaborative RBAC applicable to situations such as medical care where physicians
from different specialties need to collaborate with one another to treat a patient in an
effective and timely manner. The last perspective is the work presented in this
dissertation, which has focused on the definition of a modeling and design framework
with enforcement process for information-based applications. To place the work of this
dissertation into an appropriate context with our prior wok, this chapter has two
objectives. First, this chapter reviews the overall integrated secure software engineering
process that spans functional, collaboration, and information concerns. Second, using this
as a basis, we then concentrate on the secure information engineering process that targets
the information security concerns for an application that are the basis of our work in this
dissertation as presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

7.2 Research Contributions
As outlined previously, our research contributions are primarily in the areas of
security and access control models that support RBAC, LBAC and DAC; UML security
extensions in the model and metamodel layers for information access control with
RBAC, LBAC and DAC; the generation of enforcement policies from UML diagrams;
and, the secure information engineering process. While the research contributions
presented in this dissertation are unique and extend the research that is being conducted
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in the major areas we tackle as discussed in the beginning of Section 7.1, we further
describe each into detail to differentiate from the relevant research of other efforts in the
same areas.
E. Security Model and Access Control Integration: The contribution of this aspect
of our work provides an underlying security model that leverages RBAC, LBAC
and DAC with the purpose of securing tree-structure documents that could be
XML, JSON, RDF, OWL, etc. The initial aspects of our work towards this
objective tackled the integration from the UML model perspective (De la Rosa
Algarín, A. & Demurjian, 2013). We note that a more formal alternative was to
build a properly defined model in which integration was a key component.
Towards that purpose, in Chapter 3 we presented the formal model that supports a
wide array of capabilities (e.g. roles, clearances, classifications, authorizations,
delegations, etc.) via the introduction of specialized operations such as the
projection and decoration operations that act on a tree-structure and result in an
altered version. As a special consideration of this model, we assert that RBAC and
LBAC are orthogonal. That is, their capabilities do not affect each other. This
allows for a security solution to support either or both at the same time.
F. Seven UML Extensions for Tree-structured Document Security: The
contribution of this aspect of our work is to represent a tree-structured schema as
an UML-like diagram which is augmented with security features that capture the
core aspects of the three main access control models: RBAC, LBAC, and DAC.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to this research contribution, describing the seven new
UML diagrams for information security that are built from extensions to the UML
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metamodel: the Document Schema Class Diagram (DSCD), which is used to
represent the tree-structured schemas a UML diagram; the Document Role Slice
Diagram (DRSD), which is used to support RBAC capabilities; the Secure
Information Diagram (SID), which is used to support a projection over elements;
the LBAC Secure Information Diagram (LSID), which is used to support LBAC
features; the User Diagram (UD), which is used to describe the users and their
attributes in an information system; the Delegation Diagram (DD), which is used
to describe the delegation capabilities from users; and, the Authorization Diagram
(AD), which is used to describe the authorizations to a user/role combination. The
introduction of these UML diagrams provides the benefit to generate enforcement
code that is formalized by the underlying security model.
G. Security Policy Generation: The contribution in this aspect of our work
leverages the UML diagrams presented in Chapter 4, which were built from the
underlying security model of Chapter 3, and provides a process for automatic
generation of enforcement policies leveraging the XACML specification. This is
achieved via mapping statements from the new UML security diagrams for
RBAC, LBAC and DAC, and the XACML Policy structure, which can be used as
part of an enforcement mechanism to assure security. Towards this contribution,
we have also introduced an automatic mapping algorithm that considers RBAC,
LBAC and DAC security components and integrates them into a single
enforcement policy for a required application.
H. Secure Information Engineering: This contribution provides a secure
information engineering process to systems information by focusing on the
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perspective of the information to be secured. This secure information engineering
process involves the global security model and policy integration by modeling the
tree-structured schemas to be secured with the respective access control security
models (Contribution A), the use of UML diagrams for information security
(Contribution B), and the generation of enforcement policies (Contribution C), all
utilized as part of a development cycle for information security that can be
integrated with the work of (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and (Berhe et al.,
2010) to provide an overall process for functional, collaborative an information
concerns (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2014). The end result of this contribution is a
formal engineering process that a software designer or developer can follow in
order to ensure security and information assurance in their respective application.
We note that, as part of our research, a strong attempt to consider real world scenarios
throughout the dissertation was made. More specifically, we introduced a healthcare
driven scenario in Section 2.6, components of which were utilized to explain concepts of
the major contributions (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). The enforcement prototype of Section
6.2 has been the result of years of development that tie directly to the healthcare domain
example, and the enforcement cases presented tie with the scenario of Section 2.6. This
important final step demonstrates the practical application of our research.

7.3 Ongoing and Future Research
While we note that the research contributions of our work presented herein are
unique, we realize that there are interesting research areas that serve as our ongoing work
and future research directions. These future research directions consider alternations to
some of our assumptions of the security model (non-orthogonal RBAC and LBAC);
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support for other access control models (e.g. ABAC); support for concepts such as
compartments; and others. We have identified the following research direction as of
potential interest.
Non-Orthogonal RBAC and LBAC: The security model of Chapter 3 (contribution
A) supports RBAC, LBAC and DAC capabilities in certain unison. The model asserts
that RBAC and LBAC capabilities are orthogonal. What this means is that clearance
levels from LBAC are assigned to the user and not the role (which is also assigned to the
user). This avoid certain complexities when enforcing security as LBAC is considered to
be the most constrained of the access control models. An interesting area of future work
is to understand how the security model would change if RBAC and LBAC were nonorthogonal. That is, the clearance level for a user could also be assigned to the role. In
those cases we ask ourselves, which clearance would take precedence? Would the
decision depend on the context of the requests which are secured? Taking a page from the
healthcare domain book: how would the delegation of roles in an emergent care situation
result when the delegable user might not have enough permission? These questions paint
an interesting picture in terms of complexity, something worthy of pursuing. Because of
this, we consider this to be an important future area of research.
Support for other access control models: The security model of Chapter 3
(contribution A) and the UML extensions of Chapter 4 (contribution B) support RBAC,
LBAC and DAC. These access control models are considered to be the major security
models, being extensively utilized in cross-domain applications. That said, there are other
models that become more and more useful as the shape of information changes. One
example is the attribute-based access control (ABAC) model. Support of models such as
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these will undoubtedly affect the way RBAC and LBAC are enforced (recall that DAC
lives at the policy level, not the document level), and the overall integration might result
in something different to what we have presented here. We ask ourselves: which access
control model would take the primary spot of enforcement? How different would it be to
support ABAC if RBAC and LBAC are orthogonal? How about when they are nonorthogonal? We hypothesize that ABAC will affect LBAC more than RBAC, but that is a
hypothesis that requires research to be proved. Therefore, we conclude that this is another
important area of research.
Support of information compartments: As a small future area of research, we wish
to support the definition of compartments for information. Compartmentalization is
extensively used in the defense community as a means to protect data by the method of
isolation (no one knows the complete secret). Towards this purpose, should compartments
be defined and assigned to roles or users? Should they be assigned to the user/role
combination? How would clearance levels and classification of elements in the
compartment interplay?
Collaboration workflows in information security: The work presented in this
dissertation finds as inspiration the work presented by (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010) and
(Berhe et al., 2010). One area of research we seek to pursue is the collaboration
workflows and obligations presented by (Berhe et al., 2010) when applied to information
security. Unlike software security, which focuses on methods, information security can be
very granular or very coarse. The potential of collaboration across a document opens the
idea of granular and coarse collaboration, as well as those other topics tackled by (Berhe
et al., 2010) in his research.
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Automatic creation of DSCD: Chapter 4 presented the UML diagrams for
information security. One of those diagrams, the Document Schema Class Diagram
(DSCD), was built as part of a UML profile that created a relation between tree-structures
and UML components. We want to explore if that process can be automated to the point
where there are no errors. At the same time, we want to explore if a metamodel
extensions to convert tree-structures into UML is more scalable. Potential schemas can
have thousands of nodes, and automatic conversion to UML might not scale when using a
simple profile approach.
Generating enforcement policies in different languages: Another area of interest
relates to the generation of enforcement policies. Chapter 5 presented an approach to
create an XACML instance policy from the UML diagrams, but we seek to explore the
possibilities to generate SQL code, aspect oriented code (Pavlich-Mariscal et al., 2010)
for information security from the diagrams presented in Chapter 5. As technology
advances and standards are dropped in favor of others, we cannot assume that XACML
will be the one option for the future. Another aspect with regards to generating
enforcement policies is the performance and efficiency of the algorithm. We assert that
there must exist other methodologies to generate a policy, other algorithms that are more
efficient. Our ongoing work includes the development of these more efficient algorithms.
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Appendix A
- Carol Smith’s Health Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture (HL7 CDA) Instance
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!-- To use the impl_cdar2.xls stylesheet, remove the comment delimiters from the
stylesheet call below. -->
<!-- ?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="IMPL_CDAR2.xsl"? -->
<ClinicalDocument xmlns="urn:hl7-org:v3" xmlns:mif="urn:hl7-org:v3/mif"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:hl7-org:v3 CDA.xsd">
<typeId root="2.16.840.1.113883.1.3" extension="POCD_HD000040"/>
<id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.4" extension="c266"/>
<code code="11488-4" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.1" codeSystemName="LOINC"
displayName="Consultation note"/>
<effectiveTime value="20051014224411-0500"/>
<confidentialityCode code="N" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.25"/>
<recordTarget>
<patientRole>
<id extension="12345" root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/>
<patient>
<name>
<given>Carol</given>
<family>Smith</family>
<suffix></suffix>
</name>
<administrativeGenderCode code="F" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.1"/>
<birthTime value="19320924"/>
</patient>
<providerOrganization>
<id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/>
</providerOrganization>
</patientRole>
</recordTarget>
<author>
<time value="2000040714"/>
<assignedAuthor>
<id extension="KP00017" root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/>
<assignedPerson>
<name>
<given>Brock</given>
<family>Ketchum</family>
<suffix>MD</suffix>
</name>
</assignedPerson>
<representedOrganization>
<id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/>
</representedOrganization>
</assignedAuthor>
</author>
<custodian>
<assignedCustodian>
<representedCustodianOrganization>
<id root="2.16.840.1.113883.19.5"/>
</representedCustodianOrganization>
</assignedCustodian>
</custodian>
<documentationOf>
<serviceEvent classCode="PCPR">
<code code="xxx" codeSystem="xxx" codeSystemName="xxx" displayName="xxx"/>
<effectiveTime>
<low value="19600127"/>
<high value="20050329"/>
</effectiveTime>
<performer typeCode="PRF">
<functionCode code="PCP" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.5.88"/>
<time>
<low value="1998"/>
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63. <high value="2005"/>
64. </time>
65. <assignedEntity>
66. <id extension="1" root="1.3.6.4.1.4.1.2835.1"/>
67. <code code="59058001"
68. codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.96"
69. codeSystemName="SNOMED CT"
70. displayName="General Physician"/>
71. <addr>
72. <streetAddressLine>1 Fake Road</streetAddressLine>
73. <city>Fake City</city>
74. <state>KK</state>
75. <postalCode>123456</postalCode>
76. <country>USA</country>
77. </addr>
78. <telecom value="tel:(999)555-1212" use="WP"/>
79. <assignedPerson>
80. <name>
81. <prefix>Dr.</prefix>
82. <given>Elisa</given>
83. <family>Mathison</family>
84. <suffix></suffix>
85. </name>
86. </assignedPerson>
87. </assignedEntity>
88. </performer>
89. </serviceEvent>
90. </documentationOf>
91. <component>
92. <structuredBody>
93. <component>
94. <section>
95. <code code="10164-2" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.1"
96. codeSystemName="LOINC"/>
97. <title>History of Present Illness</title>
98. <text>
99. <content styleCode="Bold">Carol Smith</content>
100.
is a 31 year old female referred for further asthma management.
101.
Onset of asthma in her <content revised="delete">twenties</content>
102.
<content revised="insert">teens</content>.
103.
She was hospitalized twice last year, and already twice this year.
104.
She has not been able to be weaned off steroids for the past several
105.
months.
106.
</text>
107.
</section>
108.
</component>
109.
</structuredBody>
110.
</component>
111. </ClinicalDocument>
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- Carol Smith’s Continuity of Care Record (CCR) Instance
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="stylesheet/ccr.xsl"?>
<ContinuityOfCareRecord xmlns="urn:astm-org:CCR">
<CCRDocumentObjectID>Ab13c1971-221a-9724-5d09-9981709c4204</CCRDocumentObjectID>
<Language>
<Text>English</Text>
</Language>
<Version>V1.0</Version>
<DateTime>
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateTime>
<Patient>
<ActorID>A1234</ActorID>
</Patient>
<From>
<ActorLink>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
<ActorRole>
<Text>author</Text>
</ActorRole>
</ActorLink>
</From>
<To>
<ActorLink>
<ActorID>A1234</ActorID>
<ActorRole>
<Text>patient</Text>
</ActorRole>
</ActorLink>
</To>
<Purpose>
<Description>
<Text>Summary of patient information</Text>
</Description>
</Purpose>
<Body>
<Problems>
<Problem>
<CCRDataObjectID>PROB1</CCRDataObjectID>
<DateTime>
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateTime>
<IDs>
<ID></ID>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</IDs>
<Type>
<Text>Problem</Text>
</Type>
<Description>
<Text></Text>
<Code>
<Value></Value>
<CodingSystem>ICD9-CM</CodingSystem>
</Code>
</Description>
<Status>
<Text>Active</Text>
</Status>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID></ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
<CommentID></CommentID>
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70. <Episodes>
71. <Number/>
72. <Episode>
73. <CCRDataObjectID>EP1</CCRDataObjectID>
74. <Source>
75. <Actor>
76. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
77. </Actor>
78. </Source>
79. </Episode>
80. <Source>
81. <Actor>
82. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
83. </Actor>
84. </Source>
85. </Episodes>
86. <HealthStatus>
87. <DateTime>
88. <ExactDateTime/>
89. </DateTime>
90. <Description>
91. <Text></Text>
92. </Description>
93. <Source>
94. <Actor>
95. <ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
96. </Actor>
97. </Source>
98. </HealthStatus>
99. </Problem>
100.
</Problems>
101.
<Alerts>
102.
<Alert>
103.
<CCRDataObjectID>A789bbc2b-e7ee-51d4-f153-05734e7bd44a</CCRDataObjectID>
104.
<DateTime>
105.
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
106.
</DateTime>
107.
<IDs>
108.
<ID></ID>
109.
<Source>
110.
<Actor>
111.
<ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
112.
</Actor>
113.
</Source>
114.
</IDs>
115.
<Type>
116.
<Text>-</Text>
117.
</Type>
118.
<Description>
119.
<Text></Text>
120.
<Code>
121.
<Value></Value>
122.
</Code>
123.
</Description>
124.
<Source>
125.
<Actor>
126.
<ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
127.
</Actor>
128.
</Source>
129.
<Agent>
130.
<EnvironmentalAgents>
131.
<EnvironmentalAgent>
132.
<CCRDataObjectID>Afed996aa-e012-02f4-8dee-d24177756afa</CCRDataObjectID>
133.
<DateTime>
134.
<ExactDateTime></ExactDateTime>
135.
</DateTime>
136.
<Description>
137.
<Text></Text>
138.
<Code>
139.
<Value/>
140.
</Code>
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141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

</Description>
<Status>
<Text></Text>
</Status>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</EnvironmentalAgent>
</EnvironmentalAgents>
</Agent>
<Reaction>
<Description>
<Text></Text>
</Description>
<Status>
<Text>None</Text>
</Status>
</Reaction>
</Alert>
</Alerts>
<Medications>
<Medication>
<CCRDataObjectID>Af9ec1fa4-73ea-3c94-e96a-96c76398222d</CCRDataObjectID>
<DateTime>
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateTime>
<Type>
<Text>Medication</Text>
</Type>
<Status>
<Text></Text>
</Status>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
<Product>
<ProductName>
<Text></Text>
<Code>
<Value></Value>
<CodingSystem>RxNorm</CodingSystem>
</Code>
</ProductName>
<Strength>
<Value></Value>
<Units>
<Unit></Unit>
</Units>
</Strength>
<Form>
<Text></Text>
</Form>
</Product>
<Quantity>
<Value></Value>
<Units>
<Unit></Unit>
</Units>
</Quantity>
<Directions>
<Direction>
<Description>
<Text></Text>
</Description>
<Route>
<Text>Tablet</Text>
</Route>

229

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

<Site>
<Text>Oral</Text>
</Site>
</Direction>
</Directions>
<PatientInstructions>
<Instruction>
<Text></Text>
</Instruction>
</PatientInstructions>
<Refills>
<Refill>
<Number></Number>
</Refill>
</Refills>
</Medication>
</Medications>
<Immunizations>
<Immunization>
<CCRDataObjectID>Afde47991-11b3-f054-35e4-b0d0ffbeb5a3</CCRDataObjectID>
<DateTime>
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateTime>
<Type>
<Text>Immunization</Text>
</Type>
<Status>
<Text>ACTIVE</Text>
</Status>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>A208148c8-f5a7-f044-7d31-a3ea95e003a5</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
<Product>
<ProductName>
<Text></Text>
</ProductName>
</Product>
<Directions>
<Direction>
<Description>
<Text></Text>
<Code>
<Value>None</Value>
</Code>
</Description>
</Direction>
</Directions>
</Immunization>
</Immunizations>
<Results>
<Result>
<CCRDataObjectID>A75d67a94-9ffa-86c4-1979-b57ce822803b</CCRDataObjectID>
<DateTime>
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateTime>
<IDs>
<ID/>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</IDs>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID></ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
<Test>
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<CCRDataObjectID>A135053dc-a2a1-7124-f510-0a4b6e5ef90a</CCRDataObjectID>
<DateTime>
<ExactDateTime>2014-02-13T15:38:06Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateTime>
<Type>
<Text>Observation</Text>
</Type>
<Description>
<Text></Text>
<Code>
<Value>Value</Value>
</Code>
</Description>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID></ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
<TestResult>
<Value></Value>
<Code>
<Value>Value</Value>
</Code>
<Description>
<Text></Text>
</Description>
</TestResult>
<NormalResult>
<Normal>
<Value></Value>
<Units>
<Unit>Test Unit</Unit>
</Units>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID></ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</Normal>
</NormalResult>
<Flag>
<Text></Text>
</Flag>
</Test>
</Result>
</Results>
</Body>
<Actors>
<Actor>
<ActorObjectID>A1234</ActorObjectID>
<Person>
<Name>
<CurrentName>
<Given>CAROL</Given>
<Family>SMITH</Family>
<Suffix/>
</CurrentName>
</Name>
<DateOfBirth>
<ExactDateTime>1983-04-13T00:00:00Z</ExactDateTime>
</DateOfBirth>
<Gender>
<Text>Female</Text>
<Code>
<Value/>
</Code>
</Gender>
</Person>
<IDs>
<Type>
<Text>Patient ID</Text>
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</Type>
<ID>16</ID>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>A6e0d85e5-b441-22d4-4971-7a05aeb2df8b</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</IDs>
<Address>
<Type>
<Text>H</Text>
</Type>
<Line1>3814 FirstAve.</Line1>
<City>Madison</City>
<State>ND</State>
<PostalCode>39816</PostalCode>
</Address>
<Telephone>
<Value>(77) 382-5756</Value>
</Telephone>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</Actor>
<Actor>
<ActorObjectID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorObjectID>
<InformationSystem>
<Name>Clinic A</Name>
<Type>Facility</Type>
</InformationSystem>
<IDs>
<Type>
<Text></Text>
</Type>
<ID></ID>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</IDs>
<Address>
<Type>
<Text>WP</Text>
</Type>
<Line1></Line1>
<City>Farmington</City>
<State>CT </State>
<PostalCode>06030</PostalCode>
</Address>
<Telephone>
<Value>860-679-2000</Value>
</Telephone>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</Actor>
<Actor>
<ActorObjectID>Aa04b1505-4651-d224-a1a2-d4d8ea6b4b23</ActorObjectID>
<InformationSystem>
<Name>OEMR</Name>
<Type>OpenEMR</Type>
<Version>4.x</Version>
</InformationSystem>
<IDs>
<Type>
<Text>Certification #</Text>
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</Type>
<ID>EHRX-OEMRXXXXXX-2011</ID>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</IDs>
<Address>
<Type>
<Text>WP</Text>
</Type>
<Line1>2365 Springs Rd. NE</Line1>
<City>Hickory</City>
<State>NC </State>
<PostalCode>28601</PostalCode>
</Address>
<Telephone>
<Value>000-000-0000</Value>
</Telephone>
<Source>
<Actor>
<ActorID>Af81882df-f905-e064-61f4-1e06daf00609</ActorID>
</Actor>
</Source>
</Actor>
</Actors>
</ContinuityOfCareRecord>
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- Carol Smith’s Continuity of Care Record (CCR) Instance in XML Tree Editor

234

Appendix B
XACML Policy and Rule Combination Algorithms in Pseudo-code
- Permit-Overrides:
1. Decision permitOverridesCombiningAlgorithm(Decision[] decisions)
2. {
3.
Boolean atLeastOneErrorD = false;
4.
Boolean atLeastOneErrorP = false;
5.
Boolean atLeastOneErrorDP = false;
6.
Boolean atLeastOneDeny = false;
7.
8.
for( i=0 ; i < lengthOf(decisions) ; i++ )
9.
{
10.
Decision decision = decisions[i];
11.
if (decision == Deny
12.
{
13.
atLeastOneDeny = true;
14.
continue;
15.
}
16.
if (decision == Permit)
17.
{
18.
return Permit;
19.
}
20.
if (decision == NotApplicable)
21.
{
22.
continue;
23.
}
24.
if (decision == Indeterminate{D})
25.
{
26.
atLeastOneErrorD = true;
27.
continue;
28.
}
29.
if (decision == Indeterminate{P})
30.
{
31.
atLeastOneErrorP = true;
32.
continue;
33.
}
34.
if (decision == Indeterminate{DP})
35.
{
36.
atLeastOneErrorDP = true;
37.
continue;
38.
}
39.
if (atLeastOneErrorDP)
40.
{
41.
return Indeterminate{DP};
42.
}
43.
if (atLeastOneErrorP && (atLeastOneErrorD || atLeastOneDeny))
44.
{
45.
return Indeterminate{DP};
46.
}
47.
if (atLeastOneErrorP)
48.
{
49.
return Indeterminate{P};
50.
}
51.
if (atLeastOneDeny)
52.
{
53.
return Deny;
54.
}
55.
if (atLeastOneErrorD)
56.
{
57.
return Indeterminate{D};
58.
}
59.
}
60.
return NotApplicable;
61. }
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-

Deny-Overrides:

1. Decision denyOverridesCombiningAlgorithm(Decision[] decisions)
2. {
3.
Boolean atLeastOneErrorD = false;
4.
Boolean atLeastOneErrorP = false;
5.
Boolean atLeastOneErrorDP = false;
6.
Boolean atLeastOnePermit = false;
7.
8.
for( i=0 ; i < lengthOf(decisions) ; i++ )
9.
{
10.
Decision decision = decisions[i];
11.
if (decision == Deny)
12.
{
13.
return Deny;
14.
}
15.
if (decision == Permit)
16.
{
17.
atLeastOnePermit = true;
18.
continue;
19.
}
20.
if (decision == NotApplicable)
21.
{
22.
continue;
23.
}
24.
if (decision == Indeterminate{D})
25.
{
26.
atLeastOneErrorD = true;
27.
continue;
28.
}
29.
if (decision == Indeterminate{P})
30.
{
31.
atLeastOneErrorP = true;
32.
continue;
33.
}
34.
if (decision == Indeterminate{DP})
35.
{
36.
atLeastOneErrorDP = true;
37.
continue;
38.
}
39.
if (atLeastOneErrorDP)
40.
{
41.
return Indeterminate{DP};
42.
}
43.
if (atLeastOneErrorD && (atLeastOneErrorP || atLeastOnePermit))
44.
{
45.
return Indeterminate{DP};
46.
}
47.
if (atLeastOneErrorD)
48.
{
49.
return Indeterminate{D};
50.
}
51.
if (atLeastOnePermit)
52.
{
53.
return Permit;
54.
}
55.
if (atLeastOneErrorP)
56.
{
57.
return Indeterminate{P};
58.
}
59.
}
60.
return NotApplicable;
61. }
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- First-applicable:
1. Decision firstApplicableEffectCombiningAlgorithm(RuleOrPolicies[] rulesOrPolicies)
2. {
3.
for( i = 0 ; i < lengthOf(rulesOrPolicies) ; i++ )
4.
{
5.
Decision decision = evaluate(rulesOrPolicies[i]);
6.
if (decision == Deny)
7.
{
8.
return Deny;
9.
}
10.
if (decision == Permit)
11.
{
12.
return Permit;
13.
}
14.
if (decision == NotApplicable)
15.
{
16.
continue;
17.
}
18.
if (decision == Indeterminate)
19.
{
20.
return Indeterminate;
21.
}
22.
}
23.
return NotApplicable;
24. }

- Only-one-applicable:
1. Decision onlyOneApplicableCombiningAlogrithm(RuleOrPolicies[] rulesOrPolicies)
2. {
3.
Boolen atLeastOne = false;
4.
RuleOrPolicy selectedRuleOrPolicy = null;
5.
ApplicableResult appResult;
6.
for ( i = 0; i < lengthOf(rulesOrPolicies) ; i++ )
7.
{
8.
appResult = isApplicable(rulesOrPolicies[I]);
9.
if ( appResult == Indeterminate )
10.
{
11.
return Indeterminate;
12.
}
13.
if( appResult == Applicable )
14.
{
15.
if ( atLeastOne )
16.
{
17.
return Indeterminate;
18.
}
19.
else
20.
{
21.
atLeastOne = true;
22.
selectedRuleOrPolicy = rulesOrPolicies[i];
23.
}
24.
}
25.
if ( appResult == NotApplicable )
26.
{
27.
continue;
28.
}
29.
}
30.
if ( atLeastOne )
31.
{
32.
return evaluate(selectedRuleOrPolicy);
33.
}
34.
}
35.
else
36.
{
37.
return NotApplicable;
38.
}
39. }
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Appendix C
- User Elisa with Role Physician’s XACML Policy Instance for the Healthcare
Scenario
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

<Policy PolicyId="ada-policy" RuleCombiningAlgId="deny-overrides">
<Description>Omitted due to length.</Description>
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources><AnyResource/></Resources>
<Actions><AnyAction/></Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="simple-RBAC+LBAC-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<role><roleID>5</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName></role>
</Subjects>
<Resources><element>
<elementID>el-3</elementID>
<elementName>Past Medical History</elementName>
</element></Resources>
<Actions><operation>
<operationName>insert</operationName>
<opAccessMode>write</opAccessMode>
</operation></Actions>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-greater-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="…:integer-one-and-only">
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
Secret
</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="…#integer">
Secret
</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="simple-delegation-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Roles><role>
<roleID>2</roleID><roleName>Physician</roleName>
</role></Roles>
</Resources>
<DelegationTargets>
<user><id>30</id><name>Samantha</name></user>
</DelegationTargets>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="simple-authorization-rule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<user><id>6</id><name>Elisa</name></user>
</Subjects>
<Resources><Schemas><schema>
<schemaID>4</schemaID>
<schemaName>Schema 4</schemaName>
</schema></Schemas>
<Instances><instance>
<instanceID>4,2</instaneID>
<instanceName>Carol Smith Health Record</instanceName>
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64.
</instance></Instances></Resources>
65. </Target>
66. </Rule>
67. </Policy>
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